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Abstract 
While there is widespread disagreement as to just what addiction is, the 
two most popular models are the moral model (i.e., addiction is a moral failing) 
and the disease model (i.e., addiction is a kind of disease). Both of these 
models have serious problems, for theory and for practice. Furthermore, since 
competing models for addiction have different implications for treatment, law, 
social norms, and so on, it is important to find a single model for addiction that 
works in every arena. 
We need an account of addiction that avoids the problems of the disease 
models and the moral models. That is, it must be able to accurately describe 
the lived human experience of addiction, account for all the major features of 
addiction, and accord them appropriate weight. Furthermore, it should point 
us toward treatment options that will work, social policies that make sense, and 
laws that are fair. Finally, the new model should reflect the complex nature of 
responsibility, and should avoid overly simplistic attributions of blame. 
This dissertation presents an alternative definition of addiction, one that 
is fundamentally different from both disease models and moral models of 
addiction. Rather than describing addiction as a moral, psychological, or 
physiological defect of the addict, this proposed model, herein called the 
existential model, describes addiction as a compulsive, inauthentic habit: a 
compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse. Compulsion and habit 
are frequently included in descriptions of addiction, but authenticity and 
addiction is relatively new. The existential model rests on the idea that 
vii 
addiction is an inauthentic response to the experience of angst, or existential 
anxiety. These inauthentic responses to angst may begin as compulsions and 
become entrenched as habits, or begin as habits and become compulsive. In 
either case, these are addictions. 
There are implications of this model for theory and practice, as well as 
indications for further research. Perhaps the most interesting implication of 
this model concerns the importance of strengthening individuals' authenticity, 
both to protect against addiction and to recover from addiction. 
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Chapter One: Philosophy and Addiction 
Toward dipsomania there are many attitudes. To the theologian it 
is a sin; to the moralist a vice; to the lawyer a frequent cause of 
major crime; but to the student of medical science it is a disease. 1 
When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.2 
Like many topics in applied ethics, addiction is on our minds and in the 
news. Everyone has opinions about it, and nearly everyone knows someone 
who has struggled with it. The fact that some people regularly engage in 
drinking, gambling, or some other activity to the point that they endanger other, 
ostensibly more important desiderata like health, relationships and work 
arouses our scholarly interest, our desire to help, and our morbid fascination. 
Addicts can be infuriating to work with professionally and heartbreaking to 
know personally. Addiction can present difficult legal problems (should addicts 
be sentenced differently than non-addicts when an offense involves their 
addiction?) treatment issues (can we help addicts who don't want to be helped?} 
and public policy dilemmas (how should doctors manage severe chronic pain 
when there is a risk that patients will sell their prescription narcotics to - or 
have them stolen by -- neighborhood addicts?) Because of the nature and 
significance of the debate, addiction has inspired a literature that is mind­
bogglingly large, diverse, and unwieldy. Clearly, this is a topic worthy of serious 
critical attention. 
1 Yandell Henderson, Liquor: A Plea/or Dilution. (New York: Doubleday, Doran and 
Company, Inc. 1935) p. 124. Dipsomania is a Victorian term for alcoholism. 
2 Anonymous 
The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term "addiction" first 
appears as a term used in Roman law: ad means to or toward and dicere means 
to say. To be addicted to something or someone was to be attached to it by 
decree. While initially this was a legal term, e.g. a tenant was "addicted" or 
bound to a piece of property by a lease, later it came to mean that one was 
bound to a practice, habit, or vice. Around this time, the word acquired the 
familiar negative connotation. Today, addiction is used colloquially to describe 
anything from just really liking something to the excessive, compulsive 
consumption of something harmful. More precise usage is harder to pin _down: 
competing models of addiction spar with one another and vie for universal 
acceptance. 
The most popular conception of addiction in the United States today is 
that it is a disease, but that description is by no means the only one. 
Furthermore, many who do endorse this disease model do so uncritically and 
without a sense of the implications of this belief. The idea that addicts behave 
in the bewildering way that they do is because they are in the grip of a disease 
that compels them to do so is attractive to some; however, many others find 
such descriptions unsatisfying. Many people are invested in the answer: how 
addiction is defined affects the livelihoods and life's work of many professionals 
and paraprofessionals in a variety of fields. It alters the narratives and self­
conceptions of countless individuals who have personally struggled with 
addiction. A great deal hangs on whether addiction is a disease, a moral failing, 
a habit, or something else entirely-- and on who says so. 
2 
Like many issues, an historical perspective on addiction illuminates the 
Present situation. Addiction today impacts many professional dimensions, 
among them medicine, law, public health, social work, and education. 
Additionally, there are treatment programs administered by paraprofessionals, 
and those "run" by nonprofessionals like 12-step programs of recovery. It has 
become an odd amalgam of all of these and more: an incompletely medicalized 
phenomenon, the cures for which range from cutting-edge brain imagery and 
neuropharmacology to listening to what the old-timers at AA tell you to do when 
you get thirsty. The history of thought on addiction is fascinating in itself; what 
is especially of interest here is that surprisingly little progress has been made in 
the last 150 years or so. 3 The history of addiction - discussed here through 
the lens of the history of alcoholism - revisits the same concepts over and over 
again, dressing them up in the vernacular of the day. The principle notions of 
the nature of addiction reflect opposing beliefs about whether or not addicts can 
control themselves or whether they are in the grip of a disease that has them in 
its control. 
A History of Alcoholism in America 
The history of addiction vacillates between moral models of addiction and 
disease models of addiction. While other ways of understanding addiction 
surface occasionally, these two basic models are the ones that continue to 
3 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1998) p. 5. 
3 
appear, in revised forms, over the last 200 years of debate on the subject. Both 
of these have advantages, but each has serious difficulties that make them 
unsuitable to explain, define, and ameliorate addiction. 
The history of alcoholism is, perhaps, the most instructive of the 
addictions.. This was the first addiction to receive the attention of the medical 
establishment in this country, beginning with Benjamin Rush in the eighteenth 
century. Moreover, since alcohol use was legally and socially problematized 
here before drug use was, it makes a good case study for the larger issue. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, is that this history of alcoholism is also a 
clear example of the way in which the two major models of addiction fall in and 
out of favor for explaining the phenomenon of excessive drinking. What it 
means to have a drinking problem has changed substantially throughout the 
history of the United States. Each change has reflected the norms, values, and 
events of the era in which it occurred. Despite the many re-evaluations, there 
still is no satisfactory answer to questions such as, What does it mean to be an 
alcoholic? and, What ought we do about alcoholism? 
An historical overview of American beliefs about alcoholism 
contextualizes the current debate. Beliefs about why some people drink 
destructively inform social policies about drunkenness and alcoholism. During 
the times that we believed heavy drinking was a vice, we considered it 
appropriate to punish drunks. During the times we believed that heavy 
drinking was a disease, we considered it appropriate to hospitalize and 
rehabilitate alcoholics. The changes in ideology on this topic have reflected and 
been reflected in trends in other areas of inquiry: medicine, politics, sociology, 
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and public health, to name a few. Contemporary thinkers are not free from 
such influences. Late twentieth century and early twenty-first century ideas 
about alcoholism reflect a growing concern for pluralism and personal 
responsibility, as well as a fascination with science and a faith-like belief in the 
power and goodness of technology. The tension between these two 
commitments produces an interesting tension in addiction: our concern for 
personal responsibility points us away from considering addiction a disease, 
while our investment in science points us toward it. As I shall argue, the time 
has come to reject the moral-disease binary and consider the topic afresh. 
The Early Years 
During the colonial period, most people drank what would be considered 
alarming amounts of alcoholic beverages by today's standards. Alcohol was 
considered necessary for good health, partly because it was bound to be safer to 
drink than the often-polluted drinking water that was available in the colonies 
and in England. A good drink was, additionally, thought to have the effects of 
being warming, soothing and nourishing; important qualities for foodstuffs to 
have in a time when physical and psychological discomforts were numerous. 
Indeed, abstinence from drinking was thought to lead to crankiness and ill 
health: one life insurance company increased its premiums by 10% for 
abstainers, who they thought to be "thin and watery" because of their refusal to 
drink!4 Colonists loved their beer and wine, and brewed versions of it from 
whatever was available - including such unlikely-sounding ingredients as corn 
4 John Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition. (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons. 1973) p. 26. 
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silk and goldenrod5- if the more standard ingredients were scarce. Hard 
liquor was also considered a necessity, for nutritional, medicinal and festive 
purposes.6 The sense of alcohol as such being somehow illicit, which is familiar 
to contemporary Americans, seems to have been absent in the colonial period. 
The effort and inventiveness that early Americans devoted to procuring 
alcoholic drinks suggests that drinking was an important feature of daily life. 
It is important to note, however, that despite the colonists' high rate of 
consumption -- nearly double the per capita rate as today7 -- drunkenness was 
not tolerated. Drunkenness, especially if accompanied by disruptive behavior, 
was a crime, punishable by fine, imprisonment, or whipping. Habitual 
offenders could be forced to wear a mark of shame, after which they could be 
refused the right to buy liquor.8 During this period, people were far too 
interdependent for them to allow members of society to threaten social order 
with the effects of drinking too much. The loss of the ability to work, increase in 
crime, lack of interest in the family that can result from alcoholism was an even 
greater threat to social order then than it is now; the vast increase in material 
wealth and the diffusion of economic responsibility, along with social programs, 
law enforcement and the like have afforded some protection for families of 
alcoholics. Before the social, economic, and industrial changes of the 
nineteenth century, however, each individual's contribution to the social and 
economic stability of community was vital. 
5 Jack Mendelson and Nancy Mello, Alcohol: Use and Abuse in America. (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company. 1985) p. 9. 
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
7 Mark Edward Lender and James Kirby Martin, Drinking in America. (New York: The 
Free Press. 1982) p. 14. 
8 Mendelson and Mello 11. 
6 
Colonial preacher Increase Mather issued this statement about the 
difference between drink and drunkenness in 1673: 
Drink is in itself a good creature of God, and to be received with 
thankfulness, but the abuse of drink is from Satan. The wine is 
from God, but the Drunkard is from the Devil. 9 
Mather's pronouncement, together with the sanctions against drunkenness, 
suggests that the colonial perspective on alcoholism was that drunkenness is a 
voluntary and sinful act. The notion that excessive drinking could be a disease 
was not available to most people yet, and those few habitual excessive drinkers 
attracted the attention of the law enforcement rather than physicians. 10 There 
seems to be no discussion at this time of drunkenness as bad for the individual. 
The focus on the social harms of excessive drinking is what one might expect 
from a time when the focus was -- of necessity -- on the social group as a whole. 
The operative model of alcoholism at this time was the moral model: 
drunkenness was a vice, a moral failing that was best handled by legal and 
social sanctions. 
Rush was Right? 
The work of Dr. Benjamin rush marks a new perspective on immoderate 
drinking. His classic work An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits on the 
Human Mind and Body (first published in 1784 and revised several times) is 
regarded by many to be predictive of twentieth century disease theories about 
alcoholism. Rush, concerned with the newly formed republic, warned against 
9 Increase Mather, Wo to Drunkards. reprinted in Lender and Martin 1. 
10 Richard Howland and Joe Howland, "200 Years of Drinking in the United States: 
Evolution of the Disease Concept." in John Ewing and Beatrice Rouse, eds. Drinking: 
Alcolwl in American Society: Issues and Current Research (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978) 
p. 43. 
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excessive imbibing lest the very social and political project that is the United 
States of America be lost. Like many of the early republicans, Rush believed 
that one of the major reasons that independence from England was necessary 
was that the comparatively luxurious standard of living in that country was 
producing low moral standards there. England's decline in values was being 
imported to America along with her goods, and was thought to have a bad effect 
on society here. The Revolution was expected to bring about the return of the 
virtues and values that make true liberty possible: sobriety, thrift, self-respect, 
duty, hard work, and so on.11 
Rush, in keeping with these values, advocated complete abstinence from 
hard liquor. Drinking such spirits, he believed, inevitably leads to physical and 
moral ill health for individuals, which would additionally lead to a breakdown of 
the social order. Unlike those in the nineteenth century temperance movement 
and the twentieth century's Alcoholics Anonymous, he had no quarrel with 
beer, wine, and like potions as long as they were taken in moderation. He did, 
in fact, believe that drinking these milder alcoholic beverages contributed to 
good health and happiness. 12 Stronger liquor, however, he believed to be 
destructive in itself, as well as the cause of other destructive habits. This 
seeming contradiction is likely the result of his belief that beer, wine and such 
"contain so little spirit, and that so intimately combined with other matters, 
that they can seldom be drunken in sufficient quantities to produce intoxication 
11 Lender and Martin p. 35. 
12 Benjamin Rush An Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and 
Mind, eighth edition, 1814. reprinted in Yandell Henderson pp. 200-202. 
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• • •  " 13 ( ! )  "Ardent spirits" were thought to be different from milder drinks in 
which the amount of alcohol was too small and diffused to have much effect. 
In a later edition of his book, which he distributed widely, he published a 
"Moral and Physical Thermometer" which detailed the consequences of drinking 
temperate and intemperate beverages. 14 Drinking water, milk, beer, wine, cider, 
and porter would yield health and prosperity, he thought, while drinking 
punch, rum, gin, brandy and the like would lead to progressively bad ends, 
from debt to prison to the gallows. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of 
Rush's work is that he described inebriety as progressive. He believed that 
drinkers of hard liquor were in control of their drinking only at the beginning of 
the disease process, and that in later stages found themselves at the mercy of 
the alcohol. At such an unfortunate stage, he proposed, victims of strong drink 
should be confined to asylums until they had regained control of themselves. 
He proposed such a facility be built in his native Philadelphia and be called 
Sober House. The idea that alcoholism begins with what appears to be normal 
drinking and inevitably progresses to increasingly bad consequences (unless 
something happens to halt this progression) is echoed in AA literature and by 
advocates of the theory that addiction is a brain disease in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Like AA, he maintains that excessive drinking is a 
disease - and a progressive disease, at that - but characterizes its cause and 
cure in terms that are non-medical. 
13 Ibid. , p.  189.  Why Rush believed this is a matter for speculation. It is possible that 
the percentage of alcohol in beer and wine was smaller at that time than it is today, or 
that other differences in diet and exercise caused the alcohol to be metabolized 
differently. Another possibility is that standards for intoxication were different at that 
time. 
14 Ibid. , p. 43. 
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Rush is widely credited with being the first to popularize the idea that 
drunkenness is a disease, though the idea dates back to third-century Rome. 1 5 
Rush's disease concept of alcoholism included moral and spiritual dimensions: 
he lists a variety of physical ,  behavioral and moral symptoms that characterize 
this affliction. Interestingly, his proposals to destroy the desire for ardent 
spirits include shame, religion, associating ardent spirits with unpleasantness, 
and "exciting a counter passion in the mind," 16 while his proposed cures for a 
bout of drunkenness include inducing sweating or vomiting, bleeding, cold 
baths and whipping. 17  For Rush, it seems, a bout of drunkenness is primarily 
physical, while the chronic effects of ardent spirits is primarily moral. 
Moreover, the destructiveness of ardent spirits is inherent in the substance 
itself, he thought; those who indulged in them without getting fully intoxicated 
would meet the same fate as their more inebriate brethren. 18 This last point is 
especially interesting and possibly paradoxical, as the "disease" that he 
discusses is "drunkenness" - not alcoholism, inebriety, chronic drinking, or 
any such term. 19 
It is clear that Rush did not have an exquisitely-crafted notion of what 
the disease-making features of excessive drinking were. However, Rush's 
perspective on alcoholism is interesting for several reasons. For one, he was 
concerned with the medical aspects of drinking, while previous perspectives 
15 Archer Tongue, "5,000 Years of Drinking. " in John Ewing and Beatrice Rouse, eds. 
Drinking: Alcohol in American Society: Issues and Current Research. (Chicago: Nelson­
Hall, 1978) p. 37. 
16 Rush pp. 2 16-22 1 .  
17 Ibid. pp. 2 13-2 16.  I t  should be noted that the purpose of whipping was not for moral 
punishment, but rather "acts by exciting a revulsion of the blood from the brain, to the 
external parts of the body."  
18 Ibid . ,  p .  194. 
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were primarily concerned with the social consequences of drunkenness. While 
the cures he recommended for the disease were primarily non-medical, Rush 
was among the first in the tradition of physicians attending to drinking as a 
disease. Secondly, his characterization of drunkenness as not wholly voluntary 
reflects the Enlightenment interest in the freedom vs. determinism debate. Of 
related interest is his concern for the addicted as people whose dignity and 
liberty were at stake, not merely as disrupters of the public. His concern for 
agents whose freedom was being restricted by an attachment to alcohol also 
reflects Enlightenment concerns for the individual and society. Lastly, his 
focus on the progressive nature of alcoholism rather than simply the problem of 
episodic drunkenness was a new and often-cited insight in later studies of 
alcoholism. 
Temperance and its Competitors 
As he well knew, the ideal of temperance was not popular during 
Benjamin Rush's lifetime. Americans, especially working-class Americans, were 
not interested in giving up their liquor and did not take his warnings seriously. 
During the nineteenth century, however, public concern about the problem of 
drunkenness grew. One reason for this was that there was a steady increase in 
group binge-type drinking of hard liquor from 1800 - 1830.20 Prior to that time, 
most Americans drank in two different ways: most took small amounts of spirits 
regularly throughout the day (beginning with breakfast) and also drank very 
large amounts at celebrations or other social gatherings, perhaps 10 or 1 5  
times a year. In the early nineteenth century, the former pattern dropped away, 
19 Ibid. , p. 189. 
1 1  
while the latter increased. 2 1  Further, the correlation of heavy drinking with 
crime and low productivity continued to cause concern. The incompetence of 
inebriated physicians and clergy was increasingly the focus of attention, and 
alcohol was now being implicated as a contributor to ill health. 22 
Additionally, as the role and nature of women came into debate, so the 
belief in the essential delicacy of women and the sanctity of the home was 
embraced. Temperance was considered a virtue for women because it was 
thought to befit their nature, and for men because they were thought to owe a 
debt of protection to their wives and families. The devastating effects of 
drunkenness on the family were notorious: 
'Mid pleasures and palaces, though we may roam, 
Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home. 
But there is the father lies drunk on the floor, 
The table is empty, the wolfs at the door, 
And mother sobs loud in her broken-back'd chair, 
Her garment in tatters, her soul in despair.23 
Alcohol, now associated with poverty and violence, was thought to threaten the 
Victorian values of home as a separate sphere from the outside world. Finally, 
as German and Irish immigrants began to arrive, nativist sentiment often fueled 
the temperance movement. The newcomers' enjoyment of beer and liquor was 
criticized as potentially harmful to the health of the public, as was virtually 
every other habit that set them apart from those who had settled in this country 
earlier.24 
20 W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic (New York: Oxford Press , 1979) p. 150. 
21 Ibid. , pp. 149- 1 5 1 .  
22 Mendelson and Mello p .  25.  
23 Nobil Adkisson, Ruined by Drink c. 1860. in Lender and Martin p. 4 1 .  
24 Andrew Sinclair, Era of Excess (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p .  20. 
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Early nineteenth century temperance groups subscribed to a version of 
Benjamin Rush's theory of drunkenness: a disease brought on by drinking hard 
liquor. From 1830 on, however, many groups increasingly maintained that 
heavy drinking was not a disease, but a moral failing.25 This moral concept of 
addiction gained popularity as it did partly because the temperance movement 
was allied with church groups; the two joined together to fight moral problems 
of several kinds and gathered both support and dogma from one another. 
Furthermore, these church-temperance groups tended to come from rural 
communities, where news of urban problems was especially alien and 
frightening.26 The temperance movement of the nineteenth century called for a 
return to traditional values; underlying this was the belief that drinking alcohol 
was a departure from such values. (The idea that frequent binge drinking, as 
opposed to drinking as such, was the problem seems to have been lost.) The 
appropriate response to drunkenness, they thought, was to make all drinking 
illegal and to punish those who continued to drink or distribute this substance 
that was wrecking homes and communities. 
The belief that excessive drinking was a voluntary and sinful habit 
remained widespread in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, especially among 
Protestant reformers; many reformers thought of drunkards as criminals and 
sinners. It was not considered fruitful to help the drunkards themselves,  as 
they did not need "help" so much as others needed for them to be made to 
behave responsibly. While most temperance workers concerned themselves 
with closing the saloons that served the offending substances, some focused on 
2s Howland and Howland p. 46-4 7 .  
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punishing inebriates themselves.27 In either case, temperance advocates 
believed that the solutions to the problems of alcohol were primarily moral, 
religious and political. 
A new, more zealous version of the moral model of alcoholism was 
emerging. Fueled in part by the devastation of the Civil War and its aftermath, 
temperance promised order, respectability and prosperity. The idea that social 
and economic ills were the fault of sinful individuals was appealing to many, 
and that cutting off all access to drink would solve the problems (a difficult to 
accomplish, but uncomplicated solution) seemed a good solution. The moral 
model espoused by the early temperance movement showed concern for the 
drinker as an individual, reflecting Benjamin Rush's Enlightenment concern for 
personal liberty as well as for social order. In contrast, the later temperance 
movement (perhaps reflecting frustration at the steady rise in alcohol-related 
problems and desperation following the war) was driven by a more simplistic 
''moralizing" moral model. 28 
The disease concept of alcoholism remained alive, however, especially 
among medical professionals. Physicians adopted the disease model in 
increasing numbers as the century progressed. One of these, Dr. Edward 
Turner, opened the State Inebriate Asylum in Binghamton, New York in 1864.29 
Patients at the Asylum were subject to severe treatment, as the physicians 
associated with the project believed inebriety to be a variety of lunacy. Patients 
26 Sinclair p. 18 .  
2 7  Howland and Howland p .  46. 
28 Mello and Mendelson p. 43. This perspective resurfaces in the 1980s under the 
influence of Ronald and Nancy Reagan. Their answer to the nation's drug problem was 
that everyone Just Say No to Drugs, while they cut funding to rehab centers. 
29 Valverde p. 70. 
14  
in physician-run lunatic asylums at the time were subjected to such 
"treatments" as cold water baths, emetics, and physical restraints.30 Other 
medical treatments for alcoholism were gentler; these include the 
administration of gold chloride, various dietary cures, and "rest cures" in 
halcyon country retreats.3 1 These cures, of course, were only available to 
inebriates of sufficient status and money. Interestingly, some variations of the 
disease models prevalent at the time differed according to the class of persons 
to which they applied. Lower-class male inebriates were supposed to have 
generally weak constitutions, such that they could not resist even mild 
impulses to drink. Upper-class male inebriates were thought to have strong, 
virile constitutions, but even stronger desires. Women generally were thought 
to have been "seduced" into inebriety, perhaps by unwittingly ingesting the 
heavily alcoholic patent medicines that were popular at the time. 
It should be noted that the medicalization of alcoholism - regardless of 
the variety of medical treatment - was generally opposed by temperance 
activists. Early temperance workers thought such a project minimized personal 
dignity and responsibility,32 while many later temperance workers thought 
individual drunkards beneath their concem.33 However, some physicians 
advocated temperance, based on their conception of inebriety as a disease. 
Massachusetts physician Samuel Woodward called for a legal prohibition of 
intoxicating beverages, arguing that they produced insanity, diseased liver, 
delirium tremens, and inebriety. In his view, "a man is no more to blame for 
30 Robert Whitaker, Mad in America (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2002) 
31 Valverde p. 72. 
32 Ibid. p. 7 1. 
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intemperance" than for any of the other, more established diseases that 
drinking alcohol produces. 34 His description is not devoid of moral undertones, 
though, as he acknowledges that the first dosages of alcohol are voluntary. 
Further, some physicians of this era had a hybrid (moral-medical) notion of 
inebriety, based in part on the idea that the will is located in the brain. This 
perspective inspired cures that were medical in nature (e.g. administration of 
opiates and other drugs) but for the purpose of "strengthening the will ."35 The 
combination of moral and physical cures is wise, and surfaces again in the 
twentieth century. Overall, however, medical practitioners of the day conceived 
of alcoholism as more a physical problem than a moral one. 
Some groups of nonprofessionals, too, believed that alcoholism was not 
simply a matter of moral laxity. These groups had a different perspective from 
physicians or temperance advocates. Some were groups of reformed drinkers 
who met regularly to encourage one another to stay sober. One of these, the 
Washingtonians, was much like the twentieth century organization Alcoholics 
Anonymous. Interestingly, they derived their name from George Washington, 
who liberated the Republic from the oppression of England; they saw their role 
as, similarly, to liberate themselves and other drunkards from the oppression of 
alcohol.36 Thus, they are to be counted among those who believed that their 
freedom would be increased by voluntarily placing limits on their behavior -
and by fortifying their decision with the support of community. I shall return to 
the importance of community in preventing and healing addictions in chapter 
33 Howland and Howland p. 46. 
34 Mello and Mendelson p. 39 . 
35 Valverde p. 62. 
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four. Asking a supportive community for help has a profound effect on the 
individual and on the community. The power of such a measure should not be 
overlooked. Washingtonians believed that the most important problems with 
excessive drinking were the effects it had on drinkers themselves, and that 
social disruption associated with such excess was a secondary problem. Their 
mission was to help those who wanted to stop drinking to make positive, 
sobering changes in their lifestyles. They took an aggressively non-political 
stand on temperance; whether or not alcohol should be illegal for all, they were 
convinced that alcohol was bad for them. 37 
Though the movement was short-lived,38 it is worthy of note because of 
their rejection of the two dominant models of alcoholism and their individual, 
pragmatic approach to the problem of excessive drinking. They rejected the 
moral model of alcoholism on the grounds that such sanctimonious preaching 
did far more harm than good. They rejected the disease model on the grounds 
that excessive drinkers needed fellowship and support, not medical treatment. 
Their ideology and method were down to earth: they were concerned about the 
damage that excessive drinking was causing, and realized that the social 
pressure of tiling a sobriety oath while in the company of others enabled them 
to abstain. This improved their lives,  and they found that others followed suit 
when they heard reformed drinkers tell their tales of woe and redemption and 
offered the suffering an opportunity to sign a sobriety oath. "The heart's blood 
of Washingtonianism was the confessional narrative. Instead of cerebral 
36 Mello and Mendelson p. 37. 
37 John W. Crowley, Drunkard's Progress: Narratives of Addiction, Despair and Recovery 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) p. 15. 
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clergymen talking down to the inebriated unwashed, drunkards gave hope and 
inspiration to one another through the unadorned telling of their own life 
stories. "39 Although some of their most famous speakers joined the temperance 
movement after the Washingtonian movement disintegrated, the Washingtonian 
movement itself was characterized by doing what works -- without the 
dogmatism that characterized the other perspectives. 
A final perspective worthy of note is the Salvation Army. Combining the 
religious component of the temperance movement and the pragmatism of the 
Washingtonians, the Salvation Army had an ideology and method all its own. 
While they did provide treatment in the form of rest homes, which resembles 
some of the medical model treatments, members were otherwise suspicious of 
the medical profession's efforts with regard to drunkards. In particular, they 
objected to the coercive measures that medicine used on poor inebriates.40 
While the Salvation Army's perspective might be described as a moral model of 
alcoholism, such a moral model would differ significantly from the later 
temperance's moral model. Rather, the Salvation Army saw the moral failing 
that pertained to alcoholism as belonging to society, for allowing the social and 
economic conditions in which alcoholism would flourish. They believed that 
drunkards needed to reform themselves, to be sure, but their environment 
needed to change in order to support their transformation. 
The Salvation Army differed from all of the previously-mentioned 
perspectives in that they went out of their way to make sobriety attractive and 
38 Sinclair p. 37. 
39 Crowley p. 7. 
40 Valverde p. 90.  
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fun.4 1  Their interest in converting saloons into bars in which soft drinks could 
be served in familiar settings reveals their belief that drunks were not bad or 
diseased people, but rather people who were in need of more opportunities and 
alternatives than they had. Rather than viewing alcoholism as physical 
disorder or a sign of moral weakness, they considered it a normal part of life for 
the urban poor; a normal response to a bad situation. And while it is true that 
most of the Salvation Army's attention was devoted to the poor and the troubles 
they faced, they also recognized that every class of society had its challenges. 
They operated inebriety homes for paying patients as well as the for the 
lumpenproletariat.42 Perhaps Mariana Valverde put it best when she describes 
the Salvation Army as believing that " [d]rinking heavily is simply an aspect of 
life in a fallen world. "43 A related idea is that addiction results from the 
existential anxiety people of any class experience cannot be accommodated by 
either the disease model or the moral model. I shall expand on this possibility 
in chapter four. 
The nineteenth century, then, was a time of competing perspectives on 
the problem of drinking in general and alcoholism in particular. The moral 
model that influenced the temperance movement was perhaps the most widely 
accepted, but a variety of disease models were developing and gaining influence. 
While these two movements were locked in an acknowledged battle for the 
popular view of alcoholism, a third approach ( composed of the Washingtonians 
and the Salvation Army) largely put ideology aside and concentrated on their 
41 Sinclair p. 8 1. 
42 Valverde p. 9 1. 
43 Valverde p. 89. 
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own unique and pragmatic solutions. All in all , popular sentiment was moving 
toward abstinence from alcohol. 
Prohibition and Beyond 
By January of 1920, when Prohibition officially took effect, many 
Americans were already living "dry" for one reason or another.44 For one , many 
places had local ordinances that prohibited the sale or the consumption of 
alcohol by that time . Secondly, wartime rationing policies and wartime anti­
German sentiment (many brewers and distillers were German) had encouraged 
many people to drink less or to stop drinking altogether, and they had 
maintained their sober habits . Further, the temperance movement had 
succeeded in convincing many people that they should voluntarily give up 
drinking. The moral concept of alcoholism was at its zenith during the early 
years of Prohibition. Attempts at reforming problem drinkers reached a low 
point; many felt that Prohibition itself was the only solution needed. 45 Even if 
inebriates continued to drink, they reasoned, they would often be in jail, and 
they would die out soon enough. Moderate drinkers would stop drinking 
because of the force of the law and would never become inebriates. The 
children of this generation would grow up in health and happiness without ever 
knowing about the perils of "demon rum." 
And it actually seemed to work that way for a short while . While 
Prohibition-era statistics on alcohol consumption are variable and unreliable, 
most do show a significant decrease in drinking in the United States during the 
44 Mello and Mendelson p. 82 . 
4s Howland and Howland p. 49 . 
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early Prohibition years.46 Before long, however, satisfaction with the eighteenth 
amendment waned. This change of heart occurred for two main reasons. To 
being with, it simply did not deliver as promised. While alcohol was more 
difficult to come by than it was before Prohibition, it was by no means 
impossible to get. Those who wanted to drink still drank. Though data on the 
subject is too scanty to say for sure, the available data along with anecdotal 
evidence suggest that only light and moderate drinking among the native 
working class stopped, and that heavy drinking was largely unimpeded. 47 And, 
contrary to "dry" predictions, young people were among those who defied the 
law, dashing the hope that drinking would end with their parents' generation.48 
Further, since liquor making was unregulated, much of what was produced was 
of poor quality and questionable safety. Some drinkers suffered violent 
sickness and blindness as a result of imbibing bad liquor; many others died. 49 
Additionally, the temperance movement had promised a drop in crime and 
poverty once alcohol was illegal. However, since both crime and poverty were 
associated with binge drinking, the crime rate did not drop (in fact, organized 
crime gained a great deal of power at this time)50 and some people began to 
suspect that poverty caused alcoholism rather than the other way around. 
"Moreover, the campaign for the prohibition of liquor seemed to many to 
be the thin end of the wedge, the prelude to a reign of terror by moral zealots 
46 Rorabaugh p. 232. 
47 Mello and Mendelson p. 89, Howland and Howland p. 52. 
48 Sinclair p. 239, Kobler p. 252. 
49 For example, according to Mello and Mendelson (p. 87) almost twelve thousand 
people died of alcohol poisoning in 1927. 
so Sinclair pp. 22 1 -233. 
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over the habits of America. "51  A second reason for Americans' disenchantment 
with Prohibition was an increasing concern for personal liberty. Americans 
don't like to be told what to do, especially if it is supposed to be for their own 
good. This concern for freedom contributed to a revival of the disease concept 
of alcoholism in a revised form: the suggestion that alcohol was a problem only 
for people who had a sensitivity to it gained popularity. The temperance belief 
that drinking meant trouble always and for everyone began to wane. Similarly, 
the new wave of pluralistic values contributed to the idea, developed later by 
E.M. Jellinek and Alcoholics Anonymous, that individuals ought to decide for 
themselves whether drinking is a problem or not. The underlying moral model 
of alcoholism began to fade as Prohibition went on and people began to talk 
about the repeal of that amendment. "Freedom of choice" was a rallying cry 
that contributed considerably to victory for the "wets" . 52 
Perhaps it seems paradoxical, then, to observe that Prohibition advocates 
saw their cause as an attempt to increase freedom by limiting freedom. 53 It is 
easy to see how Prohibition can be regarded as simply freedom-limiting and 
coercive - an attempt on the part of the conservative, nativist middle-class to 
impose its values on everyone else . However, a more interesting perspective 
concerns the humanitarian side of Prohibition. "Drys" had taken aim at other 
social problems as well as drinking: "Poverty, tuberculosis, unsanitary living 
conditions, prostitution and inhuman working conditions were related targets 
s1 Sinclair p. 18 1 .  
52 Howland and Howland p. 53. 
53 Deets Pickett, Alcohol and the New Age (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 
1926) p. 1 19.  
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for Prohibitionists. "54 These and similar problems effectively limited freedom for 
many Americans; in many cases Dad's freedom to drink meant that Mom was 
not free to feed and clothe the kids - or to protect them from violence. Take 
away one possibility - the possibility of drinking - and so many other 
possibilities will bloom. Or so they hoped. As the World League Against 
Alcoholism argued in 1928: 
Freedom in a community does not imply unlimited opportunity to 
indulge questionable desires. Rather, the limitation of such 
desires opens the way to growth and increases the capacity for 
freedom as well as opportunities for its expression. Freedom from 
the narcotic force of alcohol permits one to function more, to enjoy 
more, to be more than he othetwise could be. 55 
The prospect was so attractive that some families who drank and did not believe 
it caused any problem for them supported Prohibition, on the grounds that it 
would be better for society if alcohol were not available for anyone. 
It didn't work, but the failure of The Great Experiment is instructive. 
Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that simple solutions to complicated 
problems are bound to fail. Restricting legal access to alcohol without 
addressing the problems that contributed to the excess that inspired 
Prohibition is a mistake that we cannot afford to make again. Further, 
attempts to impose universal values in a pluralistic society are bound to fail. 
Americans are a complex bunch; then as now, we drink for different reasons 
and in different ways. Additionally, measures that give the government too 
much power are bound to fail. One spectacular feature of Prohibition, for 
example, is the simpleminded zealotry and outright corruption that often 
s4 Mello and Mendelson p. 82. 
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characterized its enforcement. 56 However, Prohibition has a positive 
contribution to make to addiction studies as well. The notion that liberty can 
be enhanced by artful limitation of liberty is worth revisiting. The trick is to do 
so in such a way that individual liberty is truly enhanced, rather than simply 
enhancing individuals' liberty to make the choices that we want them to make. 
A crucial feature of such artful limiting of freedom is its initiation by the 
individual whose liberty it is supposed to enhance . 
The thirteen years of Prohibition were witness to a fascinating 
transformation of thinking about drinking in America. Prohibition sailed in on 
the hope that Vice would be abolished . This simple solution was supported by 
a fairly simple moral model of drinkers and drinking. By the end of Prohibition 
in 1933, however, the moral concept of alcoholism -- and the belief that total 
abstinence for all was the solution to alcohol-related problems - had reached a 
low. The time was ripe for a new theory or theories of alcoholism. 
AA. E.M . Jellinek, and the "Classic" Disease Model57 
The "classic disease model, 11 popularized by Alcoholics Anonymous, refers 
to the disease model of addiction in its most classic form, rather than the 
classic model for diseases in general . We might take the classic model for 
diseases in general to mean, in the tradition of Boorse, Szasz, and others, to 
55 Hany S. Warner, Prohibition, An Adventure in Freedom.{Westerville, Ohio: The 
American Issue Press, 1928) p. 1 42 .  my emphasis. 
56 Kobler pp. 27 1 -300. 
57 Here I retain Herbert Fingarette's designation of the AA/ Jellinek version of the 
disease model of alcoholism as the "classic" model. This disease model differs from 
Benjamin Rush's disease model and the "new" neurological disease model, among 
others. 
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mean a departure from physical health: a strictly physiological concept.ss This 
"classic" disease model is actually in conflict with AA's "classic" disease model of 
alcoholism, as AA holds that alcoholism is a disorder that has physical, 
emotional, and spiritual dimensions. The idea that alcoholism is a disease, but 
a disease that is not simply biological, is not new with AA. Nineteenth century 
diseases like neurasthenia and hysteria, for example, had physical, emotional 
and behavioral features. Indeed, we are now developing an awareness of the 
multidimensional nature of many, perhaps most, such phenomena. If such 
diverse experiences as grief, compulsive overeating, and diabetes have both 
emotional and physical features, we need to decide how to decide which of these 
are diseases and which are not. I shall address the merits and dangers of 
describing addiction as a disease in chapter three. 
Alcoholics Anonymous, founded in 1935 by two reformed alcoholics, 
bears a striking resemblance to the self-help groups of the nineteenth century, 
the Washingtonians in particular. Membership is voluntary, the group takes no 
position on outside affairs, and the only goal of meetings is to support members' 
sobriety. One important difference is that, while the Washingtonians rejected 
the disease model, AA subscribes to a disease model of alcoholism. Unlike 
Benjamin Rush's disease model, however, AA holds that alcohol - even hard 
liquor - is a problem only for those who have a sensitivity to it and need not be 
avoided by those who have no such sensitivity. Those who do have this 
sensitivity must scrupulously avoid all forms of alcohol - members are even 
ss Christopher Boorse "On the Distinction Between Illness and Disease" reprinted in 
Meaning and Medicine: A Reading in the Philosophy of Health Care ed. James 
Lindemann Nelson and Hilde Lindemann Nelson (New York: Routledge, 1 999) p. 16. 
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warned not to use Listerine mouthwash or pure vanilla extract, as these contain 
alcohol. Like Rush, AA. maintains that alcoholism is a progressive disease that, 
untreated, will lead to social and legal problems, physical debility, and 
ultimately, death. It is characterized by an inability to drink moderately - or a 
compulsion to drink immoderately - which Rush attributed to the effects of 
hard liquor on everyone, and which AA. attributes to the effect of any amount of 
alcohol on those people who have the disease. 59 
AA takes no position on the etiology of this disease (there is some 
allusion to the possibility that alcoholism is an allergy to alcohol, but this is 
undeveloped. )60 It does, however, claim that it is a disease in and of itself and 
not a symptom of another disease or social condition. That is, those who claim 
that they drink because they are depressed, anxious, impoverished, or in an 
unhappy relationship are just fooling themselves; they drink because they have 
the disease of alcoholism and for no other reason. This rather circular way of 
defining alcoholism leads to the AA adage that treatment for another problem or 
disorder will not take care of the alcoholic's drinking. Further, since alcoholism 
is a disease, AA members consider moral models of alcoholism inaccurate and 
unjust. Shaming or punishing alcoholics for drinking, they argue, is ineffective 
and has the additional harmful consequence of making them unwilling to come 
forward to get them help they need. 
Another major tenet of AA is that alcoholism is, thus far, incurable. 
We are like men who have lost their legs; they never grow new 
ones. Neither does there appear to be any kind of treatment 
59 Alcoholics Anonymous. Alcoholics Anonymous, Third Edition (New York: Alcoholics 
Anonymous World Services, 1976) p. xxvi. 
60 Ibid. 
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which will make alcoholics of our kind like other men. We have 
tried every imaginable remedy. In some instances there has been 
a brief recovery, followed by a still worse relapse. Physicians who 
are familiar with alcoholism agree there is no such thing as 
making a normal drinker out of an alcoholic. Science may one day 
accomplish this, but it hasn't done so yet.6 1 
It is noteworthy that M looks to science to make a normal drinker out of an 
alcoholic. M's approach - as opposed to some of its dogma - is non-medical. 
In fact, many physicians refer their patients to AA, but physicians themselves 
are "cast in a supporting role" by M.62 The fellowship of other recovering 
alcoholics, not "doctor's orders" , is what M offers its members. 
Members do believe that they can achieve remission of their symptoms 
by abstaining from all alcoholic beverages and following the AA program. Being 
"in recovery" is not the same as being cured, as symptoms are thought to recur 
if the alcoholic begins drinking or stops attending meetings. Further, once 
individuals develop the disease of alcoholism, they cannot recover simply by 
abstaining from drink; the spiritual and emotional symptoms of the disease 
must be addressed by attending AA meetings and by practicing the "Twelve 
Steps" of AA. The first three steps involve acknowledging that one is 
"powerless" over alcohol and expressing willingness to tum one's will and one's 
life over to a "higher power" (which, while requiring a spiritual commitment, 
does not require a belief in God or participation in a religion.) The last nine 
steps involve examining one's life for defects and "becoming willing" to be free of 
6 1  Ibid. p. 30. my emphasis. 
62 Valverde p. 1 23.  
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these.63 Those who merely abstain from drinking are not really in recovery, but 
rather are "dry drunks" who will continue to experience many of the symptoms 
of the disease of alcoholism. 
Many of the features of AA's version of the disease concept of alcoholism 
were corroborated in the research of biostatistician E.M. Jellinek. In The 
Disease Concept of Alcoholism, 64 he reinforced the AA model of alcoholism as a 
chronic, progressive disorder caused by a physiological sensitivity to alcohol 
that results in a compulsion to drink to intoxication. On this model, which he 
calls gamma alcoholism (there were four other varieties as well, each 
distinguished by a different Greek letter), the disease progresses in stages. In 
the beginning, gamma alcoholics have a certain degree of control over actual 
drinking behavior, though perhaps less than most people. In later stages, 
gamma alcoholics are "compelled" to drink to intoxication, even if they intend to 
drink moderately or even to abstain. Gamma alcoholism differs from the others 
in that only the gamma variety constitutes a disease. " .. . [A]nomalous forms of 
the ingestion of narcotics and alcohol, such as drinking with loss of control and 
physical dependence, are caused by physiopathological processes and 
constitute diseases."65 The other forms of alcoholism that he identifies - and 
he suggests that there are many other forms as well - do not have the loss of 
control or the tolerance/withdrawal symptoms found with gamma alcoholics. 
It should be noted that the addict's own experience of drinking had not 
hitherto been a criterion for alcoholism. More objective criteria, such as the 
63 Alcoholics Anonymous. Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions (New York: Alcoholics 
Anonymous World Services, 1952) . 
64 E.M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. (New Haven: Hillhouse Press, 1960) . 
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amount individuals consumed, the responsibilities they neglected or the 
damages they caused were the common yardsticks by which problem drinking 
was assessed before Jellinek's disease model became popular. The important 
feature - loss of control - is a feature of the alcoholic's experience, not 
behavior or physiology (although it may be supported by these. )  This feature is 
celebrated in AA: "We do not like to pronounce any individual an alcoholic, but 
you can quickly diagnose yourself. Step over to the nearest barroom and try 
some controlled drinking . . .  "66 People who genuinely want to control their 
drinking and find that they cannot fit the profile of gamma alcoholics. 
For Jellinek, this loss of control has physiological causes. He offers some 
ideas about what these might be, and suggests that these and other ideas 
should be researched thoroughly.67 That is, for Jellinek, only the individual can 
say whether she is a gamma alcoholic or not now, but perhaps someday 
scientists will be able to look in her brain and see if she actually experiences 
loss of control. In contrast, for AA loss of control is related to the contention 
that alcoholics are powerless over alcohol (step one) , and that turning one's will 
and life over to a Higher Power is the way to recovery (step three) . Jellinek 
views loss of control scientifically; AA views it spiritually. 
While Jellinek himself acknowledged the limitations of his work, arguing 
that much more research is needed to establish some of the claims he suggests, 
many of those who quoted him did not. AA took many of the findings that fit 
most closely with its own doctrine out of context and presented them in an 
65 Jellinek p. 40. 
66 Alcoholics Anonymous, p. 3 1. 
67 Jellinek pp. 145- 149. 
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unqualified manner. Further, some suspect that one effect of Jellinek's work 
was that many who read about his research as AA presented it began to 
interpret their own experiences , uncritically, through the example of his model. 
The disease model wore the mantle of science, and was more credible than their 
own, initially murky, self-descriptions. In the same way that earlier generations 
of alcoholics thought of themselves as degenerate because that is what they 
were told about themselves, alcoholics who knew about AA and Jellinek's model 
thought of themselves as having a disease that compelled them to drink. 
. . .  his work had the practical effect of reinforcing the AA colloquial 
axiom, "one drink, one drunk" and of encouraging people to speak 
of alcoholics as driven to drink by an "overwhelming desire," an 
"irresistible craving," or a "compulsion. "68 
Additionally, AA itself has been criticized for its emphasis on spiritual 
matters, for its focus on powerlessness (which has been said to be 
disempowering to women and racial minorities, who are already powerless over 
many factors in their lives) and its insistence that its members abstain from 
drinking entirely. It has been compared to a religious cult that indoctrinates 
members into believing they are sick and need to depend on the organization for 
their health. In AA's defense, it must be noted that it does not present itself as 
the only method for treatment for alcoholism,69 that it is not a moneymaking 
organization, and that it does not attempt to isolate members from the larger 
community. Additionally, AA suggests that acknowledging powerlessness over 
alcohol empowers, rather than disempowers, all of its members; knowing what 
68 Herbert Fingarette, Heavy Drinking. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 988.) 
p. 20. 
69 That is, the official AA dogma is that other paths to sobriety may work for some 
people. Some AA members, in contrast, are judgmental and condescending towards 
anyone who has the temerity to try it any other way. 
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one is powerless to change allows one to concentrate on what one is able to 
change. In the case of alcoholics, AA believes that they are unable to drink 
normally but are able to abstain from drinking. In any case, if membership is a 
measure of success of a program, then AA must surely be counted as a success; 
as of this writing in the fall of 2002, AA has more than 100,000 groups and over 
two million individual members worldwide.70 
Moreover, there are features of the "classic" disease model of AA and 
E.M.  Jellinek that ought to be retained. While disease models are probably not 
the best way to conceive of addictions, as I discuss in chapters two and three, 
the experience of compulsion that addicts of all sorts report - and evince - is 
an essential feature of addiction. Jellinek characterizes this as "loss of control" 
which is a metaphysical statement, and has been roundly criticized (see below.)  
However, the feeling ofloss of control refers to the experience of addicts, not the 
actual abilities. Furthermore, Jellinek's description of different kinds of 
problem drinkers is important, although this feature of his work seems to have 
been duly noted and then cast aside in the treatment world. In a passage that 
now seems ironic, he notes: 
By adhering strictly to our American ideas about "alcoholism" and 
"alcoholics" (created by Alcoholics Anonymous in their own image} 
and restricting the term to those ideas, we have been continuing 
to overlook many other problems of alcohol which need urgent 
attention. 71  
His observation foreshadows the contemporary, emerging belief that treatment 
ought to be matched to the individual rather than strict adherence to a single, 
standard method and measure of success. Finally, parts of AA's method, 
70 www.recoveryresources.org. 9-4-02 . 
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especially those which use community for support and strategies to extinguish 
old habits and build new ones, are sound, coherent, and likely its most effective 
components. The role of habit in the development and deconstruction of 
addic_tion is particularly useful, as I will argue in chapter four. 
Challenges to the Classic Disease Model 
Two basic challenges to the classic disease model have emerged: the first 
is the movement to reject disease models of alcoholism outright, while the other 
is a new, refined disease model. Some version of the disease model is the most 
popular understanding of alcoholism today; however, it is not without its 
critics. Since these challenges are critically discussed in chapters two and 
three, I will mention them only briefly here. 
Despite the popularity of the disease model and its incorporation into 
American discourse, many thinkers do not subscribe to it. One of the reasons 
for this is the collection of objections to AA mentioned above. A more 
philosophically interesting reason, however, is that researchers have become 
suspicious of single-model explanations for complicated problems. Some argue 
that there is no such thing as alcoholism; rather, there are patterns and 
narratives that involve problem drinking. These patterns resist easy 
categorization; there are, perhaps, as many kinds of problems with drinking as 
there are problem drinkers. The nature-vs. -nurture, moral-vs.-disease 
controversies have missed the point entirely: there are no "magic bullets" for 
alcoholism. 
1 1 Jellinek p. 35. 
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In his 1988 book Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease, 
Herbert Fingarette attempts to debunk the disease model of alcoholism and 
replace it with a pluralistic account of his own. Problem drinking, he argues, 
has become unnecessarily and inaccurately medicalized. Treatment for 
alcoholism has become big business in recent years. Inpatient and outpatient 
clinics and hospitals specializing in the treatment of alcoholism employ millions 
of people, many of whom are paraprofessionals, many of whom describe 
themselves as in recovery themselves. Further, the medicalization of alcoholism 
has convinced many that the only alternative explanations of alcoholism are of 
the judgmental, moral-model type. The medical model of alcoholism is simply 
wrong, he argues: the plethora of experiences reported by those who have 
problems with drinking belies the possibility of a single "disease" with a single 
etiology. 
Thus there is no one story of how people become heavy drinkers. 
Nor is there some mysterious demon afoot - at each point the 
heavy drinker's conduct is an intelligible version of normal 
cognitive and emotional behaviors. 72 
This kind of challenge to disease models of alcoholism is reflected in 
contemporary features of the law. Alcohol and drug abuse are not admissible 
mitigating behaviors under federal sentencing guidelines, and there have been 
legal developments in several states that disallow intoxication as a defense.73 
As of January of 1997 in the state of Tennessee, alcoholics are not eligible for 
disability benefits. Interestingly, the resurrection of the moral model for 
alcoholism is not always echoed in legal decisions regarding other addictions. 
12 Fingarette p. 109.  
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In May of 200 1 ,  for example , a federal judge spared a woman from j ail after she 
who had stolen a quarter of a million dollars from the company she worked for. 
He stated he believed her "shopping addiction" was a factor in the crime. This 
case is thought to be the first in which a federal judge reduced a criminal 
sentence because of a shopping addiction. 74 
The other kind of challenge to the "classic" disease model is the new, 
revised disease model. This new model is a challenge to the older one in the 
simplest sense: experts who espouse the disease model tend to espouse the new 
one, though the older versions are still influential, especially in paraprofessional 
and nonprofessional circles. The new disease model differs from the 
Jellinek/ AA model in several respects. For one, the science that supports it is 
vastly more rigorous and sophisticated. The new disease model holds that 
addiction is a brain disease , characterized by a compulsion to use addictive 
substances caused by the neurological changes that result from drug use. 
Secondly, this new model more clearly articulates the psychosocial dimensions 
of addiction, and more readily acknowledges the individual differences between 
addicts . While the "classic" disease model tended to have relatively simple, 
universal answers as to the cause and cure for addiction, the newer disease 
model encourages comprehensive, individualized treatment planning for 
addicts. 
There is a problem, however, with automatically extending the new 
disease model to alcoholism. The new disease model is advanced primarily by 
73 Valverde p. 194. 
74 Pam Belluck, "Judge Spares Shopping Addict from Prison," The New York Times May 
25,  200 1 :  Al4. 
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NIDA, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which is a branch of the NIH. 
Their focus is on drug abuse; the NIAAA {the National Institute for Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism, also a branch of the NIH) concentrates on alcoholism. 
While NIDA and NIAAA each classify drug abuse and alcoholism {respectively) 
as diseases, the quality of their rationale differs. NIDA's conception of drug 
abuse as a disease is based on the persistent effects of drugs on the brain. In 
contrast, NIAAA's conception of alcoholism as a disease relies on notions of 
craving, tolerance and withdrawal.75 These criteria are also found in the DSM­
IV under the heading "substance abuse/dependence" .76 However, they are 
contentious, and have been rejected as outdated by some leading researchers 
today. 
If tolerance and withdrawal were the only problems of addicts, 
"treatment" would consist of detoxification . . .  while the individual 
receives medication to block the withdrawal symptoms . . . .  We now 
know that detoxification is, at best, a first step in beginning 
treatment and that achieving the drug-free state is not a 
particularly significant accomplishment. 77 
The new disease model will very likely catch on in the thinking about 
alcoholism as it has in research on drug addiction. Just as Alcoholics 
Anonymous made way for Narcotics Anonymous, now the lead is reversed and 
innovations in drug-related research are ahead of those for alcohol. 
Addiction Beyond Alcoholism 
The very topic of addiction beyond alcoholism is controversial. While 
alcohol's legitimacy as an addictive object is unquestioned, few other objects are 
7s http/ / :niaaa@nih.gov 09-06-02. 
76 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
11 Charles O'Brien, "A Range of Research-Based Pharmacotherapies for Addiction," 
Science 278 ( 1997), 66. 
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universally accepted as such. Heroin and certain other drugs make the cut, 
but others - notably cocaine and marijuana - do not produce withdrawal 
symptoms and so are not considered "physically" addictive by those who still 
adhere to that criterion. (As noted, despite the fact that the "tolerance and 
withdrawal" criteria are considered outdated by most drug abuse researchers, 
they do persist in parts of the treatment world. )  Beyond drugs, there are 
nonchemical addictions, such as shopping and gambling, and so-called 
intermediate categories of possibly addictive objects such as food, exercise, and 
sex. (The basis for including exercise and sex as quasi-chemical addictive 
objects is the endorphins that are supposedly released during these activities. 
However, other thrill-seeking behaviors, such as gambling produce a euphoric 
"rush" as well, which recalls neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp's remark that " life 
causes persistent changes to the brain. " )  
What "counts" as an addiction, then, depends on whom you ask. On one 
side of the debate, psychologist Stanton Peele argues that "addiction may occur 
with any potent experience . "78 Since certain experiences are potent for some 
people and not for others, this draws the boundaries with a generous hand 
indeed. UK psychologist Jim Orford takes a somewhat more moderate position, 
identifying six "core" addictions: drinking, gambling, drugs, eating, exercising, 
and sex. He notes, 
Although people can potentially become excessively attached to 
any activity, and there is no easy dividing line to be drawn 
between those activities to which people often get so attached and 
those that rarely cause addiction, it threatens to diminish the 
78 Stanton Peele, The Meaning of Addiction. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1 985) 
p. 25.  
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importance of the topic by too readily extending the concept in 
these ways. 79 
Orford is responding to those who advocate reserving the term "addiction" for 
substance abuse, as well as those who would include having cornflakes for 
breakfast. His list may be criticized for not including work, acquisition of 
material goods, and technology - common objects for excessive appetites today 
- but his concern regarding the dangers of easy inclusivity is sound. 
Comparatively more recent addictions are also worthy of note, perhaps 
especially technological addictions. These have only arisen in the last thirty 
years or so, perhaps because technology has only recently become interesting 
enough and widespread enough to even be a candidate for addiction. An 
interesting thing about that is that it is during this same time that disease 
models of addiction have enjoyed widespread popularity, and yet technologies 
that have been accused of being addictive, such as television80 and the 
Intemet8 1 are, obviously, nonchemical. For many, the chemical component of 
alcohol and drug addiction is what makes disease models plausible. In fact 
some, notably sociologist Jon Elster, argue that nonchemical "addictions" are 
addictions only in a metaphoric sense.82 Could watching too much TV be a 
disease? 
79 Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites: A Psychologi.cal View of Addictions Second Edition 
(New York: Wiley, 200 1) p. 6.  
80 Many citations are possible here, a recent one is Robert Kubey and Mihalyi 
Csikszentmihalyi, "Television Addiction: No Mere Metaphor," Scientific American (Feb. 
2002) pp. 74-80. 
81 Kimberly Young, Caught in the Net: How to Recognize the Signs of Internet Addiction ­
and a Winning Strategy for Recovery. (New York: J. Wiley. 1998) . 
s2 Jon Elster, Strong Feelings. (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1999.) 
37 
A few themes emerge from this historical review. For one, the history of 
addiction, like the history of alcoholism, reveals more circularity than linear 
progress. As criminologist Mariana Valverde notes, contemporary debate about 
the nature of alcoholism reflects the same dialectic as it has for two hundred · 
years. The same questions, many of them variations on the inquiry into 
alcoholics' freedom, are asked and answered in strikingly similar ways today 
with regard to Internet addiction as they were in the eighteenth century about 
excessive drinking.83 Contemporary discussions about freedom and addiction, 
Valverde argues, proceed with a blithe lack of awareness of the debates that 
have preceded them. Thus, they ask the same questions and encounter the 
same - and ultimately doomed - answers about freedom, responsibility, and 
people who drink too much. 
Another theme in the history of addiction is that conceptions of addiction 
reflect the social, economic, and political climate of the day. The abstemious 
nineteenth century sentiment that was prevalent among the upper classes 
echoed the prevailing social values of denial of the will and the body. In 
contrast, the working classes of the same era, who worked hard and played 
hard, did not always agree with their more genteel neighbors. Similarly, the 
move toward what Valverde calls "enlightened hedonism" - moderate 
indulgence in pleasure - became more prevalent after WWI when post­
Victorian values were gaining popularity. Each shift in thinking about 
addiction is supported by a related belief about freedom and responsibility, 
83 Valverde p. 14 .  
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which, in turn, is embedded in a larger social and cultural context. Thus, the 
same two models appeared over and over in different guises. 
A final theme in the history of addiction is that addiction has resisted 
medicalization and psychiatrization. There have been attempts at various times 
and in various places to define addiction, its etiology, and cure solely in terms 
of rn.edicine and/or psychiatry. They have, without exception, failed. Nor has 
addiction been successfully subsumed under epidemiology, sociology, or any 
other of the social sciences. Each attempt by a field or discipline to "claim" 
addiction as its own has been met with only limited success. Addiction borrows 
from many fields of study, but has remained a project with an identity of its 
own. 
Some Philosophical Issues in Addiction 
Addiction, then, is a profoundly interdisciplinary topic. It has, until 
recently, received relatively little attention from philosophers; however, 
addiction and philosophy have much to say to each other. Enduring 
philosophical issues related to addiction include classic binaries, such as the 
mind-body problem and the freedom-determinism debate, theoretical concepts 
that are interestingly illustrated by the experience and behavior of addicts, such 
as authenticity and akrasia, and topics in applied philosophy, such as concept 
of disease and a number of ethical issues. 
There has been a marked increase in philosophical articles published on 
the topic of addiction in the last dozen years or so. Herbert Fingarette 
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published Heavy Drinking in 1989 , in which he criticized the popular 
understanding of alcoholism as a disease. In the 1990s there was increased 
attention to the way in which addiction illustrated issues in freedom and 
determinism. Work by Alfred Mele and others focused on addiction as a 
contemporary instance of akrasia, which is the phenomenon of knowing right 
but lacking the power to do right. In the past year, the American Journal of 
Bioethics published an issue in which there were a number of articles that 
addressed ethical issues in addiction research. These were responses to 
questions raised by Louis Charland in "Cynthia's Dilemma: Consenting to 
Heroin Prescription,"84 in which he asks whether heroin addicts are competent 
to consent to be research subjects in protocols that involve their using heroin. 
Because of the many implications for related issues in medical ethics, including 
patient autonomy, competence to consent to treatment, compliance and 
noncompliance, intersections between law and medicine, and so on, bioethicists 
and other philosophers will surely have much to contribute to the addiction 
dialogue in the future. 
Most of the philosophical literature that relates to addiction concerns the 
topic of freedom vs. determinism. In its most extreme form, this debate is 
between libertarians, who believe that human behavior is the product of 
completely free, unconstrained choice, and the hard determinists, who hold 
that human behavior, like the behavior of objects, is the result of a set of 
caused factors, and that human "choice" is an illusion. A middle position is 
84 Louis Charland, "Cynthia's Dilemma: Consenting to Heroin Prescription," American 
Journal of Bioethics Spring 2, 2 (2002) pp. 37 -4 7. 
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held by compatibilists, who argue that determinism does not preclude human 
freedom. 
Rather than approaching the topic of addiction from within that 
framework, however, it behooves us to think specifically about features that a 
theory of freedom would need in order for it to provide a good foundation for 
thinking about addiction. One is that it would need to consider freedom to be 
an ability instead of a property. Libertarians and hard determinists consider 
people to "be" free or to "be" compelled, rather than considering people to have 
the potential ability of acting freely. This ability can be acquired, strengthened, 
or lost, just like other abilities. Furthermore, a useful account of freedom 
would need to take into account that freedom is a continuum concept; that is, 
there are degrees of freedom. Within this framework, it is possible that some 
people are more free (that is, have more of the ability to act freely) than others. 
On the same note, we may regard each person as being more free at some times 
than at other times. 
Finally, as John Dewey discusses in Philosophy and Civilization,85 
freedom involves not only free choice, but also power - the power to bring 
about that which I have chosen. On Dewey's account, freedom is a complex set 
of abilities, including intelligence, power, flexibility, and self-control. In this 
view, the diminishing of freedom is not the loss of some mysterious and 
inarticulable quality. It is rather a decline in one or more of the various 
features of freedom just mentioned. As I shall discuss in chapter four, this 
ss John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom," Philosophy and Civilization, (New York: 
Minton, Balch and Company, 193 1) p. 293. 
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ability can be described in terms of personal competence - Diana Meyers' term 
for autonomous persons' ability to act authentically. 
The connection between authenticity and addiction has not been much 
explored in the philosophical literature, but I find it more helpful than 
discussions of freedom and determinism for understanding addiction. Addicts 
behave in ways that challenge our notions of authenticity - they do things that 
they lmow will harm themselves and others, they sometimes report feeling very 
free and unconstrained ("I can stop whenever I want") and sometimes report 
feeling compelled by their addiction ("I didn't even want to; I didn't even enjoy 
it" ) .  Whether addicts qua addicts behave authentically also falls fairly neatly 
along moral model/ disease model lines: the moral model is consistent with the 
belief that addicts authentically choose bad things (or at least things that are 
bad for them) while the disease model is consistent with the belief that addicts 
do not choose freely or authentically to behave as they do. 
Authenticity is an important issue in addiction, in part because it is the 
key to solving the problems that result from defining addiction in terms of how 
much of a substance is consumed (or how much time or money one spends on 
something, etc.) . Defining addiction in terms of how much one consumes poses 
clear problems; certainly some problem drinkers drink less than some other 
people who have no problem with alcohol, for example . In contrast, whether or 
not the individual genuinely wants to engage in the habit in question (i .e. the 
potential addiction) is one of the essential features of addiction. If one 
individual says, for example , "I enjoy smoking; I don't want to quit - it is one of 
the pleasures of my life ," we have less reason to suspect addiction than in the 
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case of the person who says, "I wish I could quit smoking. I wish I'd never 
started."  
Determining what an individual's authentic desires are is not always 
easy. Bravado, caprice, an exaggerated sense of personal power and just plain 
lying are often features of addicts' personalities. How then, are we to determine 
which are the addictive desires and which are authentic? More vexingly, when 
people who drink heavily and destructively avow that they endorse their lifestyle 
and accept all of the features of it, are we to agree that such a person is 
drinking heavily and destructively and also authentically and non-addictively? 
Clearly, this presents a practical problem that cannot be solved by casual 
acquaintance with or observance of the individual in question. However, it is 
my contention that over time and with sufficient contact, especially if the 
contact occurs in diverse settings, individuals' authentic values and desires do 
become apparent to others. Sufficient empathetic listening, moreover, can 
make individuals' authentic values and desires more readily apparent to 
themselves as well. 
Addiction interferes with authenticity in that the desires it produces are 
so powerful, and become even more powerful by force of habit, that they become 
monumentally difficult to resist. When these powerful desires that are 
reinforced by habit conflict with an individual's more authentic desires, the 
authentic desires often lose. However, an addiction is different from a habit 
that has consequences that one dislikes. Most people have habits that have 
some undesirable consequences, but overall they still endorse the practice. In 
contrast, addictions conflict with the individual's authentic desires, rather than 
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simply having undesirable consequences. One fundamental feature of this 
conflict is the compulsive nature of addictions. An individual might endorse the 
addictive habit except for the compulsive experience of it. In such cases, it is 
the experience of feeling compelled that the individual does not endorse, rather 
than the practice or habit in which that sense of compulsion is embodied. 
In another vein, addiction provides a fascinating example of problems 
with the concept of disease. As noted earlier and discussed at length in later 
chapters, addiction is widely held to be a disease, but what makes it a disease 
is more vexing an issue. Since terms like "disease" and "illness" are applied to 
both physical and nonphysical problems, and since addiction is clearly a 
problem that touches many facets of human life, it poses problems as to just 
what the nature of this disease is , if it is a disease at all. While some addictions 
have obvious physiological features, others do not. Further, the physiological 
features of addictions do not seem to be the essential (i.e .  defining) features. 
Perhaps, rather than holding addiction up to a set of diseasemaking criteria 
and checking for fit, it would be most fruitful to ask if "disease" is the best way 
to describe it. 
As H. Tristram Engelhardt and others have noted, there are values 
implicit in naming a phenomenon a disease. The notion that medicine - or 
any science - is a completely objective matter has been challenged. "Values 
influence the purpose and direction of investigations and treatment. "86 Thus, 
the belief that addiction is or is not a disease reflects certain value 
86 H Tristram Engelhardt, "The Disease of Masturbation,"  Meaning and Medicine, Hilde 
Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson, eds. (New York: Routledge. 1999) p. 
1 1 . 
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assumptions. What is there to be gained in using the moral model or the 
disease model to explain addiction? Whose values (and other interests) are 
supported by each explanation? As noted in the history of addiction, each 
version of each model reflected the values of the era in which it was most 
popular. We would do well to examine the values that influence our present 
concept of disease, and the instances in which we apply it. Current motives to 
describe addiction as a disease include a fascination with science and the 
technology of medicine, a desire to respond humanely and effectively to the 
plight of addicts, and faith that science can ameliorate what seems to be a 
problem that is spiraling out of control. However, as I argue in chapters two 
and three, the implications for adopting the disease model are less effective, less 
humane and less coherent than they might seem on encounter. 
A related question is, If addiction is a disease, is it also a disability? In 
1999, a Chicago-area teenager who was dropped from his high school 
basketball team for drinking sued for reinstatement and damages.87 He argued 
that his alcoholism, which had been diagnosed by his physician, meant that he 
could not control his use of alcohol and should be protected by the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case, while newsworthy, was not expected 
to go very far legally. According to Curt Decker, director of the National 
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, the 1990 law covers recovering 
addicts (i.e. drug addicts and alcoholics) but not current users.88 However, if 
addiction is a disease, and is in fact the kind of disease that ought to be a 
s7 Andrew Buchanan, "Teen Says Alcoholism is a Protected Disability," The San Diego 
Union-Tribune Sept. 10, 1999: Al6. 
88 Ibid. 
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protected disability, it seems counterintuitive to argue that those whose disease 
is in remission deserve to have their disease acknowledged while those whose 
disease is florid do not. While it is easy to see problems with including current 
users of drugs and alcohol under the ADA, and also easy to see why recovering 
addicts might be vulnerable to unjust discrimination, calling addiction a 
disability or disease in order to gain such protection seems to cause more 
problems (both at the level of theory and legal practice) than it solves. 
Finally, ethical issues abound when addiction is involved. Many ethical 
questions arise because it is not always clear whether (and to what degree) 
addicts are responsible for their actions. For example, a classic issue involving 
addiction in medical ethics concerns allocations of liver transplants for 
alcoholics. A 199 1 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association 
contained two articles on either side of this debate. In one, physicians Mark 
Siegler and Alvin Moss argued that patients who have end-stage liver disease 
due to alcoholic cirrhosis should, categorically, be given lower priority for 
transplants than patients whose liver disease results from other causes. 89 In 
contrast, philosophers Carl Cohen and Martin Benjamin, et al, argue that 
alcoholics should be considered for transplants on a case-by case basis just like 
other patients. 9 0  They argue that, while it is morally sound to consider whether 
the patient is likely to ruin the transplanted liver by drinking, patients with a 
history of alcoholism differ as to whether they become good stewards of a 
transplanted organ and therefore ought to be considered as individuals rather 
89 Mark Siegler and Alvin Moss. "Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver 
Transplantation?" JAMA 265 no. 1 0  ( 199 1) pp. 1295-8. 
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than merely as alcoholics. Moreover, individuals who are in medical need 
"because of alleged self-abuse ought not be grouped for discriminatory 
treatment - unless we are prepared to develop a detailed calculus of just 
deserts for health care based on good conduct. "9 1  
A related ethical problem concerns treatment for addictions. Some 
addicts who break the law are offered the option of treatment for their addiction 
in place of criminal sentencing. This "offer" strikes some as utterly sane and 
humanistic, others see it as coercive and Orwellian. The argument for 
treatment in place of incarceration is fairly clear: addicts whose crimes are 
related to their addictions break the law partly due to a factor beyond their 
control. Curing the addiction will better ensure that they will not break the law 
again, which is better for society, and is more just than punishing them for 
doing something that they were not (or not wholly) at fault for. The argument 
against mandatory (or coercive) treatment rests partly on objections to the 
disease model of addiction that the previous argument assumes, and partly on 
the limited effectiveness of the treatment modalities that are available . As noted 
in more detail in chapter two, psychologist Stanton Peele has argued that 
coercive treatment for addicts is morally wrong because it imposes a "diseased 
identity" on a healthy person. Moreover, it encourages addicts and their 
communities to absolve themselves of responsibility for the criminal activity and 
hide behind what he regards as a mythical disease. 92 
9o Carl Cohen, et al. "Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation," JAMA 265, no. 10  ( 199 1) 
pp. 1299- 130 1. 
9 1 Ibid. 
92 Stanton Peele, Diseasing of America (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1995) p. 22 1. 
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There is, then, a broad foundation on which today's philosophers can 
build to clarify and explore many issues regarding addiction. Philosophy, when 
artfully done, can lend an illuminating hand to very nearly any project, and 
addiction is no exception. The following chapters explore some of these 
directions, especially authenticity, bioethics, and the concept of disease. Other 
promising philosophical directions for addiction studies are philosophy of law, 
philosophy of science, and research ethics (continuing Charland's recent work) . 
The growing field of applied philosophy can contribute much to our 
understanding of addiction. 
Finally, while it is tempting to frame the problem of addiction with the 
freedom-determinism debate, I argue that we have reached a stalemate at this 
point; that no progress can be made in addiction studies with this binary at this 
time . A more probable direction to turn for now is toward the notion of habit . 
On this topic, such diverse philosophers as Aristotle and John Dewey have 
contributions that can profitably be paired with the work of social psychologists 
and others to develop conceptions of addiction that avoid the entanglements 
that the freedom-determinism debate inevitably entails. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
In addition to critiquing the standard models of addiction, there are three 
major themes on which I focus in the following chapters. These include: 1 )  The 
phenomenology (i.e. the lived experience) of being addicted. The most 
important feature of this experience is the feeling of compulsion. 2) The notion 
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of habit, which, I argue, should replace freedom vs. determinism in the 
addiction debate. 3) Authenticity, which is, I argue, an important criterion in 
defining addiction; it is also a more promising goal than abstinence. Existential 
anxiety, which I suggest is the source of addiction, is related to authenticity. 
In chapter two, I describe and critique the position that addiction is not a 
disease, as represented by two critics of the disease model, Stanton Peele and 
Herbert Fingarette. The work of both of these scholars dates back to the late 
1980s and early 1990s and is characteristic of critiques of the version of the 
disease model that was popular at that time. While certainly there were others 
who contributed important work on the subject, Peele and Fingarette are strong 
representatives of this position. Their work, and the work of others such as Jim 
Orford, Charles Winnick, and Patrick Biernacki, raised serious objections to the 
"classic" disease model. 
The classic disease model has been revised to accommodate the 
objections raised by its critics. The new disease model, as represented by the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and one of its former directors, Alan 
Leshner, is the focus of chapter three. This model is an improvement over the 
earlier one that Peele and Fingarette critique, but it is still vulnerable to several 
serious criticisms. 
The new disease model differs from its "classic" predecessor in several 
respects. The most striking of these is the sophisticated level of neurological 
research that has contributed to its development. While the old disease model 
made use of the problematic "tolerance and withdrawal" criteria, or made 
reference to the notion that addiction was based on an "allergy" or 
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hypersensitivity to a substance, the new disease model makes specific claims 
about the neurological foundations of addiction. Another difference is that the 
new disease model is sensitive to the individual differences between addicts, 
and calls for matching treatment modalities to the individual. A final difference 
is the importance the new disease model places on the role of personal 
responsibility in addiction, where the classic disease model tends to emphasize 
absolving the addict from blame. All in all, the newer perspective offers a more 
credible picture of the development of addictions than does its predecessor. 
However, even though the new disease model is much clearer, more 
useful and more coherent than the classic model, I shall argue that there are 
still important flaws in it. The arguments given for addiction's being a disease 
do not include a set of criteria for diseases and show that addiction fits them; 
rather, they offer a more intuitive argument based on the presence of the 
neurological changes that are a component of drug addictions. In point of fact, 
it may be that addiction fits certain criteria for diseases . Even if that is the 
case, it is not the best way to categorize addiction. 
Chapter four begins with a discussion about the relationship between 
existential anxiety and addiction. I suggest that addictions of all kinds are 
attempts to avoid or mask existential anxiety. That is, compulsive habits are 
ways in which we keep from having to face ourselves, our inadequacies, our 
mortality. Some of these are obvious addictions - the housewife who drinks to 
escape the boredom of her day, the drug addict who stays stoned to avoid the 
desperation of poverty and violence - but others are not so obvious. The 
"workaholic" who is overcommitted to career, thereby avoiding intimacy, is a 
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more contentious addiction; some thinkers have even suggested that technology 
in general is also an addiction for many (or most) of us in the United States 
today.93 
I argue that addiction should be considered a compulsive habit that the 
individual does not endorse rather than a disease. This definition has several 
advantages over both disease models and moral models, not the least of which 
is that it avoids two troubling binaries that have derailed progress on the topic; 
namely the binary of disease vs. moral models and the binary of freedom vs. 
determinism. My definition of addiction emphasizes three themes: the 
phenomenology of addiction, a focus on habit instead of freedom or 
determinism, and the goal of authenticity. 
The use of the term "phenomenology" here refers to the experience of 
being addicted, which I take to be a feeling of compulsion toward the addictive 
object. This experience of compulsion has been a theme in discussions of 
addiction throughout the history of the topic. E.M. Jellinek was the first to 
elevate the status of this feeling of compulsion to a position of prominence; for 
Jellinek, compulsion to drink was the symptom that characterized the disease 
variety of alcoholism. My contention is that Jellinek was right to focus on the 
experience of alcoholics, but that his conclusion that such experience makes 
alcoholism a disease is inaccurate . Lastly, I expand on this last component in a 
discussion of the manner in which addiction limits authenticity. Addiction 
limits authenticity, in part, by creating powerful, conflicting desires. In addition 
93 Chellis Glendinning, My Name is Chellis and I'm in Recovery from Western Civilization. 
(Boston: Shambhala Press, 1994} . 
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to their being characterized by a sense of compulsion, the addictive desires are 
those that interfere with the addict's life project. 
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Chapter Two: Two Anti-Disease Model Theorists: Flngarette and Peele 
One commonly held conception of addiction is that addiction is a disease. 
The disease model of addiction has fallen in and out of favor since it was first 
introduced by the physician Benjamin Rush in the eighteenth century. While 
different versions of this model exist, the basic idea is that addiction is an 
illness to which certain people are vulnerable. These people engage in their 
addictions without the consent of their will; they can't help doing what they do, 
nor can they control how much they do it. Once they start, they become 
increasingly involved in their addiction, neglecting other important features of 
their lives, until they reach a crisis. From this crisis point they either get help 
and abstain from their addictive object, or they begin another cycle. 
While the disease model is widely held by the general public, including 
many who work in the addiction treatment industry, many of the people doing 
research in the field have rejected it. Philosopher Herbert Fingarette goes so 
far as to say " . . .  no leading research authorities accept the classic disease 
concept. "94 Fingarette, along with psychologist Stanton Peele, argues that the 
disease model is not supported by data, that it is inconsistent, and that it is 
ineffective at best, dangerous at worst. The disease model, they argue, 
oversimplifies a complex problem. People engage in addictions for many 
different reasons and respond to different interventions. They do not have the 
same disease, and cannot benefit from a single "cure." Fingarette confines his 
topic to drinking, while Peele addresses other addictions as well . Both call for 
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replacing the disease model with an understanding of addictive behavior that 
accounts for the diversity of experiences and behavior that accompany it. 
Fingarette advocates a perspective on heavy drinking (he eschews the 
term "alcoholism") in which heavy drinking is a central activity in the drinker's 
life. A central activity is a habit around which an individual defines herself. 
Common central activities include career, religious affiliation, and hobbies. It is 
the result of a series of the individual's preferences and choices, although it 
bears noting that some choices can have unanticipated or unintended results. 
Once a central activity becomes established, it becomes difficult to change 
because so much of the individual's life depends on it. Fingarette rejects the 
disease model of alcoholism in favor of a rich picture of heavy drinking as a 
destructive habit. Similarly, Peele advocates a perspective in which addiction is 
a maladaptive way of coping with problems in a person's life. This way of 
coping affects everything in a person's life, from the smoker who is able to stay 
in a high-stress job that is ruining her health because the cigarettes help her 
manage in the short term, to the compulsive shopper who indulges in "retail 
therapy" to deal with depression, to the multi-drug street addict who uses 
because that's the only thing that makes her existence bearable. 
Both thinkers reject "easy, simplistic" solutions to addiction and 
alcoholism, and regard moralistic models and well as disease models as 
wrongheaded. Addictions are remarkably hard to break. Puritanical 
reproaches of the "Just Say No" variety fail to appreciate the complexity of 
addiction. However, with appropriate motivation and support, people can and 
94 Herbert Fingarette. Heavy Drinking. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) p. 
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do quit. Addiction, they both maintain, is not some mysterious force to be 
exorcised; rather, it is a comprehensible (if destructive) aspect of human 
behavior. 
Fingarette's book was published in 1 988; Peele's books were published in 
the 1 980's and early 1990's.  Why focus on authors whose work is so old? Why 
not concentrate on more recent attacks on the classic disease model? There are 
two reasons. The first is that these two are the first and most noteworthy 
critics of the classic disease model. Their work forms the foundation of the 
debate that continues in recent literature. The second is that, while the disease 
concept has continued to evolve in the literature, the disease concept in the 
mind of the general public has not. In order to get the richest perspective, the 
evolution of the disease concept must be considered. I will argue later that the 
"new" disease model does not answer the objections raised by these early 
critics. 
Stanton Peele 
Stanton Peele is a psychologist who has written extensively on addiction. 
His :first book on the topic, Love and Addiction, co-authored with Archie 
Brodsky, was published in 1 975.  Since then he has written several other books 
and many articles on the subject, including The Meaning of Addiction, ( 1985) , 
Diseasing of America, ( 1 989 , 1 995,  1 999) and The Truth about Addiction and 
Recovery (with Archie Brodsky and Mary Arnold) ( 1 99 1 ) .  
3.  emphasis in original. 
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Peele maintains a vociferous criticism of the disease model of addiction. 
He argues that the disease model, which he defines as the belief that addiction 
is a biological disorder marked by an inability to control one's behavior due to 
the pharmacological effects of a substance on the individual, is a 
misconception based upon bad data about opiate use.95 According to Peele, the 
disease model of addiction has been thoroughly disproved. Controlled use of 
narcotics by even regular and heavy users of these drugs96 , the presence of 
addictive behavior in users of nonnarcotic substances (including substances 
that do not produce physiological withdrawal) , 97 and variations in self­
administered substance use in animals98 support his contention that addiction 
is not simply a result of the pharmacological action of a substance on an 
individual's brain. In fact, addictive behavior appears in individuals who are 
not substance users at all. For this reason, Peele subscribes to a version of 
unitary theory, the notion that many behaviors can be understood as 
addictions; i.e. that many compulsive nondrug involvements such as 
compulsive gambling, exercise, and the like are properly called addictions.99 
While certain kinds of experiences are more likely to be addictive than others, in 
theory anything could become an addiction. However, no addictions - neither 
heroin nor gambling nor compulsive orange juice consumption - are diseases. 
95 Stanton Peele. The Meaning of Addiction. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1985.) p. 6 .  
9 6  The Meaning of Addiction, p. 7.  
91 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 1 . 
98 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 77. 
99 Stanton Peele. Diseasing of America: How We Allowed Recovery Zealots and the 
Treatment Industry to Convince Us We Are Out of Control (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1995.) p. 3. 
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Peele's objection to the disease model is not just that it happens to be 
false. He argues that the disease model is morally and intellectually sloppy; 
that it undercuts moral and legal standards of personal responsibility, 
pathologizes and medicalizes normal emotions and problems, and encourages 
a fatalistic, self-preoccupied perspective on life. 100 Further, not only does it fail 
to ameliorate the problem of addiction, it actually increases the incidence of 
addictive behavior, since it convinces people that their behavior is not under 
their own control and makes it less likely that people will mature out of their 
addiction (because of their mistaken belief that they have a disease) , as many 
normally do. 101  His objection to the disease model, then, might be called 
pragmatic and moral as well as scientific. The fact that the disease model 
emerged from sloppy science cannot be excused by saying that it nonetheless is 
useful or has good consequences, as some disease model advocates suggest. 
The worst thing about the disease model, Peele argues, is the damage it causes 
to individuals, to communities, and ultimately to the culture as a whole . 
Evidence Against the Disease Model 
Peele argues that the notion that addiction is a physiological 
phenomenon marked by irresistible craving and a loss of control over one's 
behavior toward an addictive substance has been debunked by a great deal of 
evidence. Even so, most people - researchers as well as the general public -
continue to believe the classic disease model of addiction. He suggests that one 
factor that has influenced the pervasiveness of this model is that it is derived 
largely from research on heroin addiction. The prevailing beliefs about heroin 
100 Diseasing of America, pp. 26-28. 
57 
use are based on studies in which the subjects came from treatment centers 
for drug abuse. This clinical data is biased because all of the heroin users in 
such centers are there precisely because they cannot control their drug use. In 
contrast, naturalistic studies of heroin use show greater variation, as well as 
less destructiveness, in the behavior of those who use such drugs. 102 
Peele notes that there are numerous studies that document controlled, or 
nonaddicted narcotics use. A 1984 study by N .E Zin berg, for example , 
identified both controlled and addictive patterns of narcotics use . Zinberg 
concluded that nonaddicted narcotics users control their desire for the drug 
according to other values; for example, in order not to interfere with work or 
nondrug-related recreation. Contrary to popular belief, some individuals use 
narcotics regularly but are able to abstain when they need or want to. 103 
Perhaps even more significant is the finding by L.N.  Robins, et al in 1975 that 
even a previous history of addiction does not preclude non-addictive narcotics 
use. Robins and her colleagues studied Vietnam veterans who had been 
addicted to narcotics while in the service. Of their subjects, half used heroin 
after returning to the United States, but only fourteen percent became 
readdicted to the drug. Despite such findings, and despite the fact that 
narcotics and other now-illicit drugs were widely used with low rates of 
addiction in the nineteenth century, 104 there has been considerable reluctance 
to accept the existence of controlled narcotics users. Narcotic drugs are the 
clearest case of addictive objects; if some can use them in a controlled manner 
101  Ibid. 
102 The Meaning of Addiction p. 10.  
103 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 8.  
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then it cannot be the case that they produce an irresistible loss of control, and 
the disease model loses some of its force. 
Similarly, alcohol is a substance with clear addictive potential. During 
the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century in the United 
States, alcohol was widely believed to be inherently addictive; this belief led to 
Prohibition in 1920. 105 (Ironically, this was the same time that the use of 
opiates was commonplace!) Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century 
the notion that alcohol is only addictive for a specific group of people - i.e. , 
those who are born alcoholics - gained popularity. Despite this belief, Peele 
cites a number of studies that document controlled drinking by individuals who 
had been determined to be alcoholics. 106 107 According to Peele , the fact that 
alcoholics can and do sometimes control their drinking does not mean that 
there is no such thing as alcoholism or people who abuse alcohol; it simply 
means that alcohol abuse is not the result of some disease process that is 
beyond individuals' control. 
There is also the matter of addictive features that do not involve 
narcotics or alcohol. Many nonnarcotic drugs are popularly considered 
addictive. However, since marijuana, cocaine, and amphetamines (among 
others) do not produce chemical dependency, 108 and yet many people certainly 
seem to be addicted to them, there needs to be some explanation for addictive 
behavior in users of nonaddictive substances. 
104 Diseasing of America, p. 22. 
10s Diseasing of America, p. 37. 
106 Diseasing of America, p. 59 . 
107 The Meaning of Addiction, pp. 35-45. 
10s The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 1 . 
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One attempt to do this while maintaining the traditional view of addiction 
is the World Health Organization's distinction between physical and psychic 
dependence. 109 According 1964 WHO guidelines, physical dependence is an 
unavoidable result of the biochemical action of certain drugs. Psychic 
dependence, in contrast, is determined by the extent to which the use of a drug 
is a central activity for an individual, and to which it edges out other coping 
mechanisms for that individual. 1 10 As Peele notes, all recreational drugs can 
be classified as producing psychic dependence, whether or not they produce 
physical dependence. However, " . . . [t]he concept of psychic dependence cannot 
distinguish compulsive drug involvements . . . from compulsive overeating, 
gambling, and television viewing." 1 1 1  It makes more sense, Peele argues, to 
simply use the term "addiction" for all compulsive, destructive activities . The 
most important features of addiction are behavioral rather than physiological; 
if not, there would be no need to create terms such as "psychic dependence." 
Furthermore, drug studies involving animals support the argument that 
addiction is not the irresistible force of a substance on an individual. While 
there are many studies that document caged laboratory animals self­
administering high, regular doses of drugs, studies that take the animals' 
environment into account show significant variation in how much of a drug the 
animals self-administer. A 1979 study by Patricia Hadaway, et al, made a 
morphine-sucrose solution available to rats under two conditions. One group of 
rats was in isolated cages, while the other group was placed in a more 
109 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 20. 
1 10 Ibid. 
m The Meaning of Addiction, p. 2 1 .  
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naturalistic environment that was larger, contained more diversions, and 
contained sixteen to twenty rats of both sexes. The rats in this latter 
environment, dubbed "Rat Park" consumed significantly less morphine-sucrose 
solution than did their caged counterparts. Further studies and analysis have 
led to the conclusion that space and social interaction have a combination 
effect (that is, these factors together have a greater effect than either factor 
taken alone) on drug use in rats. 1 12 
These animal findings are, of course, subject to all of the limitations that 
any animal-to-human generalizations are. However, they do support findings in 
human research that there are several important nonbiological factors in 
addiction. An individual's culture, social situation, environment, stage of 
development, personality, and beliefs and expectations about drugs have 
powerful effects on his or her behavior. These factors can affect an individual's 
desire for drugs or alcohol, her behavior while using drugs or alcohol , as well as 
her experience of withdrawal of drugs or alcohol. 1 13 The fact that, for example , 
subjects in studies by Marlatt and Rohsenow ( 1980) and Wilson ( 198 1) became 
aggressive and sexually aroused when they mistakenly believed they were 
drinking alcohol, but did not when they drank disguised alcoholic beverages 1 14 
supports Peele's claim that the effect a substance has on an individual is not 
simply a matter of biochemistry. 
According to Peele , people become addicted to experiences. "First and 
foremost, addictive experiences are potent modifiers of mood and sensation, in 
1 12 The Meaning of Addiction, pp 79-88. 
1 13 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 12 .  
1 14 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 17 .  
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part because of their direct pharmacological action or physical impact and in 
part because of their learned symbolic significance." 1 15 Addictive experiences 
tend to be those that provide a feeling of power and control (gambling, 
drinking), security or calm (barbiturates, cigarettes) , exhilaration (cocaine, 
amphetamines, gambling), or comfort and being cared for (shopping, eating.) 
This helps to explain why certain addictions are correlated with different groups 
of people. For example, lower socioeconomic class is associated with problem 
drinking and obesity1 16, while compulsive running and dieting is associated 
with middle and upper socioeconomic class. 1 1 7 Of course, one has to wonder 
what definition is being used for "problem drinking, " as it may be that lower 
socioeconomic class is correlated more with being unable to avoid problems 
associated with drinking than with compulsive drinking itself. Even so, many 
studies show that rate of addiction and choice of addictive object are related to 
life phase and socioeconomic class, vary along cultural and ethnic lines, and 
are influenced by an individual's peers and parents.1 18 1 19 
"What is more, as Vaillant ( 1 983) noted for alcoholics and Wishnie ( 1 977) 
for heroin addicts, reformed substance abusers often form strong compulsions 
toward eating, prayer, and other nondrug involvements." 1 20 Anyone who has 
ever been to an AA meeting knows that these recovering alcoholics smoke an 
astonishing number of cigarettes and drink impressive amounts of bad coffee. I 
have even heard AA members who attend one or more meetings a day to remark 
1 ,s The Meaning of Addiction, p. 98. 
1 16 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 104. 
1 17 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 105. 
1 1s The Meaning of Addiction, pp. 104- 1 1 0. 
1 19 Diseasing of America, pp. 149- 150. 
120 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 7.  
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wryly that they have traded addiction to alcohol for addiction to meetings! 
Addictive behavior has been documented with such non-drug involvements as 
running, 1 2 1  gambling, 122 and love . 123 This supports Peele's argument that 
addiction has more to do with an individual's behavioral response to his or her 
environment and less to do with his or her physiological response to a 
substance. 
Dangers to Individuals 
As noted above, some disease model theorists acknowledge the scientific 
problems with this model, but argue that it is nonetheless a useful model 
because it is more humane than moralistic models of addiction. They maintain 
that disease models offer addicts a face-saving way to seek treatment for their 
problem, rather than driving them away from help with judgmental attitudes 
and condemnation. Peele offers a steady criticism of this notion of disease 
models as "useful fiction," arguing that such thinking does far more harm than 
good. 
Perhaps the simplest reason disease models are dangerous to individuals 
according to Peele, is that they don't work very well. Untreated people fare at 
least as well as, and sometimes better than, treated patients. One outstanding 
illustration of this is Dr. George Vaillant's classic The Natural History of 
Alcoholism, which Peele cites extensively in several of his own works. V aillant, a 
Harvard psychiatrist, compared alcoholic patients in his program (which 
included inpatient detoxification, mandatory AA meetings, and counseling) with 
121 Stanton Peele. How Much is Too Much· Healthy Habits or Destructive Addictions. (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1 98 1 . ) p. 3 7. 
1 22 How Much is Too Much, p. 1 1 . 
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alcoholics who received no treatment. He found that " . . .  [a]fter initial discharge , 
only five patients in the Clinic sample [of one hundred] never returned to 
alcoholic drinking, and there is compelling evidence that the results of our 
treatment were no better than the natural history of the disease." 124 
Furthermore, Peele cites the American Cancer Society and other sources 
indicating that ninety-five percent of Americans who quit smoking did so on 
their own, 1 25 and a study by the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers 
for Disease Control that found that individuals who tried to quit smoking on 
their own were significantly more likely to be successful than individuals who 
used smoking cessation programs. 126 Since many people consider smoking to 
be the hardest addiction to give up, these findings are notable . Finally, Peele 
cites a study by Columbia psychologist Stanley Schachter which found that 
obese people who had never entered a weight loss program showed better long­
term weight loss than those who did, 127 and Patrick Biemacki's 1986 book, 
Pathways from Heroin Addiction: Recovery Without Treatment, that describes 
the many ways in which untreated heroin addicts quit their drug habits . These 
and other studies strongly suggest that treatment is not the only way (or even 
the most effective or reliable way) to kick the habit. 
These findings could easily be misconstrued to say that addiction is not 
really a problem, because even doing nothing works as well - or sometimes 
123 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 54. 
124 George Vaillant. The Natural History o/ Alcoholism (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1 983 . )  p. 283-84 . 
12s mseasing of America, p. 25.  
126 Stanton Peele, et al. The Truth About Addiction and Recovery: The Life Process 
Program/or Outgrowing Destructive Habits. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 1 . ) p. 
97. 
127  Diseasing of America, p. 176. 
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better - as therapy. That is not Peele's assertion, as both treated and 
untreated individuals persist with their unhealthy habits for a long time and 
cause a lot of damage before they quit. And there are tragic cases in both 
conditions in which individuals never do quit. Rather than therapeutic 
interventions, Peele favors approaches to addiction that focus on the 
individual's personal values, achieving a sense of balance, and reliance on 
community support. 
The fact that disease-based approaches to addiction simply don't work is 
dangerous because, while such approaches are being tried, other, more likely­
to-be-effective approaches are not being tried. Further, time, effort and money 
spent on an ineffective approach leave less of these resources for other 
approaches. Failure at the goals generated by these approaches,  moreover, 
can diminish the sense of hope and self-efficacy that one needs to quit an 
addiction. 
It is morally and economically necessary for us to evaluate the 
effectiveness of alcoholism and other addiction treatments.  For we 
are wasting limited health-care resources to place people in 
expensive treatments - treatments that have not been shown 
they do more than inexpensive, straightforward skills counseling 
or than people accomplish on their own - often more reliably! 12s 
A related problem is that the disease model makes it less likely that 
individuals will "grow out of it". That addicts often do "mature out" of heroin 
addiction was documented by sociologist Charles Winnick, 129 and has been 
supported by other studies of heroin addicts and alcoholics. 13° As noted 
elsewhere in this chapter, individuals' beliefs about addiction affect their 
128 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 39. 
129 Diseasing of America, p. 170. 
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perceptions and their behavior. Winnick found that the minority of heroin 
addicts who do not mature out of addiction believe that there is no point in 
trying to beat their habit; these are persons "who decide that they are 'hooked, '  
make no effort to abandon addiction, and give in to what they regard as 
inevitable ." 1 3 1  Of course, it could be argued that this minority of addicts hold 
the belief that addiction can't be overcome precisely because they truly do have 
a disease that continues to rage in their later years . Perhaps those who mature 
out never had the disease form of addiction, and those who remain addicted are 
the ones are diseased. However, this is circular reasoning: Certain addicts 
have the disease form of addiction . How do you know? Because they never 
recover. Why don't they ever recover? Because they have a disease that keeps 
them from recovering. 
Disease model theorists, who favor abstinence as the only appropriate 
treatment goal, argue that relapse is such an overwhelming possibility for 
alcoholics that suggesting to them that they might be able to drink moderately 
is morally wrong. However, belief in the disease model - and privileging 
abstinence - may pose its own dangers. Peele cites several studies that 
suggest that those trying to achieve strict abstinence are more likely to binge 
following a single drink than those who are not attempting to maintain strict 
abstinence. 132 He argues that the disease model teaches that alcoholics are 
unable to control themselves after they drink any alcohol (in AA lingo, "One 
drink, one drunk") ,  and that this belief facilitates out-of-control behavior. This 
130 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 23 .  
13 1 Charles Winnick. 11 Maturing Out of Narcotic Addiction." Bulletin o n  Narcotics 14 :  1 -7 .  
1962. p. 6 .  cited in Meaning of Addiction, p .  122. 
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is not to say that Peele rejects abstinence as a reasonable goal for some people; 
rather, he rejects the notion that abstinence is the only acceptable goal for 
addicted persons. What is important about the goal is that it fits with the 
values, lifestyle, resources, and deficits of the individual. 
A final danger of disease models is that treatment is and has been forced 
on people "for their own good" on the grounds that addicts are "in denial" about 
their disease and hence unable to make judgements about their lives. Coerced 
treatment is indefensible on moral and legal grounds, Peele argues. Disease 
model-based treatments require participants to accept the identity of a diseased 
person as the beginning point of therapy. To force a person to assume an 
identity that she does not feel is her own, especially when that identity involves 
being incurably diseased, is morally wrong. Likewise, remanding people to AA 
is unconstitutional because of its emphasis on spirituality. (Despite the fact 
that AA's "Higher Power," "Power greater than ourselves" and "God as we 
understood Him" can be interpreted as loosely as one wishes, some people do 
object to AA on the grounds of "spiritual coercion" - bullying people into a 
spiritual milieu that is not their own.)  Coerced treatment is particularly odious, 
however, because treatment for addiction is so notoriously ineffective. 133 
Therefore, it cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds (because it doesn't 
work) or on the grounds of preventing harm to others (because it is an attempt 
to "cure" the individual, not an attempt to prevent her from harming others. )  It 
is neither humane nor effective, claims Peele, to force people to get better, 
especially when they were not sick to begin with. 
132 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 40. 
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Coercive treatment can take many forms. The most straightforward 
cases are those in which you ng people are commi tted by their parents to 
treatment centers. Peele argu es that this i s  becoming more common becau se of 
the marketing of addiction treatment for adolescents to frig htened parents. 134 
Alcoholism, dru g addiction, eating disorders and the like are real problems that 
g enuinely do affect adolescents, bu t they are not diseases and cannot be 
ameliorated i f  treated as su ch. Ou t of fear, a lack of understanding ,  an a 
desperate desire to do something , parents bu y into the treatment indu stry' s 
characterizati on of these problems, along with the industry' s simple, dramati c, 
and expensive solution. Other examples of coerci ve treatment include cou rt­
ordered treatment as an altern ative to jail or other punishments and employee­
assistance programs that require employees to g o  to rehab in order to retain a 
j ob. Su ch measures do not hold people responsible fo r  their  behavior, bu t 
rath er coerce people to accept a new, damaging self- concept: th at of an ad di ct. 
Rather than force people to u nderg o costly, ineffecti ve treatment th at teaches 
them that they are unable to control thei r li ves, Peele argues that we shou ld 
simply hold them accou ntable  fo r  the actions that make addi cti on obj ectionable 
in  the first place. Addiction is  not some mysteriou s g host in  the machine; i t  is a 
comprehensib le ( thoug h harmfu l) way of approaching the world. I f  we don' t 
approve, we need to say so; i f  we find some of the behavior associated wi th 
addi cti on unacceptable (e. g. ,  lying , DUI) we need to stop excu sing it. 
Perhaps the most fundamental claim Peele makes is that individuals are 
active parti ci pants in th eir addi cti ons, not passi ve victims of them. Whi le 
The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 364. 
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addictions are indeed difficult to break, addicted persons are still responsible 
(in both the moral and the causal sense) for their own involvement in them. 
Addiction - which he defines as "an ingrained habit that undermines your 
health, your work, your relationships, your self-respect, but that you feel you 
cannot change" 135 - is situated within the rest of individuals' lives. It 
expresses their values, their skills, and their deficiencies.  Moreover, rather 
than being an inevitable expression of individuals' neurochemistry, addiction is 
an expression of individuals' value options. "The environments and value 
options people face do have tremendous implications for drug use and drug 
addiction, as well as for teen pregnancy and other social disabilities and 
problems." 136 In an important sense, then, the most important danger that 
the disease model poses to individuals is the dangers it poses to communities . 
Dangers to Communities 
According to Peele, research has shown that people are more vulnerable 
to addiction if they face certain kinds of problems.  The common idea that 
"addiction can strike anyone" is misleading. While no one is immune to 
addiction, it does affect people whose lives are dangerous, hopeless or 
meaningless to a far greater degree. 137 Therefore, the poor, those with few 
social supports, people who are under undue stress are more vulnerable to 
developing addictions than others. 138 To suggest that alcoholism is not related 
to poverty because there are rich alcoholics, for example , is like saying that 
gender is not related to power because Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of 
13
4 Diseasing of America pp. 128- 1 3 1 , 
13s The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p.9. 
136 Diseasing of America, p. 166. 
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England. Addiction seems to affect middle- and upper-classes to a greater 
degree than it really does because they are the "squeaky wheels" in many ways. 
While recognition of the social factors that contribute to addiction does not 
obviate individual responsibility for personal choices, it does indicate that these 
social factors must be addressed. 
In Diseasing of America, Peele situates his call for community-level 
responses to addiction in a discussion of the historical progression of the use of 
the word "disease" . 139 Diseases that are lmown by their effects on the body ­
those that are defined by measurable physical effects - are labeled "first 
generation diseases ." These are uncontroversially diseases. I will add that 
while these diseases clearly have non-physical dimensions (a broken leg can 
cause feelings of frustration, depression) they are still primarily related to the 
function of the body. The "second generation diseases" are somewhat more 
controversial. These are mental illnesses and emotional disorders, known to us 
by our observations of the individual's behavior, and by what she reports about 
how she feels, what she thinks, and so on. And while these clearly have 
physical dimensions (many mental illnesses respond to psychotropic 
medication) they are still primarily related to disordered beliefs and feelings. 
The third generation of conditions to be called "diseases" are addictions. These 
are known to us by the behaviors they describe: compulsive over-consumption 
of something or compulsive and excessive engagement in some activity. 
131 Diseasing of America, pp. 159- 160. 
138 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 92.  
139 Diseasing of America, pp. 5-7. 
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Some, notably psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, dispute labeling mental and 
emotional problems "diseases," arguing that these are importantly different 
from "real" (physical) diseases. Likewise, Peele rejects the notion that addiction 
is a disease. However, he does think that an environmental approach to 
disease control, which has been adopted for many first generation diseases, 
should be adopted for addictions as well It is fairly well-recognized that mental 
states affect physical wellness and illness, that a positive frame of mind, 
balanced perspective on life, and solid social supports can promote healing and 
perhaps even help prevent illness in the first place. (Perhaps the best-known 
example of this phenomenon is the greater risk of heart disease and "type A 
personalities" . )  It is no great leap to recognize that nurturing communities that 
offer hope and a sense that people can control their destinies can contribute to 
a positive mental outlook. From here it is no great leap to say that 
communities in which people are isolated from one another, communities that 
have few resources and offer little hope, are likely going to produce members 
with high rates of diseases of all kinds. An environmental approach to 
controlling some "first generation diseases" - especially infectious diseases -
has been effective. 
Yet we have not generalized this environmental approach very well 
in the later stages of disease control. For example, we don't fight 
mental illness by trying to create better communities, even though 
we know community support is a tremendous force for mental 
health. Our environmental approaches to drugs are of the most 
superficial kind - cutting off drug supplies . We fail entirely to 
ask which communities inspire the most drug abuse. Instead, we 
argue (contrary to all common sense and epidemiological evidence) 
that community approaches don't make sense because drug 
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addiction and alcoholism are diseases to which those in all 
communities are equally vulnerable. 140 
Addiction and community interface in several ways. First, disconnected 
communities contribute to addiction. Few social supports, few opportunities for 
rewards and meaningful activity, and the presence of social problems (such as 
violence and poverty) create a stressful and hopeless milieu. Peele suggests 
that addiction arises in individuals who are undergoing stresses that they 
cannot realistically expect to modify, a claim that is supported by a number of 
studies. 1 4 1  The corollary to this is that solid communities are an effective 
defense against addiction. Secondly, addiction harms communities in obvious 
ways; addicted people are not available to be contributing members of their 
communities as well as nonaddicted members are. Some addicts are real 
threats to their communities, others are merely self-absorbed and not able to 
participate in the groups they belong to as fully as they would if not for their 
addiction. 
Thirdly, the disease model of addiction harms communities. One reason 
for this is that it misses the point: it makes us fear things that are not real and 
that we can't fix, while allowing us to remain blissfully unaware of the problems 
that are real and that we can fix. For Peele, the disease model of addiction is 
part of a trend in America to overdramatize remote-but-scary things (e.g., the 
fear, perpetuated by movies, news media and government agencies, of strangers 
kidnapping children and drugging Halloween candy) while ignoring immediate 
problems that hard work can change (e.g., our crumbling communities, 
140 Diseasing of America, p. 9. 
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steadily-rising obesity rates and sedentary lifestyles) . The disease model 
perpetuates both fear and hopelessness with its mantra that we are out of 
control of our selves and our world, and fear and hopelessness are two of the 
very factors that exacerbate addiction. "We fear so many things that already too 
much of our society's ameliorative energy goes toward warning people against 
and protecting them from the many addictive dangers we have discovered. " 142 
We Americans do not know or trust our neighbors and tend to see family as an 
arcane and ludicrous chore, and yet we join self-help groups in which we 
willingly disclose our personal traumas to others. 
A related danger of disease models of addiction to communities is that 
they encourage a self-centered perspective that precludes the very community 
involvement that inoculates people against addiction. Peele argues that both 
the support of a solid community and the individuals' caring about their 
community protect people from developing addictions. These are important 
factors in quitting addictions, as well. 143 Disease models focus intensely on the 
individual and her feelings; they have no room for other-directed action or 
attention. Some versions of the disease model are notably self-indulgent and 
explicitly eschew the needs of others (much of the literature CoDependents 
Anonymous illustrates this point. ) 144 Peele does not advocate completely 
selfless, other-directed values, but emphasizes the importance of "getting out of 
your own head" in quitting addiction. Addictions themselves are self­
preoccupied endeavors; disease models of addiction and recovery are as well. 
14 1  The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 1 2.  
142 Diseasing of America, p. 238. 
1 43 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 202, 323 .  
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Further, disease models reduce behavior to biology, which undercuts 
moral and legal standards. Since behavior that was once criminal or just plain 
stupid is now "diseased," nobody can be said to be responsible for anything 
they do. "Diseases" from drug addiction (as in the case of Joel Steinberg, who 
beat his daughter, Lisa, to death) 145 to overindulgence in junk food and 
excessive TV (as in the case of Dan White, who killed San Francisco mayor 
George Moscone) 146 have been used to explain and excuse all manner of 
wrongdoing, including murder. This leads to some incoherent legal and social 
policy. For example, " . . .  employees found to be unable to perform their jobs 
because of drunkenness cannot be fired by Minnesota state law ( or by that of a 
majority of states) but must be treated at the employer's or insurer's 
expense,"147 but meanwhile many states are cracking down on drunk drivers. 
Evidently alcoholism on the job is a disease, but alcoholism in your vehicle is a 
crime. 
Finally, disease models pathologize normal human experiences. By 
contrast, the view that addiction is an ingrained habit with negative 
consequences allows for degrees of addiction and allows for negative human 
experiences that are not "sick" . For example, on a disease model, someone who 
overeats for emotional comfort is a "compulsive overeater" who has a 
permanent, diseased relationship to food. On Peele's model, this same person 
has an unhealthy, hard-to-break habit that is helping her to cope with 
problems in her life . On the disease model, the compulsive overeater should 
144 Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom. p. 3 1 .  
145 Diseasing of America, p.2 14 
146 Diseasing of America, p. 220. 
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accept that she has a disease, attend Overeaters Anonymous or some similar 
support group, and completely abstain from her "trigger foods" (usually all 
sweets, snacks and rich foods .) On Peele's model, she should identify what 
eating does for her, find other ways to get those needs met, and select goals 
regarding eating that fit with her goals for her life. 148 Rather than a nation of 
imperfect individuals with some bad habits to work on (or with some good 
habits to cultivate) with disease models we are becoming increasingly sick, sad, 
and self-absorbed - hardly the legacy we want to pass along to the next 
generation. "If we cannot persuade our children that they have the capacity to 
manage their lives and that the world is worth living in -- and then work to 
create a world in which this is true -- medical treatments will expand endlessly 
but will be unable to help us. " 149 
Better Approaches 
According to Peele, treatment for addiction generally does not work, 
because most treatment programs are based on faulty assumptions about the 
nature of addiction. The only way to help addicted persons - and those 
affected by the behavior of addicted persons - is to bring about social change. 
Such change must include creating a moral climate in which people are 
expected to behave themselves. 1 50 In must also include strengthening our 
communities so that people can flourish. 
The rise in disease treatments for behaviors and emotions is 
primarily a compensation for our deteriorated community. It is 
not an answer to this deterioration. Instead, we need to take 
147 Diseasing of America, p. 127. 
148 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, parts II and III. 
149 Diseasing of America, p. 29 . 
1so Di.seasing of America, p. 260. 
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responsibility for our communities and make them more 
efficacious. While this is certainly a difficult undertaking, there is 
no substitute for it . ts 1  
The goal for addicted persons should be a life of self-esteem, personal 
competence, and contribution to others. It should include opportunities for 
accomplishment and recognition. Disease model approaches to addiction, in 
contrast, foster an identity of powerlessness and endless therapy. Some groups 
based on disease models of addiction (e.g. AA) are supportive communities 
themselves, but they require their members to be "sick" in order to get the 
support they need. There is something dreadfully wrong, Peele argues , about 
the disease-model notion that addicts can perpetually be "in recovery" but never 
"recovered." Unlike some "first generation" diseases that are manageable but 
not curable (e.g. diabetes) addiction supposedly persists even when all the 
definitive symptoms (the addictive behaviors) have been gone for years. With 
supportive communities that foster wellness and self-efficacy, addiction is not 
only amerliorable, but preventable. 
The most promising approach to addiction, then, starts with 
communities. We need to start by recognizing that our resources are finite , and 
that cost-effectiveness is an important criterion in selecting an approach to a 
problem. Medical model programs are not only ineffective, they are 
expensive. 152 Therapeutic Communities, in which residents learn life skills and 
have as their goal the ex-addict's return to the community, are comparatively 
effective . However, they are expensive and artificial. In contrast, the 
Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) is both effective and relatively 
1 5 1  Diseasing of America, p. 27 1 .  
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inexpensive; in fact, " . . .  it is the most cost-effective treatment on record for 
alcoholism." 1 53 Participants in a CRA identify people in their community who 
can help them develop and maintain healthy habits in each aspect of their lives. 
Such people might include family members, friends, co-workers, as well as 
others. Participants who do not already have such supports are assigned a 
partner for the areas in which they need one. CRA coordinators help addicts to 
restore community supports, but do not do anything for addicts that they can 
do for themselves. The coordinators also help partners develop specific ways in 
which they can help the addicted person stop the addictive behavior. In tum, 
the people who partner with addicts provide motivation and accountability for 
them to live up to their goals. This approach preserves the dignity of addicted 
persons because it neither berates them with heavy-handed moralizing, nor 
infantilizes them with excuses for their inappropriate behavior. 
An important component of this approach is developing the outlook that 
individuals and communities can bring about desired goals, called efficacy. 
Community efficacy is important for each individual's sense of efficacy. 154 Self­
efficacy requires a sense of personal competence, a belief that the world is 
comprehensible, and that some minimum of social and material resources are 
available. Disease models work against self-efficacy by convincing people that 
they are incompetent to their very core because of their disease. They explicitly 
state that, try as they will, addicts simply cannot control their own behavior or 
make their own decisions regarding their addictive habits. They will go off the 
152 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 368. 
153 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 369 . 
154 Diseasing of America, pp. 27 1 -274. 
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deep end unless they abstain altogether. Disease models also work against self­
efficacy because they posit a mysterious disease state that is responsible for the 
addict's baffling behavior, rather than the simpler, more accurate and more 
accessible explanation that addiction is a disruptive pattern brought about by a 
series of individual choices. 
Interestingly, Peele calls for the legalization of drugs. He argues that 
drug use in and of itself should not be considered a crime, especially 
considering the variety of experiences (i.e .  addictive and non-addictive) that 
people have with drugs. However, criminal activity and bad behavior should 
never be legally or socially excused, even when related to addiction. 1 55 Further, 
drug screening in the workplace and in schools should be replaced by high 
performance standards and the expectation that inappropriate behavior 
(addiction-related or not) will not be tolerated. 156 Treatment for addiction 
should be fully voluntary, and should fit with the individual's values, goals, and 
personality. Court-ordered treatment is unsound ethically and legally, 
especially when it requires an individual to assume the identity of a sick, 
incompetent, powerless somebody. 
For Stanton Peele, disease models of addiction are an example of what is 
worst about contemporary American society. They are short-sighted, self­
indulgent and heavily dependent on medicine-as-magic. Effective approaches 
require nothing more - and nothing less - than a cultural change that 
emphasizes personal and community responsibility. "The only way we can 
1 55 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 358-360. 
156 Ibid., p. 362 . 
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really do something about addiction is to create a world worth living in. " 157 
Peele seems to believe that such a world is still within our reach. 
Herbert Fingarette 
In contrast to clinical psychologist Stanton Peele, Herbert Fingarette is a 
philosopher. His book-length critique of the disease concept of alcoholism was 
one of the first attempts by a philosopher to consider the topic. While he has 
not written as extensively on alcoholism as Peele has on addiction, he considers 
similar evidence, rejects the disease model for similar reasons, and draws 
similar conclusions as to where the solutions lie as Peele does. 
In Heavy Drinking ( 1988) , Herbert Fingarette argues that the disease 
concept of alcoholism is inaccurate and unuseful. Despite a consensus among 
researchers in the interdisciplinary field of alcoholism studies that the disease 
concept is outdated, the general public (including most of the staff at 
alcoholism treatment centers) continues to believe in it. The myth of the 
disease of alcoholism, firmly rooted in the culture, should be replaced by an 
established fact: people who drink heavily do so for a variety of reasons. Heavy 
drinking has no single cause and no single cure. 
There is no "one size fits all" explanation or solution to the problem of 
heavy drinking, as disease theory proponents would have us believe. "Disease 
concept of alcoholism" here refers to the AA version of the disease concept and 
the variations that have developed from it. It is essentially the same as the 
157 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 355. 
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disease model of addiction that Peele describes. Unlike Benjamin Rush, the 
18th century physician and pioneer of the disease concept of alcoholism, who 
held that beer and wine were safe for everybody, and hard liquor a problem for 
everybody, AA holds that only certain people are alcoholics. 158 If these people 
do drink, they inevitably experience loss of control over their drinking and 
proceed in a stepwise fashion through the stages of disease. Eventually they hit 
bottom, at which point they either die of alcohol-related problems or are saved 
by some power greater than themselves. Complete abstinence from alcohol is 
required, at which point the alcoholic is "in recovery" but never "recovered" .  
The vast majority of Americans believe the disease model, even if they can't 
quote it chapter and verse and even if they also hold some beliefs that are 
inconsistent with it. 1 59 
Some proponents of the disease concept argue that it is invaluable for 
getting alcoholics the help they need, whether or not it scientifically valid. The 
disease model offers a non-judgmental explanation for excessive drinking, 
which allows alcoholics to seek help without sacrificing their dignity. Families 
and treatment staff will be moved to respond compassionately and productively 
to the heavy drinker, rather than responding accusingly and alienating her 
further. However, these hoped-for effects of the disease concept often do not 
materialize. In fact, many heavy drinkers react negatively to being called 
"diseased" or "sick," and reject treatment that demands complete abstinence 
but offers no cure. 
158 Alcoholics Anonymous World Services. Alcoholics Anonymous: The Story of How 
Many Thousands of Men and Women Have Recovered from Alcoholism, New and Revised 
Edition. (New York: Cornwall Press, 1955.)  p. xxvi. 
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Like Peele , for Fingarette the most damning criticism of the disease 
concept of alcoholism is this: it actually works against helping people who drink 
excessively. Most of the people who drink heavily and get into trouble as a 
result of their drinking do not consider themselves alcoholics; further, these 
people would not be diagnosed as alcoholic by traditional diagnostic criteria. 
Some twenty percent of Americans drink enough to be statistically at 
substantial risk for alcohol-related disorders. The greater number of these, 
states Fingarette, don't fit any of the traditional diagnoses for alcoholics. So the 
very people who need help are not alcoholics by their own standards - or by 
society's - and do not seek help for their problem. "In this way, the prevalence 
of the disease concept narrows the scope of inquiry, concern, and help. " 160 The 
most promising thinking about excessive alcohol consumption tends to focus on 
difference: differences in cultural, economic, social, and political factors in 
heavy drinking, as well as individual differences in motivations and patterns in 
heavy drinking. This is in contrast to AA's disease model, which emphasizes 
that, as a disease, alcoholism does not respect differences between individuals. 
A closer look at heavy drinking reveals different patterns,  motivations, and 
experiences . 16 1 
Finally, Fingarette nods at the notion of a "unitary theory," the 
proposition that addictions and compulsions in general are related and should 
coalesce into a theory about excessive appetites . While there are important 
behavioral and chemical differences between the addictions, he considers the 
1s9 Heavy Drinking, p. 2-4 
160 Heavy Drinking, p. 5.  
161 Heavy Drinking, p. 65. 
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possibility of a unitary theory a promising area of future research. He suggests 
that many of the ideas in Heavy Drinking may apply to other addictions, but 
leaves it at that. 162 
The Classic Disease Concept of Alcoholism 
In his chapter on the history of thinking about alcoholism, Fingarette 
documents the evolution of the disease model from Benjamin Rush, through the 
Temperance movement, on to E.M. Jellinek and AA. Perhaps the most 
significant feature of this history is Jellinek's 1 960 book, The Disease Concept of 
Alcoholism. This text is the authoritative text for the disease model. The data 
for this work was obtained from a questionnaire that Jellinek developed from 
AA literature and administered to AA members. After eliminating certain 
subjects (including all women, because their responses differed so significantly 
from the men's) he had data from 98 male members of AA. His _results were 
striking: they closely corroborated the disease notion of alcoholism that AA 
espouses. Jellinek himself cautioned against making much of this theory, since 
there were such significant limitations to the data. Nevertheless, the disease 
concept of alcoholism caught on, and has remained remarkably persistent even 
in the wake of countless studies that challenge it. 
Fingarette suggests several reasons for this persistence. 163 He 
perceptively discusses the current political climate that surrounds alcoholism 
treatment, noting that different groups are invested in the disease model 
because of what they stand to lose if it is debunked. For one, alcoholism 
treatment is big business. Treatment centers and all who are connected with 
162 Heavy Drinking, p. 7. 
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them stand to lose a great deal of money (in 1989, he puts the figure at $ 1  
billion per year in tax revenues and health insurance coverage) if it turns out 
that alcoholism is not a treatable disease after all. Further, many of the direct 
service staff in alcoholism treatment are paraprofessionals who describe 
themselves as recovering alcoholics. "Since their own treatment was effected at 
a time when the classic disease concept of alcoholism was dominant, they tend 
to have faith in the old dogma and tend to perceive any challenge to the disease 
concept as a challenge to the validity of their own emotional ordeal and 
conversion to sobriety." 164 The economic and psychological risks in challenging 
the status quo are enormous for researchers, administrators, professional and 
paraprofessional program staff, as well as individual alcoholics. The liquor 
industry itself benefits from the disease concept, which, after all, holds that 
only a small number of persons are diseased, and that everybody else can enjoy 
their product without fear. Finally, the simplicity of the disease model is 
appealing to the general public. 
Fingarette notes that some people, while recognizing the inaccuracy of 
the disease model, nevertheless believe that it's a useful social fiction. The 
belief that alcoholism is a treatable disease rather than a moral failing 
encourages a humane attitude toward alcoholics and encourages them to seek 
treatment. However, he cautions that these benefits may be fiction, as well. 
The notion that alcohol-related problems have a single cause (a disease) with a 
single, simple solution (abstinence for all alcoholics) is reassuring. However, 
despite all these benefits, the disease concept of alcoholism is false. Heavy 
163 Heavy Drinking, pp. 22-28. 
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drinking is caused by different factors in different people, and thereby requires 
different solutions for different people. Some heavy drinkers fail to achieve total 
sobriety but succeed in drinking moderately; a laudable goal of its own.165 The 
truth about heavy drinking is more useful than the "useful fiction" of the 
disease of alcoholism. 
For Fingarette, the central premise of the disease notion of alcoholism is 
that alcoholics cannot control their drinking. Even when they recognize that 
they will suffer if they continue to drink, their disease prevents them from 
stopping. This claim, argues Fingarette, has been discredited by the scientific 
community, yet it remains popular. Several studies support his argument. In 
one by Mello and Mendelson ( 1972}, diagnosed alcoholics in an inpatient 
treatment center were allowed to "earn" an ounce of bourbon at a time by 
pushing a button according to instructions. When and how much alcohol was 
served to them was up to them. According to the disease theory, they should 
have been drunk all the time. The results, however, showed that they did not 
drink continuously, that they did not consume the alcohol as soon as it became 
available, and that some of the subjects even tapered off their drinking in the 
days just before the experiment ended, to avoid withdrawal.166 
In another by Marlatt, Deming and Reid ( 1973), diagnosed alcoholics 
were divided into four groups and asked to sample different brands of a 
beverage. One group was truthfully told that they were drinking plain tonic 
water, the second group was truthfully told that they were drinking a mixture of 
164 Heavy Drinking, p. 23 
165 Heavy Drinking, p. 124. 
I66 Heavy Drinking, p. 34-35. 
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tonic and vodka, the third group was given plain tonic water and told it was a 
vodka-tonic mix, and the last group was given the vodka-tonic mix and told that 
it was straight tonic. According to the disease theory, the alcoholics who were 
actually drinking vodka should have consumed enough to get drunk, regardless 
of their belief about what they were drinking. However, the amount consumed 
depended on what the alcoholic subjects believed they were drinking; those who 
thought they were drinking vodka drank significantly more than those who 
thought they had straight tonic water, regardless of what they actually drank. 
Further, the amount consumed remained moderate in all four groups. These and 
other studies support the claim that there are no physiological factors that 
compel alcoholics to consume alcohol. 167 The evidence strongly suggests that 
people who drink heavily - even those who are diagnosed as having the disease 
of alcoholism - are able to moderate their drinking when the reasons to do so 
are salient to them. 
Some disease model theorists respond to this data by arguing that the 
studies did not use "real" alcoholics; since they did not demonstrate a loss of 
control when confronted with alcohol, they must not have been true alcoholics. 
However, this approach suggests that the portrait of alcoholism the disease 
model offers is unfalsifiable, and thereby unscientific. Others, notably Yale 
researcher Mark Keller, propose that the disease of alcoholism, characterized by 
a loss of control over one's drinking, is multifactorial and that it can go into 
remission for indefinite periods of time. However, 
This new approach to loss of control so emasculates �he concept 
that it becomes useless in explaining or predicting drinking 
161 Heavy Drinking, 39-40. 
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behavior. There is indeed a phenomenon involving the strong 
inclination to drink to excess, and it does need to be made 
intelligible if possible . But the attempt to account for this by 
reference to an on-again, off-again loss of control that follows no 
discernible pattern will not help anyone understand why heavy 
drinkers sometimes drink moderately and sometimes go on 
binges. 16s 
Fingarette might say that by applying Occam's razor to the most scientifically 
comprehensive version of the disease theory, we find that the disease theory is 
unnecessary to explain heavy drinking. 
There are several scientific theories as to what causes problem drinking. 
Among these are genetic , metabolic , psychological and socio-cultural 
hypotheses. 169 While each of these identifies risk factors that problem drinkers 
would be well advised to pay attention to, none of these adequately explains 
why some people drink heavily, nor do they adequately predict when such 
people will drink heavily and when they will abstain or drink moderately . 110 
The consensus is that there is no single cause for excessive drinking. While 
surely there are factors that increase the likelihood that a person will drink 
excessively, each person is a unique combination of these. 
It follows from the claim that alcoholism has no single cause that there is 
no single cure that will work for all problem drinkers. Indeed, Fingarette argues 
for tailoring the treatment to each problem drinker's situation. He argues 
forcefully, however, against modes of treatment for alcoholism that rely on the 
disease model . Two of his premises are scientific in nature; one is 
philosophical. In the name of science , he cites studies that have shown that 
168 Heavy Drinking p. 44. 
169 Heavy Drinking, pp. 5 1 -65. 
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heavy drinkers who receive intensive treatment fare no better than those who 
receive a single counseling session in which each patient was told that he (all 
subjects were male) and he alone had to deal with his situation. 11 1 So, to begin 
with, there are good reasons to question the efficacy of disease model inspired 
modes of treatment. Secondly, he notes that data regarding the efficacy of 
Alcoholics Anonymous (which holds that alcoholism is a disease) is suspicious. 
The number of drinkers who successfully stop drinking with M varies widely 
from source to source, and is in any case a self-selected group. Since 
participation in M is voluntary, it may well be that those who succeed are 
those that stay, rather than the other way around. 1 72 
In the name of philosophy, Fingarette argues that treatment goals based 
on the disease model are incoherent. The goal of treatment for such programs 
- since alcoholics are held to have a disease, not unlike an allergy to alcohol -
is abstention from drinking for the alcoholic. "Treatment" in this context does 
not mean "cure," since alcoholism is thought to be an incurable disease. 
Instead, "treatment" refers to a regimen that purports to ease or eliminate the 
symptoms of the disease, rather like achieving remission from or entering a 
latency phase of an illness . 
The paradox is this: the alcoholic is believed to have a disease that 
makes it impossible for her not to drink. The essential feature of this disease is 
that its victims cannot stop drinking; that they suffer from a loss of control with 
regard to alcohol. How, then, are they expected to achieve the treatment goal 
1 70 Ibid. 
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set out by the treatment industry, namely abstinence? Some reply that the 
loss of control happens after the first drink; again, much like an allergic 
reaction happens after initial contact with the allergen. (The M slogan "one 
drink, one drunk" speaks to this. ) This is the very reason that alcoholics are 
encouraged to abstain from drinking altogether. However, notes Fingarette, the 
allergy analogy breaks down before it can be of any use in explaining excessive 
drinking. People who have serious allergies don't need treatment programs or 
support groups to encourage them to stay away from allergens; especially if 
they have ever experienced an adverse reaction, they simply avoid the offending 
substance. Once sober, then, why would an alcoholic ever take another "first" 
drink?l73 
Fingarette's final blow to disease model modes of treatment is that they 
hijack medical language and metaphors without (often) using medicine for 
treatment. Most notably, while M uses terms like disease, symptom, and 
allergy, the "treatment" M offers is explicitly nonmedical. 174 I would add that it 
isn't even psychological in any clinical/counseling sense; it is utterly pragmatic. 
Fingarette alludes to the possibility that the powerful - and useful - aspects 
of M are not dependent on the disease model. In fact, it may be that more 
people would be moved to try "the AA way" if it weren't for the problems that the 
disease model imports. 
17 1 Specifically, he cites Jim Orford and Griffith Edwards. Alcoholism - A comparison of 
Treatment and Advice, with a Study of the Influence of Marriage. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977.) 
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New Approaches to Heavy Drinking 
If alcoholism is not a disease , then what are we to make of people who 
drink excessively and get into trouble because of their drinking? Rather than a 
homogenous group with a single problem or set of problems, Fingarette 
suggests that problem drinkers are a diverse group that " . . .  have little in 
common except that ( 1 )  they drink a lot, (2) they tend to have many more 
problems in life than nondrinkers or moderate drinkers, and (3) they show a 
puzzlingly inconsistent ability to manage their drinking."175 Problem drinkers 
are people for whom excessive drinking is a "central activity. "  A central activity 
is a theme in one's way of life, around which other aspects of life are centered. 
In addition to central activities, we each have our set of valued pleasures and 
less-important habits that make up our lives. Valued pleasures are less 
thematic; they are features of life that the individual enjoys but are not as 
deeply embedded in the individual's routine or identity as central activities are . 
Less-important habits are those habits that develop incidentally, that are not 
related to other features of a person's life . Obviously, drinking is a central 
activity for some people , merely a valued pleasure for others, and a fairly 
unimportant feature (or absent entirely) for still others. Some central activities, 
heavy drinking among them, are self-destructive.176 
People for whom drinking is a central activity arrange their lives - their 
social lives, their work lives, etc. - around drinking. The details of how they 
do this varies from person to person, but for each heavy drinker, drinking is a 
prominent feature that determines other features of life. All manner of details, 
m Heavy Drinking p. 99. 
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from one's choice of friends to the way in which one furnishes her home reflect 
one's central activities. We do not choose our lives complete and ready-made, 
but our choices build upon each other in ways that we cannot always predict . 
Thus, in an important sense, though each of us initially makes 
choices that eventually determine our central activities, once an 
activity becomes central it influences, inspires, or even seems to 
demand certain other choices that further define who we are, how 
we act, where we go, and what we value.177 
Heavy drinking, then, is the result of a series of choices that have come together 
as a central activity. Like any other series of choices, once the pattern is in 
place it carries a certain force. It is reinforced by a complex web of habits that 
are also the result of decisions the individual has made. Whether or not they 
are aware of it, heavy drinking is a meaningful part of the way in which some 
people are coping with their lives. For Fingarette, heavy drinking as a central 
activity is destructive; he does not discuss the possibility (even to dismiss it) 
that heavy drinking might be an appropriate coping mechanism - the "right 
choice" for some people. 
Helping the heavy drinker out of this pattern requires an understanding 
of the momentum of central activities without giving in to the fiction of loss of 
control. Because central activities develop over time, and because of the way 
that they come to influence every aspect of our lives, we often do not recognize 
the force they have. Any change that challenges a long-standing, deeply 
ingrained habit is difficult, but that does not mean that the difficulty is the 
result of the grip of some alien power. A single, isolated decision to stop 
176 Heavy Drinking, p. 103.  
177 Heavy Drinking p. 1 0 1 .  
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drinking will likely fail; it does not address the myriad ways in which drinking is 
a part of a heavy drinker's life. Sheer force of will is not enough to achieve a 
desired change of a central activity, but such a change is impossible without a 
serious commitment to make that change. Helping the heavy drinker, then, 
cannot involve such circuitous rationalizations as the disease model offers. "If 
our righteous condemnation is not in order, neither is our cooperation in 
excusing heavy drinkers or helping them evade responsibility for change." 11s 
Fingarette's suggestions for helping heavy drinkers follow from his 
argument that heavy drinking is a destructive central activity that results from 
a complex series of decisions that each heavy drinker makes, as opposed to a 
biologically-driven malady that causes people to lose the ability to make 
choices. Specifically, he calls for matching the treatment (including the 
therapist and the setting) with the drinker's personal characteristics, drinking 
history and patterns, and so on. 179 Additionally, he calls for flexible measures 
of success, which include both abstinence and controlled drinking. tso 
Controlled drinking presents both conceptual and practical difficulties. Once 
the abstinent/not abstinent dichotomy is rejected, operationally defining what 
counts as "success" becomes complicated. However, normal drinking is at least 
as desirable a goal as abstinence - perhaps more desirable, as the drinker sees 
it as more attainable and less stigmatizing. Like the notion of "heavy drinking" 
as opposed to "alcoholism" , controlled drinking as a treatment goal is more 
178 Heavy Drinking p. 1 1 2. 
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complicated and individualized than abstinence . This goal should not be 
rejected simply because it is not as simple as we might like it to be. 
Finally, Fingarette suggests that social policies that govern excessive 
drinking reflect this new understanding of heavy drinking as a central activity 
rather than a disease. His suggestions are largely commonsense ideas; that is, 
commonsense if one rejects the disease model. Some of his proposals (notably 
to reduce the availability of alcohol through liquor truces and licenses) are at 
odds with Stanton Peele; others (notably to increase public education and 
advertisement campaigns in attempt to influence social norms, to further limit 
liquor advertising, and to increase legal responsibilities associated with 
drinking) , 181  are consonant with Peele's suggestions . In either case, they are at 
odds with the widely-accepted disease model of alcoholism. Those who 
subscribe to the disease model will reject these as ineffective, inhumane, or 
both. There is evidence, however, that these approaches will work. For 
example, limiting the availability of alcohol during Prohibition did not eradicate 
alcohol consumption or alcohol-related problems, but the incidence of both 
substantially declined during that time. 182 Fingarette is not advocating another 
Prohibition, but offers this as support for his claim that simply making alcohol 
harder to get will reduce the incidence of heavy drinking. While no social policy 
will help everyone, certain policies can make it less convenient or appealing to 
drink to excess. Abandoning the disease model is the first step in developing 
such policies . 
1 8 1  Heavy Drinking, p. 1 34-5. 
1s2 Heavy Drinking, p. 1 36. 
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Once we leave behind the disease concept, which emphasizes 
medicine and individual treatment for a supposedly involuntary 
symptom, we can adopt a broader view: that what takes place in 
the drinker's environment may be more important than what 
takes place in the drinker's body. 1s3 
Remarks 
Stanton Peele and Herbert Fingarette offer a convincingly damning 
criticism of the widespread acceptance that the disease model has enjoyed. In 
the following chapter, we will see if the most recent genetic and neurological 
research can answer their charge that addictions are results of the choices 
people make, not the product of compelling biochemical determinants of 
behavior. First, though, I will offer a critique of their work. I will address a few 
problems with each of them, but primarily I want to sketch out some 
philosophical implications of their rejection of the disease model of addiction. 
Phenomenology and Addiction 
Both Fingarette's description of drinking as a central activity and Peele's 
description of addiction as an ingrained habit that one feels she cannot change 
understate the experience of addiction. It's true that Fingarette does caution 
the reader to have a healthy respect for the momentum that central activities 
have in influencing each individual's behavior, and Peele frequently notes that 
addictions are hard to break. However , this does not capture how different 
drinking is from other central activities for some drinkers, or how powerfully 
some people feel that they cannot rid themselves of their addiction. 
183 Heavy Drinking, p. 142. 
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Central activities as Fingarette describes them· are features of everyone's 
life. Our central activities not only contribute powerfully to our choices, but 
also give shape and color our perceptions and values. He gives the example of 
three people approaching a downtown building: a real estate investor who sees 
the building as a business opportunity, an architecture buff who sees the 
influence of Louis Sullivan in the skyline, and an anxious patient who is aware 
only of the clock near the elevators as his appointment approaches. Similarly, 
he says, a heavy drinker will approach a party and notice how much alcohol is 
available, while others (presumably those with the relevant central activities) 
might notice the decor or the food. 184 The heavy drinker's central activity, 
drinking, determines what she notices and what will make the evening a good 
one or a bad one for her. 
His description is accurate for as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. 
While surely some heavy drinkers will observe how well-equipped a bar is at a 
party with the same level of enthusiasm as an interior decorator might notice 
the new drapes, for some heavy drinkers the experience is - feels - obsessive. 
These drinkers do not merely "wince if it is poorly equipped" as Fingarette 
describes, but panic and plot, calculating how they will get enough alcohol 
without being detected. Caroline Knapp, journalist and author of Drinking: A 
Love Story, describes it this way: 
Are you driven by a feeling of hunger and need? When someone 
sets a bottle of wine on the dinner table, do you find yourself 
glancing at it subversively, possessively, the way you might look at 
a lover you long for but don't quite trust? When someone pours 
you a glass from that bottle, do you take careful note of the level of 
liquid in the glass, and measure it secretly against the level of 
184 Heavy Drinking, p. 104. 
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liquid in other glasses , and hold your breath for just a second 
until you 're assured you have enough? Do you establish an edgy 
feeling of relationship with that glass, that wine bottle; do you 
worry over it, care about it, covet it, want all of it yourself?1ss 
For these drinkers, Fingarette's notion of drinking as a central activity is only 
part of the picture. For these drinkers, drinking is an obsession. Not all 
central activities (not even all maladaptive central activities) are obsessions. 
They carry with them the momentum of having arranged one's life around 
them, but do not feel compulsive. 
To use Fingarette's own example, reading is a central activity for some 
people. For these folks, reading affects the way they arrange their homes (lots 
of bookshelves and reading lamps) how they spend their time and money, whom 
they associate with, and so on. If deprived of books or other reading materials 
for a while, they may feel uneasy or at loose ends, but probably not panicky. 
We cannot ordinarily imagine people stealing cars or prostituting themselves for 
because of their intense, uncontrollable craving for more and more . . .  books. 
("First it was novels and plays, no big deal. But then I got in to literary criticism 
and pretty soon I was doing hard stuff like Foucault and Derrida. Now I'll read 
anything I can get my hands on. You gotta help me, doc!") And lest we become 
tempted to say that it is the nature of certain substances that makes people do 
that, let's remember that gambling and other nondrug addictions have the same 
phenomenology. 
Similarly, Peele does not adequately acknowledge the power of the 
experience of addiction. Like Fingarette, he does not explicitly downplay or 
185 Caroline Knapp. Drinking: A Love Story. (New York: The Dial Press, 1 996.) pp. 52-53. 
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deny the power of the addictive experience, but his descriptions of addictions 
and his discussion of the way people often "mature out" of addiction, his zeal in 
trashing medical model-therapies as having fantastically low efficacy rates, and 
his hope for such homespun interventions as having a buddy to encourage you 
not to drink, leave the reader with the sense that addictions aren't as hard to 
quit as those bad treatment-industry moguls would have us believe. This is not 
to say that he is wrong about what works and what doesn't work, but rather 
that he tends to understate how trapped and hopeless addicts feel by their 
addiction. 
It may be that, for both Fingarette and Peele, the sense of helplessness 
and being overwhelmed that addicts feel has been so well-documented in 
disease model literature that they do not feel the need to emphasize it 
themselves. Further, they may think that focusing on how very hard it is to 
quit addictions detracts from their position that addiction is not a disease. 
However, social and psychological factors can be extremely powerful - clearly 
in some cases social and psychological factors are more powerful than biological 
ones. (For example, a devout Muslim will not eat pork even if she is very 
hungry.) Their argument - that addiction is not a disease, that it is a 
comprehensible pattern of behavior brought about by other choices in an 
individual's life, and that it can be overcome without appeals to medicine or 
religion - does not preclude the fact that addiction seems incomprehensible, 
feels like being possessed by aliens, feels impossible to break. While neither 
Peele nor Fingarette deny this, they do not give it the emphasis needed. 
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Authenticity. Value Options. and Central Activities 
Peele argues, contrary to conventional wisdom, that addiction is an 
expression of an individual's values. According to Peele, a crack addict's 
resorting to violence, theft, prostitution and the like to support her drug habit 
(for example) cannot be said to be due to the drug's making her act in ways that 
are contrary to her own values, as is commonly claimed; rather, her addiction is 
a result of choices based on what means the most to her . 186 He offers the 
example of an adolescent girl who stays at a crack house, having sex for money 
to buy more crack. 187 She does not, he notes, go to work or school . Peele says 
that addicts like her choose "to pursue drugs at the cost of other opportunities 
that do not mean as much to them - in this girl's case, learning, leading an 
orderly life, and self-respect. " 188 He makes the related claims that "Those with 
Better Things to Do Are Protected from Addiction," 189 and "If you have better 
things to do and value other things more than escape into intoxication, then 
you won't make intoxication the center of your life . " 190 
In one sense Peele is clearly wrong on this one. One of the very reasons 
that addiction attracts such morbid fascination is that people who do have 
better things to do - and who have a lot to lose - become addicted to some 
substance or behavior and lose everything that is dear to them because of it. 
People lose their children, their homes, their jobs, their health, and more to 
addiction. More importantly, they do not lose them because they value them 




less than their addiction; it seems quite wrong to say that, for example, that the 
crack addict described _above would rather get high again than live a life of 
order and self-respect. Perhaps a straw man version of his argument is that 
addicts value nasty things like violence and indiscriminate sex and disvalue 
virtuous things like cleanliness and good, old-fashioned hard work. Surely he 
doesn't mean that. But he is clear that he believes that an addiction is not 
separate from the rest of a person's life; addiction and the other behaviors 
required to support it are part of a coherent life story. 
A promising interpretation of his claim makes much of his use of the 
expression "value options" in this discussion. Expanding on Peele's use of the 
term, each person has a set of value options: possible objects of value for us. 
What is possible for an individual to value varies, not only from person to 
person but also over time for each individual. Value options change for many 
reasons, some of which are directly or indirectly a result of choices a person 
makes, others of which are beyond the control of the individual. Each choice a 
person makes opens up another set of choices. Of these, some are more salient 
than others, some are new, and some options that were live options are no 
longer live. This is why addicts sometimes find themselves doing things we 
never thought they'd do, as in narratives from women interviewed in Fast Lives: 
Women Who Use Crack Cocaine: 
I can't tell you about it. I'm at a place I thought I'd never be. For 
years, I fought against becoming a bad person, and here I am . .. I 
1a9 Diseasing of America, p. 1 60. 
190 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 43 . 
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can't even look at myself anymore. I never sit down and think 
about my life and where I should be going. It's too painful. 19 1 
It's not like I want to be a whore . I never thought about it, but I 
got into it . I guess it happened once I started smoking crack. . . .  I 
wasn't doing no drugs before crack. I never stole anything from 
the store or did any sin. Any woman can give sex. That's what I 
ended up doing . . . .  I 'd like to do something better than hooking 
but I am always high. 192 
The concept of value options is related to Fingarette's discussion of 
central activities .  An individual's central activities determine, in part, what 
value options are available to her. If it is the case that certain values or central 
activities "protect" against addiction, it seems that the "protection" will be value­
relative. Consider, for example, a passion for buying and wearing haute 
couture. This kind of central activity might offer some protection from eating 
compulsively, but not necessarily from addictions such as using amphetamines 
or shopping. If a person with this central activity becomes addicted to 
something, it will be to something that allows her to keep her fashion habit, 
though she might wreck her life in other ways. The degree to which her values 
and identity are wrapped up in her ability to wear high fashion is related to the 
likelihood that she will stay slim. Likewise, to say that a someone who overeats 
co.mpulsively does so in accordance with her values is not to say that she values 
obesity, excess, junk food, etc . ,  but rather that she values comfort, a sense of 
being taken care of, etc, and that furthermore her values don't preclude excess 
weight as, say, a fashion model's might. 
19 1Claire Sterk. Fast Lives: Women Who Use Crack Cocaine. (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1999. )  p. 76. 
192 Fast Lives: Women Who Use Crack Cocaine. p. 70. 
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With addiction, a person's involvement with a central activity gets away 
from her; she slides down a slippery slope. The values of "learning, living an 
orderly life, and self-respect" are not live value options for the crack addict in 
the example; the central activity of drug use (motivated, perhaps by the value of 
comfort or escape) has gained momentum and become the central activity of 
drug addiction. A person will "select" her drug of choice based on which 
(initially small) indulgences she can accommodate. 193 In sufficiently degraded 
lives, drug use is not so stupid a value option. It is not objectively the best 
choice, but it is a choice that makes sense to some people given their situation. 
"For the person challenged by personal problems, heavy drinking is one of the 
culturally available responses, however imprudent and self-destructive. " 194 For 
this reason, we should neither excuse her behavior nor pathologize it. Peele 
would argue for contributing to some value options worthy of the effort it takes 
to attain them (by providing safe schools and neighborhoods, decent 
employment opportunities, for example) and letting her make her own choices, 
without excusing socially or legally unacceptable behavior. 
Peele's claim that addiction is an expression of an individual's values can 
be reconciled with my claim that addiction mars authenticity by noting that 
sometimes values can be at odds with one another, especially the most extreme 
expression of some values (e.g. valuing fun in moderation doesn't interfere with 
valuing family, but valuing either to an extreme can interfere with the other) . 
Likewise, Fingarette notes that most individuals have more than one central 
193 For discussion of culture and choice of addictive object see Peele's The Meaning of 
Addiction, p. 109- 1 10; for individual values and choice of addictive object see The Truth 
About Addiction and Recovery p. 202-203. 
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activity, but he does not develop a discussion of coherence and central 
activities . Some central activities fit easily together and so produce coherent 
value options. Others do not fit together as obviously and produce odd value 
options, and some don't fit together at all and produce dichotomous value 
options. Valuing health together with valuing beauty might lead to coherent 
value options - good diet, exercise, and adequate rest, etc. , or might lead to 
incoherent value options - good diet, exercise , and plastic surgery, etc. 
Likewise, addictions can conflict with values, as with women who use drugs but 
also want to be good mothers. 195 Addiction compromises authenticity precisely 
because it produces powerful conflicting desires, and the seductiveness of 
addictive desires gives us reason to be suspicious about their authenticity. To 
say that addictions express an individual's values, then, is not false, but it is 
misleading and incomplete. 
This discussion of central activities and value options is related to lack of 
meaning in that addiction is possible when life has no value option that 
precludes some kind of addiction. Valuing even things like health and 
relationships can allow addiction to sneak in the back door, as these can lead 
to running addiction, anorexia, and "love addiction". To truly be "protected" 
from addiction, you need value options that are transcendent. A discussion of 
this theme follows in Chapter 4. 
Addiction, Habit, and John Dewey 
Fingarette's idea of central activities and Peele's call for social changes in 
order to ameliorate addiction echo John Dewey's remarks on the topic of habit. 
194 Heavy Drinking, p. 103. 
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While Fingarette does not discuss habit specifically (the word does not even 
appear in the index) and neither he nor Peele makes any mention of Dewey, 
their work can be meaningfully analyzed using the work of this philosopher. 
Though neither of them make this point explicitly, both Fingarette's and Peele's 
treatment of alcoholism and addiction implicitly reject the free will/ determinism 
binary that has gridlocked our ability to assign responsibility - especially in 
situations like those involving alcoholism. Similarly, Dewey's work on the role 
of habit in behavior offers a middle ground between views that individuals have 
no control or total control over their behavior. 
Like Fingarette, Dewey argues that human behavior is not mysterious or 
remote from our understanding and control. He calls for individual 
responsibility, which can be supported by careful changes in an individual's 
environment. Further, rather than targeting the will as the sole source of 
motivation in human behavior or rejecting the notion of willpower outright, 
Dewey advocates disciplining the will to attend to the activity that is "next" in 
the chain of events that lead to a desired goal . These features of Dewey's 
thought may be usefully applied to concerns about heavy drinking. 
Habit for Dewey is a social function; all of our habits develop within a 
social context. The patterns of our behavior take shape as each action meets 
'\\'ith the approval or disapproval, support or abandonment, of others. This kind 
of claim might have led to claims about the force of society on individual 
behavior, and then to the conclusion that individuals are not responsible for 
themselves, but rather society deserves the blame for the bad behavior of its 
195 Fast Lives: Women Who Use Crack Cocaine, p. 1 1 8 .  
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citizens . However, Dewey argues instead that the best response to wrongdoing 
is to demand personal responsibility from individuals, and to do so in a way 
that focuses on changing the factors that contribute to wrong acts. 
Courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as 
if his evil will were the sole cause of wrong-doing and those which 
condone offense on account of the share of social conditions in 
producing bad dispositions, are equally ways of making an unreal 
separation of man from his surroundings, mind from the world. 196 
Dewey's words recall Fingarette's caution to avoid both righteous condemnation 
and allowing heavy drinkers to evade responsibility for their actions. Both 
philosophers argue for approaching problem behavior with a balanced, firm, 
compassionate sense of judgement. 
Such an approach requires not only the right attitudes and beliefs about 
individual responsibility, but also requires a commitment to changing the 
environment in a way that supports the desired behavior. Just as Fingarette 
calls for social policies that will encourage moderate, non-excessive drinking, 
and Peele calls for mutual support between individuals and communities to 
prevent addiction, so too Dewey calls for attending to and modifying the 
environment in order to influence the formation of good habits. Simply 
exhorting people to change is not effective (which explains the success of the 
Reagans' "Just Say No" campaigns in the 1980s) . 
We must work on the environment and not merely the hearts of 
men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised 
in a desert of motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen 
and without a miracle. But only first by changing the jungle and 
desert. 197 
196 John Dewey Human Nature and Conduct. (New York: Random House, 1922 . )  p. 18 .  
197 Human Nature and Conduct p. 22.  
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Just common sense, to be sure, but focusing on the environment runs contrary 
to the classic disease model of addiction. (Interestingly, as Peele notes, this 
method is used to combat "first generation" diseases such as malaria and 
dysentery.) 
Finally, Dewey's discussion of habits and how they affect behavior 
includes the suggestion that, in order to change a habit, the individual ought to 
focus her energies and attention on "the next step" rather than on the final 
goal. This suggestion is actually in line with some classic AA advice to stay 
away from alcohol "Just for Today." In fact, a frequent saying at AA meetings is 
that the person who woke up earliest that day is the person who has been sober 
the longest. As Fingarette observes, AA's theory and practice are not altogether 
coherent; much of the advice that circulates among AA members flies in the 
face of the classic disease concept of alcoholism. On this point, AA, Fingarette 
and Dewey are in agreement; in particular, Dewey's suggestions on changing 
habits are echoed in Fingarette's suggestions on changing one's central 
activities: 
The hard drinker who keeps thinking of not drinking is doing what 
he can to initiate the acts which lead to drinking. He is starting with 
the stimulus to his habit. To succeed he must find some positive 
interest or line of action which will inhibit the drinking series and 
which by instituting another course of action will bring him to his 
desired end. 198 
Thus for a heavy drinker to make a major change in his drinking 
patterns requires a reconstruction of his way of life. The drinker 
must learn over time to see the world in different terms, to cultivate 
new values and interests, to find or create new physical and social 
settings, to develop new relationships, to devise new ways of 
behaving in those new relationships and settings. 199 
198 Human Nature and Conduct, p. 35.  
199 Heavy Drinking, p. 1 10. 
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Again, the advice here is commonsensical, but it challenges both the disease 
model of alcoholism and the equally simplistic moral model with which it often 
competes. 
A final thought on AA: Peele and Fingarette are unswerving in their 
attacks on all disease-theory based treatment, calling it expensive and useless, 
promoted by closed-minded zealots who equate questioning their way of 
treating addiction with heresy. AA, which explicitly accepts the disease model 
while actually utilizing many techniques that contradict it, is among those 
programs that they criticize . However, AA is undeserving of some of this 
criticism. It is free, membership is supposed to be voluntary (one of the Twelve 
Traditions is that it acquires members by "attraction rather than promotion") , it 
helps a lot of people, and certain aspects of it are pretty self-effacing and 
modest. One slogan is "Take what you need, and leave the rest," and members 
are encouraged to interpret AA literature in whatever way helps them to stay 
sober.20° For all of its shortcomings, AA should not be dismissed lightly. 
Conclusion 
These two thinkers have raised an important challenge to the dominant 
thinking about addiction. They argue that the disease model is neither 
coherent, supported by data, nor particularly useful or humane. They offer 
suggestions for alternative ways of thinking about and responding to addiction. 
200 Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom p. 14 1 .  
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Much of the current research on addiction , however, focuses on the 
neurological effects of addiction and characterize it as a disease. Whether these 
recent contributions can answer the challenges raised by Peele and Fingarette 
is the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three : The New Disease Model and Beyond 
The classic disease model - which characterizes addiction as a chronic, 
progressive illness to which certain people are susceptible - is not as widely 
accepted as it once was. Its decline in popularity is partly due to the work of 
critics like Stanton Peele and Herbert Fingarette, partly due to the changing 
political climate, and partly due to advances in neuroscience. On this older 
version of the disease model, the disease of addiction does not discriminate 
according to individual characteristics, such as background, social supports, 
economics, gender, etc. The only solution to this incurable disease is said to be 
complete abstinence from the addictive substance. This model is conveniently 
vague as to the etiology or physical manifestations of the disease, though M 
has made some gestures toward asserting that alcoholism is an allergy to 
alcohol. In contrast, the updated disease model takes seriously some of the 
theoretical and practical criticisms advanced by detractors of the classic disease 
model, and the result is more specific, more coherent, and more useful than its 
predecessor. The dip in the classic model's popularity has been absorbed by 
two basic perspectives: the view that addiction is not a disease at all, and a new 
version of the disease model. 
The newer disease model improves on the old model in several respects. 
For one, it makes specific claims about the nature of the disease of addiction, 
situating it in the neurological changes that result from drug use. The old 
disease model's claims about what, specifically, was the disease-making feature 
of addiction were generally vague and unsubstantiated. Another difference is 
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that the new model makes much use of the psychosocial dimensions of 
addiction, and calls for including such supports in addiction treatment 
regimens. A related difference is that, while the classic disease model tended to 
focus on the similarities between addicts, and the homologizing effects of 
addiction, the contemporary version acknowledges the myriad individual 
differences between addicts and calls for appropriately individualized treatment 
approaches. Finally, the updated disease model addresses the choices that 
addicted individuals make and the effects these choices have on addiction to a 
greater and more coherent degree than the classic disease model did. 
Despite these many improvements, there are reasons to reject even this 
much-improved version of the disease model. While it is certainly true that the 
neurological features of addiction are striking and merit further research, I 
contend that the most important defining features of addiction are behavioral 
and phenomenological, not neurological. There are theoretical and practical 
dangers in using the moniker "disease" to describe addiction. Even if there are 
sufficient physiological features of addiction to warrant calling it a disease, it is 
still not the best or most accurate way to describe this complex phenomenon. 
That is, even if we come to believe that it technically meets the criteria for a 
disease, that characterization both misleads one to think things that are not 
true, and it diverts one from appreciating things that are important about 
addiction. Thus, even the new and improved disease model has serious flaws in 
it, and is not the best way for us to think about addiction. 
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Alan Leshner, NIDA, and the Science of Addiction 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse, or NIDA, was established in 1974 
to explore issues of drug abuse. It became part of the NIH in 1992 . NIDA's 
goals have expanded from issues in drug abuse alone to include combating 
drug-related problems, such as the spread of diseases like hepatitis and AIDS.  
It  is  an organization that is  aggressively promoting the notion that addiction is  a 
brain disease. A visit to its website reveals its position on the matter: a 
silhouette of the human head in shades of blue and purple sets off NIDA's 
mission statement: Bringing the Power of Science to Bear on Drug Abuse and 
Addiction, together with the slogan Keep Your Brain Healthy. The resources 
that NIDA makes available include educational materials on drugs for teachers, 
information for students, and updates on its latest research for the general 
public and for other researchers. 
NIDA has taken the issue of addiction to new levels of sophistication. Not 
only has it sponsored the most advanced, cutting-edge neuroscience , but 
additionally it has augmented its affinity for medical science with data from the 
social sciences. Indeed, Strategy 1 from NIDA's five-year strategic plan is Give 
Communities Science-Based Tools To Prevent Drug Abuse and Addiction. It 
reads, in part: 
Understanding what determines vulnerability to substance abuse 
is crucial to the development of effective prevention programming. 
At this point, there is no evidence that a single, unique factor 
determines which individuals will abuse drugs; rather, drug abuse 
appears to develop as the result of a variety of genetic, biological, 
emotional, cognitive, and social risk factors that interact with 
features of the social context. Thus, both individual-level factors 
and social context-level factors appear to make an individual more 
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or less at risk for drug abuse and influence the progression from 
drug use to drug abuse to drug addiction. 201 
This organization is to be commended for including community and social 
factors in the discussion that focuses on the latest advances of the medical 
science of addiction. However, NIDA is vulnerable to the criticism that it calls 
addiction a brain disease when, by its own description, nonmedical factors 
(such as the plethora of "social context-level factors") determine risk for drug 
abuse and addiction. 
Further, despite its recognition of the importance of the nonmedical 
features of addiction , NIDA continues to funnel its efforts into high-tech 
treatments and interventions. Such treatments and interventions seem quite 
warranted if one adopts NIDA's position that addiction is a brain disease, but 
misguided if one accepts NIDA's description of the salience of the nonmedical 
features of addiction. The following appears in NIDA's Strategy 2: Develop and 
Distribute Tools To Improve the Quality of Drug Abuse Treatment Nationwide: 
Scientific advances, particularly over the past decade, have 
catapulted both our understanding of addiction and approaches to 
treating it. Research has, in fact, come to define addiction as a 
chronic disease, for many people a recurring disease, 
characterized by compulsive drug-seeking and drug use that results 
from the prolonged effects of drugs on the brain. Both animal and 
human studies have demonstrated that chronic drug use changes 
the brain in fundamental ways that persist long after the drug use 
has stopped. By using advanced brain imaging technologies, we 
can see what we believe to be the biological core of addiction.202 
This passage makes mention of compulsive drug-seeking, as well as discussing 
the effects of drugs on the human brain. However, "compulsive drug-seeking" 
is a behavior, not a medical symptom, and there are, clearly, social, volitional, 
20 1 http/ / :www.nida.nih.gov. my emphasis. Updated 06/ 02 .  
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and other factors that contribute to whether this "symptom" manifests itself. It 
is, therefore, unlike certain behaviors that are medical symptoms of various 
conditions (e.g. slurred speech, shuffling gait, etc.) in which the volitional and 
social factors are minimal. 
Neuroscientist Alan Leshner is a prominent advocate for the 
contemporary disease model of addiction. Leader of NIDA from 1994 to 200 1,  
he has worked to popularize the idea that addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain 
disease.203 At first glance, he and theorists like Stanton Peele and Herbert 
Fingarette seem to occupy opposite positions on the subject of addiction. In 
fact, while they do differ dramatically in the sides they take, they agree on some 
substantive issues in addiction, most notably that addicts must take 
responsibility for their problem and play an active role in solving it. Even so, 
Leshner's characterization of addiction as a brain disease is less accurate and 
less useful than the position that it is something other than a disease. 
Leshner argues that addiction is the result of changes in brain function 
that are produced by the use of addictive drugs.204 Drug taking begins as a 
voluntary activity, then, as brain function changes due to the neurochemical 
action of the drug(s), compulsive craving occurs that makes it nearly impossible 
for addicted persons to stop using on their own. Even when they are not 
experiencing the direct effects of the drug, these neurological changes are slow 
to reverse themselves. These physical differences in the brains of addicts as 
compared to the brains of non-addicts is the basis for calling addiction a 
202 Ibid. 
203 Peggy Orenstein. "Staying Clean" The New York Times Magazine Feb 10,  2002 . 
section 6. p. 38. 
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disease ; it isn't just a psychosocial phenomenon. However, he also says that 
the "nature of addiction" concerns the experience of compulsion: 
What does matter tremendously is whether or not a drug causes 
what we now know to be the essence of addiction: compulsive drug 
seeking and use, even in the face of negative health and social 
consequences.2os 
This contemporary disease model of addiction differs from the 
"traditional" or "classic" model - espoused by E.M.  Jellinek and the 
Anonymous programs and criticized by Peele and Fingarette - in that the 
newer account describes a disease that is the effect of a harmful substance on a 
healthy brain, whereas the traditional account describes addiction as a disease 
to which certain people are inherently vulnerable. (As noted, AA sometimes 
describes alcoholism as caused by an allergy to alcohol .)206 This updated 
disease model also takes into account behavior and social contributors to 
addiction in ways that earlier accounts did not. For these reasons, it is a more 
comprehensive model than the classic disease model. 
Despite the opposite camps that they occupy, both Leshner and disease 
model critics such as Peele and Fingarette agree that addicts should not be 
excused from responsibility for their behavior and that addiction is a problem 
that requires many kinds of intervention. "Addiction is a brain disease . . .  but 
not just a brain disease,"207 according to Leshner. Successful treatment for 
addiction must be tailored to the needs of the individual, and each individual 
204 Alan Leshner. "Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment" Journal of 
the American Medical Association Oct. 13 ,  1999 . p. 1 3 1 5. 
205 Alan Leshner. "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters. "  Science. October 3, 
1997. vol. 278 . p. 46. my emphasis. 
206 Alcoholics Anonymous (New York: Alcoholics Anonymous World Services. Inc. ,  
1955.)  p. xxvi. 
2o1 Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters ."  p. 46. 
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will have multiple needs. "[B]ehavioral and social cue components must also be 
addressed, just as they are with many other brain diseases, including stroke, 
schizophrenia, and Alzheimer's disease. "208 Further, since addiction is a 
chronic, relapsing disease rather than an acute disease, treatment options 
should reflect the need for continued maintenance - a difference from Peele 
and Fingarette, who disagree with keeping people dependent on treatment. 
(This may not be a serious difference, however, depending on what counts as 
"treatment" and what is meant by "chronic.") On Leshner's account, the best 
treatment for addiction can combine medications, cognitive, behavioral, and 
psychological therapy, social service assistance, and the like, as directed by the 
needs of the individual. 
Leshner's version of the disease model is a big improvement on the 
classic disease model. With its emphasis on tailoring treatment to the needs of 
the individual instead of ltone-size-fits-all" therapy, and on addressing many 
dimensions of addiction instead of focusing on just one or two, the model of 
addiction that Leshner articulates has much to recommend it. Even so, there 
are some important problems with it. The major criticisms of Leshner's model 
are persistent problems with the notion of volition and disease, and the 
inappropriate medicalization of a condition that has but a small medical 
component. Additionally, characterizing addiction as a disease has some 
undesirable implications for our thinking about morality and addiction, and 
neglects nonsubstance addictions. Stated in general terms, the most important 
criticism of Leshner's account of addiction is not so much that it is wrong, but 
20s Ibid. 
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that it seriously overstates "the biological core of addiction" and under­
emphasizes other, more important features. 
Volition, Behavior, and Disease 
The first problem with the new disease model of addiction is that to 
characterize addiction as a disease diminishes the volitional component of 
addiction. Since the term "disease," when used to describe addiction, has 
historically been used to connote a defect in an individual's body or mind, 
continued use of the term is misleading, even with the appropriate nods to 
other causal factors. It suggests that there was something wrong with addicts 
to begin with rather than the addicts' having done something that has 
damaged themselves. Even though Leshner himself clearly says that addicts 
must take responsibility for the choices they make, retention of medical 
vocabulary carries the connotation that addictions just happen to people, rather 
than being the result of individuals' choices. The account of addiction as a 
brain disease is similar to that of diseases like asbestos poisoning: these are 
conditions that occur in a healthy body due to prolonged exposure to a 
substance. However, in the case of asbestos poisoning, the volitional, social 
and economic features of the medical problem are much more clear than in the 
case of addiction, which seems miasmatic by comparison. 
Furthermore, calling addiction a brain disease does not adequately 
account for why some drug users become addicted and others do not, or why 
some former addicts begin using after many years of having been "clean" . It is 
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true that advances in neuroscience have revealed certain substances cause 
changes in the brain that persist far longer than had previously been thought. 
However, it remains the case that some individuals whose brains have been 
altered by substance abuse do not return to using that substance, while others 
do. Presumably, nonbiological factors such as poverty are at work here; 
alcoholism, for example, is correlated with low socioeconomic status, and 
relapses are associated with certain memory triggers and with stressful life 
events. If such nonbiological factors are important enough to determine who 
becomes addicted (i .e . "develops the disease of addiction") and who does not, as 
well as who returns to using and who "remains in remission," it seems far more 
accurate to say that addiction is a condition that has important neurological, 
phenomenological, and psychosocial features than to say that it is a brain 
disease ("but not just a brain disease") . 
Leshner rightly disagrees with the notion that diseases have no volitional 
component. "What about people with high cholesterol who keep eating French 
fries? Do we say a disease is not biological because it's influenced by 
behavior?"209 This is an important point. Many (arguably alij human problems 
have many dimensions; likewise, many (arguably all) biological diseases have 
nonbiological components. In Leshner's example, heart disease (a "real" disease 
if ever there was one) is exacerbated by high cholesterol, which in tum is 
exacerbated by the behavior of eating french fries . But notice: the disease in 
this example is in the body: the heart does not function as it should. The 
behavior that exacerbates the problem - french fry eating - is not itself the 
209 Orenstein, "Staying Clean" p. 38. 
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problem. By contrast, the "disease" of addiction is in the behavior itself: 
compulsive drug taking. In the case of heart disease, a behavior causes a set of 
physical problems, which are the disease. In the case of addiction, a behavior 
is the disease, which causes a set of physical problems. The point here is that 
the physical features of addiction are not essential features. 
Take the example of two people, call them Minnie and Mickey. Minnie 
has heart disease, and Mickey is addicted to diet pills. If Minnie stops eating 
french fries (and starts eating soy and taking daily walks, etc.), but somehow 
her heart still remains gunked up and her cholesterol remains high, we would 
conclude that Minnie still has heart disease even though her behavior has 
changed in the relevant ways. Now let's say Mickey stops taking diet pills and 
never experiences craving or withdrawal, but somehow his brain remains 
unchanged (i.e. does not begin to return to its pre-drug state) even over a long 
period of time. If he is no longer taking the drugs, would we say that he is still 
addicted to diet pills? In both cases, the behavioral features have stopped and 
the physical features have remained the same. The difference is that the 
physical features of heart disease are essential features, while the physical 
features of addiction are not. Likewise, the behavioral features of addiction are 
essential, but the behavioral features of heart disease are not. 
One might be tempted to say that whether Mickey has the disease of 
addiction depends on whether or not his brain was changed by the diet pills in 
the first place. In the example above it is simply stated that Minnie had heart 
disease and that Mickey is addicted to diet pills; but what criteria are being 
employed for addiction? According to Leshner, the most important criterion is 
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the compulsion to use drugs. Tolerance (usually defined as an adaptation to a 
substance so that the effect is diminished) and physical dependence (usually 
defined as certain characteristic withdrawal symptoms when drug taking stops) 
are, he rightly argues, not the most important criteria. Since the most 
important features of addiction are behavioral and phenomenological rather 
than physiological, these are also the most important criteria for describing 
addiction. Neurological data, if and when it becomes available, will serve to 
corroborate clinical findings, or to adjudicate difficult cases. Neurological 
features alone are not, and cannot be, the most important criteria for addiction. 
To illustrate, consider another person, call him Donald. Donald acts just 
as Mickey did when he was addicted to diet pills (i.e. he had a compulsion to 
take the pills), and even has feelings of craving and withdrawal when he tries to 
stop taking them. But when we look at Donald's brain, it does not show the 
same drug-induced neurological changes that Mickey's did. Would we say that 
he is not - and never was -.addicted? It seems that Donald is addicted, 
despite the lack of neurological features that often accompany addiction, and 
that Mickey (the new Mickey, after quitting the drugs) is not, despite the 
persistence of these neurological features. The most important features of 
addiction are the behavioral and phenomenological features; while the 
neurological features are important because they point us to useful tools in 
helping addicted persons overcome their habit, they are not defining 
characteristics of addiction. 
The point here is that, for all of the many problems and difficulties that 
people face, some are best described in terms of their physical manifestations. 
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Diabetes and broken legs fall in to this category, for while there are 
nonbiological contributors to these problems, their most salient features are 
physical. Other problems, while they may have striking physical dimensions, 
are best described in other terms. This may be because their etiology, most 
important phenomenological features, and/or their best solutions are not 
physical in nature. I will address these three dimensions of addiction later in 
this chapter and in the following chapter in greater depth; I will argue that 
neither the etiology nor the best solutions to addiction are physical in nature. 
The way a problem is framed shapes our thinking about it, and can have 
important implications for treatment, research, moral attitudes, and so on. 
There is a better frame for the problem of addiction than to frame it as a 
disease. 
Medicalization and its Dangers 
The second problem with the new disease model is that naming addiction 
a disease threatens to medicalize it inappropriately. Leshner says, for example, 
that addiction should be treated by addressing the medical, behavioral, and 
social needs of the addict, just as we treat individuals who have other brain 
diseases, like schizophrenia. He's right, except that we don't treat 
schizophrenia that way, though we should; we give schizophrenic people 
psychotropic medications and send them on their way. Calling addiction a 
"brain disease like schizophrenia" threatens addicts with the same fate as 
schizophrenics. He is certainly right that the most effective way to treat a 
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problem is to address each dimension of the problem; I would argue that this 
applies to all human problems. For example, we are now beginning to address 
the psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions of conditions that used to be 
considered strictly from a medical perspective, such as cancer and heart 
disease. Likewise, we are beginning to address the physical dimensions of 
conditions that had once been considered from nonmedical perspectives, such 
as grief. However, since this is the case, there is nothing to be gained from 
calling addiction a brain disease, especially when the social and psychological 
aspects of it are so powerful. 
Furthermore, although the best treatments for all kinds of problems 
address them in many dimensions (i.e .  physical, emotional, social, etc .) many 
people do not have access to the best care and treatment. While ideally 
conditions like schizophrenia should be addressed on an individual basis, using 
intensive social support, counseling, medications, etc. as appropriate for each 
individual, more often treatment consists of medications and a sham outpatient 
"counseling" session that primarily consists of inquiries as to how the 
medications are working. The sad fact is that many people will not get adequate 
care; given that, it is imperative that the care they do get be of the kind that is 
going to be most effective. The characterization of addiction as a disease will 
mean that the treatment priority will focus on the neurochemical aspects of it, 
which are the least important and the least effective in arresting addiction. 
A case in point is that a common treatment for overeating and the 
obesity that results from it is appetite suppressant drugs. The theory is that if 
individuals' appetites are suppressed, they will eat less and will lose weight. 
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However, common sense suggests that treating obesity with appetite 
suppressants is counter-productive. People do not overeat because their 
appetites (i.e. the physical sensation of hunger, which is the sense of "appetite" 
that "appetite suppressants" address) are too big, rather they overeat because 
eating satisfies some other, nonphysical, need. Some animal data support this 
point. For example, one study compared the rate of consumption of starved 
rats versus well-fed rats for both normal maintenance chow and ground meat. 
As one might expect, well-fed rats will eat much less rat chow than starved rats 
will when both groups have access to unlimited amounts of food; well-fed rats 
are not as hungry as their deprived brethren. However, well-fed rats will eat as 
much raw ground meat (which is thought to be much tastier than rat chow) as 
starved rats will .2 10 Such findings suggest that overeating is not a result of 
physical hunger. If that is true, then medications to ameliorate hunger will not 
stop overeating. Likewise, if medications are the only treatment - or 
essentially so - available for addicted persons, addicts' attempts to change will 
be inadequately supported and they are likely to fail.  
A related danger of medicalizing addiction is that it puts the emphasis on 
curing addiction rather than preventing it. In doing so, it puts the 
responsibility for addiction primarily on the medical community, secondly on 
the addicted individual, and hardly at all on social, political and economic 
groups. A more appropriate and effective allocation of responsibility would put 
the medical community last, with the contextualized individual (that is, the 
210 Jaak Panksepp. Affective Neuroscience. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) .  
p. 171 .  
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individual understood as being situated in certain kinds of social, political and 
economic factors) first. Since on Leshner's model addiction is a disease that 
occurs because of excessive drug use, it follows that the most effective way to 
approach addiction is to intervene before it happens. While theoretically this 
model isn't stopping anyone from doing just that, the focus on a cure often 
works against working on prevention. 
We who are interested in arresting addiction can take a cue from the 
example of Garfield Park. This area, in one of the poorest parts of Chicago, was 
the subject of a 1974 task force on community health. Northwestern 
University's Center for Urban Affairs, together with a group called the Christian 
Action Ministry, searched medical records of nearby hospitals for the major 
causes of health problems in the area. They found that residents of the 
neighborhood were frequently admitted to hospitals for treatment of dog bites. 
They could have responded to this health problem by providing inservices for 
ER physicians on suturing techniques for dog bites, by making rabies vaccines 
more widely available, and perhaps by providing pamphlets for community 
members on how to avoid dog bites. But they didn't. Instead, they hounded 
(you should excuse the expression) their local government until the animal 
control department removed the stray dogs.2 1 1  These researchers did much to 
prevent the health risk the patients were facing, and thus made a far greater 
contribution to the patients' health than they ever could have if they had stayed 
in the clinic. Likewise, focusing research and treatment efforts on curing 
2 1 1 "Hospitalization Causes: New Look at Ghetto."  in Medical News, Journal of the 
American Medical Association Oct. 3 1 ,  1 977. vol. 238, no. 18 .  p. 1 908. 
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addiction, while necessary, diverts time, effort, money, and inspiration from 
preventing it. Perhaps most tragically, it diverts us from even thinking about 
preventing it. 
Calling addiction a disease and focusing on the neurological features of it 
is like calling malnutrition a disease and putting research, therapeutic, and 
education dollars into understanding and using knowledge of precisely what 
happens to the human body when it is deprived of adequate food. Such 
knowledge is unquestionably useful, but to emphasize it is to miss the point. 
Hunger is a political issue as well as a biopsychosocial one. While it helps to 
know that starving children need vitamin E, it is better to change the systems 
that allow starvation to happen than to hand out vitamin E capsules to starving 
children. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that a danger in putting energy 
into calibrating and distributing the proper dosage of vitamin E to starving 
children is that we will lose sight of why they are starving in the first place, and 
we will have no resources left to address that. Since the danger of focusing on 
cure to the detriment of working on prevention applies to "real" diseases, too, 
we should exercise caution about extending the reach of medicine. 
The fact that focus on a cure often works against working on prevention 
is related to my first objection, that labeling addiction a disease has the 
connotation that addicts have a defect in their brains that causes them to 
abuse drugs, rather than defects in their brains that result from their drug use. 
It is important to retain an awareness of addicts' agency, and to say that 
addiction is a disease tends to reduce this. It is useful, for example, to compare 
drug addiction with asbestos poisoning, since both phenomena occur when a 
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healthy person becomes unhealthy due to exposure to a toxic substance. 
Labeling asbestos poisoning a disease makes sense because the features of the 
condition are primarily physical and because exposure to asbestos is often 
involuntary - or, in any case, less voluntary than exposure to relevantly 
similar levels of drugs. Further, while some people's bodies are more sensitive 
to toxins than others, and so will be more prone to react to asbestos than 
others, nearly any body that is exposed to certain levels of asbestos will get 
sick. This no matter of agency or willful action. However, this is not the case 
with drugs and drug talcing . .  Amount of exposure to a drug does not determine 
addiction - though it might determine chemical dependency - in the same 
way that exposure to asbestos can determine toxicity. Many people who take 
drugs that are addictive (for pain management, for recreation, etc. )  never 
become addicted (that is , never manifest the compulsive, excessive drug-taking 
behavior that marks addiction) and stop taking the drug when they wish to . 
Others who take the same drugs do become addicted. While certainly there are 
many factors that contribute to the difference between the two groups, one 
factor concerns the choices that individuals make with regard to their drug 
talcing. This factor is inappropriately de-emphasized by calling addiction a 
disease. 
Leshner is aware of this objection, and agrees that the volitional 
component in addiction is crucial. He notes that recovery from any disease 
requires the participation of the individual; addiction is no different. He also 
notes that the danger in calling addiction a brain disease is that it makes 
addicts sound like victims,  and he is interested in avoiding that danger. "It can 
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be a brain disease and you can have given it to yourself and you personally 
have to do something about treating it,"212  he argues. Maybe it can be. But he 
still has not explained the advantage of calling addiction a brain disease "with 
embedded behavioral and social aspects" instead of calling it a habit with 
important neurological and social aspects. The latter description accounts for 
the same features as the former, but it places the emphasis where it belongs 
and can do the most good. At best, the former description is merely 
inconsistent, at worst, it can misdirect energy from where it is needed. 
An example of such inconsistency appears in an article describing a 
program in which addicts talked about their experiences for a group of medical 
students. The program was intended to correct future physicians' 
misconceptions about drug addicts , and to sensitize them to addicts' lived 
experience. The program itself sounds like an innovative approach to educating 
health care professionals about addiction, except for this rationale, offered by 
the program's medical director: "A medical student who becomes a physician in 
the community who hasn't learned that addiction is a brain disease is not going 
to be effective . 112 13  The contradiction is evident, as the addicts in the program 
weren't talking about their diseased brains; they were talking about their 
experiences and actions. One medical student who found the experience 
enlightening said, "What I heard were people who were using drugs to make the 
suffering go away, to get lost in the world of drugs." The push to label addiction 
a brain disease doesn't seem to have done any damage in this case, but the 
212 Orenstein, "Staying Clean." p. 38 
213 Linda Villarosa. "Recovering Addicts Help Educate Future Doctors." The New York 
Times, Final Ed. , Dec. 24, 2002, Sec. F, p. 6, col. 3 .  
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inconsistency is troubling. Which perspective will inform this future doctor's 
thinking about addiction as she continues in her career - her mentors' or her 
patients'? 
Since addiction is clearly a condition that has only a small medical 
component, what is to be gained by further medicalizing it? Instances of 
inappropriate medicalization of legal, political , and social problems has been 
well-documented. Reasons for inappropriate medicalization vary, from sleazy 
attempts to silence or disempower people (e .g. "drapetomania," the desire that 
causes slaves to run away214) to reflections of the morals and norms of the day 
(e .g. nineteenth-century beliefs about masturbation.215) While surely the 
interest in medicalizing addiction reflects contemporary values, specifically our 
fascination with science and technology, another possible motive to medicalize 
non-medical phenomena - and likely one that is at work with regard to 
addiction - is to capture the sympathy of the general public. As Mariana 
Valverde notes, " . . .  the scientific temperance activists of the early twentieth 
century, and, after the 1930s, Alcoholics Anonymous, used the term "disease" 
not to hand over control of alcohol questions to medicine , but simply to de­
stigmatize the population which they sought to reach and reform. "2 16 
Furthermore, in contemporary American culture, we believe that medical 
problems are eminently comprehensible and fixable . We are confident that 
those we cannot solve today are simply those that we will solve tomorrow. 
214 Thomas Szasz. ''The Sane Slave. '' American Journal of Psychotherapy 25 ( 197 1 ) :  228-
239. 
2 1s Engelhardt, "The Disease of Masturbation: Values and the Concept of Disease. "  
216 Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom. pp. 43-44 . 
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Physical problems are comfortingly, undeniably real, while spiritual, emotional, 
or cultural things are maddeningly contestable. 
The related advantage to the new disease model for addiction over other 
models is that treatments for diseases are fundable in ways that assistance for 
bad habits or weak willpower is not. If we believe that addiction is a disease, we 
are likely to feel more generous about funding for research and treatment, and 
w� are more likely to feel generous about funding for jails and probation officers 
if we believe that addiction is a bad habit or a manifestation of moral weakness. 
Indeed, it may be that advocating for the new disease model is more a political 
move than a scientific one.217 Psychobiological research is, after all, an 
expensive enterprise, and if touting a disease model of addiction allows 
addiction researchers to acquire adequate funds to continue to learn about the 
neurological features of addiction - well, why not? The brain-related aspects of 
addiction and the biological tools to combat them that are being developed are 
important, but costly. Given that, some might argue that the disease model is 
necessary (a "useful fiction," perhaps) to get the relevant research done. 
A suppressed premise to this argument is that, while we might call 
addiction a brain disease in order to get funding, we can continue to treat it any 
way that works. This kind of argument is used on a micro scale when patients 
are given a billable diagnosis, even though what is actually wrong with them 
bears little resemblance to that diagnosis. The problem with this practice is 
that in order to keep getting funded (whether for research or for individual 
treatment) those who do the funding (for grants or for insurance) have to see 
217 Jaack Panksepp, personal correspondence. 10-0 1 -02. 
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some consistency. There is room for professional autonomy, to be sure, but 
glaring inconsistencies (like, "addiction is a brain disease, we need funding for 
community development") are going to catch up with one sooner or later. 
Medicalizing addiction doubtless produces great short-term gains in funding, 
but at what price for our long-term understanding of addiction? Ultimately, the 
brain disease model boxes our thinking into a corner, and the answers aren't in 
any single corner. 
A related, hopeful development in this area is that some psychiatrists are 
advocating that "relational disorders" - emotional and behavioral distress that 
emerges from disturbances in relationships between people - be included in 
the DSM.2 18 This move represents a divergence from medical model psychiatry, 
in which all emotional and behavioral disorders are thought to be tied to 
neurological defects. Those advocating the inclusion of relational disorders 
acknowledge the obvious link between emotions, behavior and brains, and 
argue that problems that are primarily emotional and behavioral are just as real 
and worthy of treatment as problems that are primarily neurological. If such 
thinking catches on, perhaps the motivation to characterize addiction as a 
brain disease will diminish. 
The implicit assumption made in medicalizing addiction is that diseases 
are completely beyond the control of the individual (not true) and that habits 
and moral weaknesses are wholly under the individual's control (also not true). 
The overly simplistic dyad of freedom vs. determinism contributes to our faulty 
thinking about individual and social responsibility - i.e. either addiction is a 
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moral weakness, addicts are free and responsible for their actions and deserve 
to be punished for their behavior OR addiction is a disease, addicts are not 
responsible for their actions and deserve treatment for their illness. This, 
again, is not Leshner's own view. It is, however, the view that is most apt to 
"filter down" from the theoretical heights to the valleys of our everyday living. 
As such, it deserves critical attention. 
Morals and Addiction 
Thus, the very volitional component that both Leshner and the anti­
disease theorists maintain is important is jeopardized by the sentiment that 
people deserve help only if their situation isn't their fault. In order to get 
funding for research and treatment, we have to begin with an assumption that 
prejudices and weakens our thinking about research and treatment: the 
assumption that addiction is primarily (or best understood as) a brain disease. 
It is as though we believe that if addicts got themselves into this mess, they can 
just get themselves out of it, but if they are victims of something beyond their 
control we are only too willing to help. Indeed, as Leshner notes " . .. there are 
many people who believe that addicted individuals do not even deserve 
treatment. This stigma, and the underlying moralistic tone, is a significant 
overlay on all decisions that relate to drug use and drug users. "2 19 The moral 
model of addiction (that is, moral models of addiction) hold some variation of 
2 18 Paul R. McHugh. 11Treating the Mind as Well as the Brain. "  The Chronicle of Higher 
Education Nov. 22, 2002, p. B-14 .  
2 1 9  Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It  Matters." p. 45. 
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the belief that addicts are simply bad, weak-willed people who simply need to 
shape up. This assumption is unattractive for at least two reasons: for one, it is 
mean-spirited and judgmental, and secondly, it points us to treatment options 
that are tantamount to abandoning addicts to their own devices ("Just Say NO 
to drugs!") 
Surely it is true that the stigma attached to addiction and the judgmental 
attitudes that go with it can be unwarranted and detrimental. And surely it is 
true that public perceptions of addiction are woefully inadequate and simplistic. 
However, disease models of addiction only feed into these judgmental attitudes; 
people lmow that there is a strong volitional component to addiction, and many 
react to the disease model by rejecting it so thoroughly that they swing back 
into the moralistic models that disease model theorists (rightly) want to replace. 
The disease model, even the improved version, seems to suggest that the fact 
that the cravings have the "legitimating" feature of neurological changes makes 
them beyond moral criticism. An article in the New York Times Magazine in 
which Leshner was quoted describes this feature thus: "At some point (when, 
precisely, is unclear) the neurochemistry and receptor sites of a user's brain 
change , radically, causing drug-seeking to become as biologically driven as 
hunger, sex, or breathing. "220 And yet we still maintain certain standards of 
behavior for at least two out of the three of the biologically-driven behaviors 
cited. The cravings and compulsions that addicts experience are not beyond 
moral critique because they have persistent neurological features. Many 
biological drives can and should be controlled by the individual. Furthermore, 
22o Orenstein, Staying Clean" p. 38. 
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both the disease models and moral models minimize the role of social and 
economic factors in addiction. Because they present polarized views of addicted 
persons, as either villains or victims, they leave little room for discussions of the 
loosened social supports that contribute to choices - and lack of choices -­
that are available to individuals . It is unreasonable to expect people to flourish 
without adequate social support. Social support includes moral support and 
expectations of high standards of behavior. 
The best antidote to this tug-of-war between the disease models and the 
moral models is to introduce a third, different category that is not disease­
based nor moral-based, nor even a hybrid category, but a description that sits 
apart from the dichotomy. Allegiance to the disease model - any disease mqdel 
- condemns the discussion of addiction to ping-ponging between it and the 
moral model. In order for any progress to be made , we need to escape the 
disease/moral dichotomy and consider models of a different sort. In doing so, if 
we do it well , we can avoid counterproductive appeals to morality and can also 
continue to disvalue - that is, continue to retain an appropriate moral attitude 
toward - addiction. That is, it is true that the self-congratulatory moralism 
that many people hold toward addicts is unwarranted and detrimental. It is 
unwarranted because it does not acknowledge how difficult addictions are to 
quit, or indeed what drives many people to addiction in the first place. It rests 
on faulty, self-serving assumptions about addicts and addiction. Furthermore, 
it is detrimental because addicted persons are less likely to seek help if they feel 
that they are being unfairly judged and misunderstood. 
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However, it would be a mistake to say that we should strive for a morally 
neutral attitude toward addiction and toward addicts' behavior, as disease 
models seem to imply. A certain level of moral approbation - tempered with 
compassion - is useful, appropriate, and consistent . First of all , it is useful 
because honest, fair-minded moral disapproval can be a powerful motivator for 
individuals to change and grow. When people believe that others disapprove of 
their behavior, but still esteem them as individuals and believe that they can 
change their behavior, it can give them the self-esteem they need to overcome 
their problems. This is especially true when they themselves disapprove of their 
own behavior. Indeed, "enabling" in AA lingo refers to allowing addictions to 
flourish by keeping confrontations with addicts from becoming too 
uncomfortable for them. Such discomfort is necessary for change. 
Secondly, moral disapproval (again, tempered by understanding) for 
addiction and for addicts' behavior is appropriate. Addicts hurt themselves and 
others. The anger, pain, and frustration that those who are involved with 
addicts feel is natural and healthy. To distill away these feelings and regard 
addiction as a morally neutral "condition" is dishonest, and produces a kind of 
emotional dissonance in those who attempt to do so. These emotional 
gymnastics do nothing to help the addict, and do harm those who are around 
them. (Obviously, those who are involved with addicts should take pains to 
express their feelings constructively.) Thirdly, moral disapproval of addiction is 
consistent with moral approval of ending addiction. Breaking an addiction is 
hard work and requires a great deal of personal effort. People who do break 
addictions (and people who are attempting to break addictions) deserve high 
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praise for doing so. To say that we cannot blame addicts for their addictions 
but can praise them for breaking their addictions is only consistent if we believe 
that they had no causal role in the development of the addictions - a move 
that few would be willing to make. While the contemporary disease model that 
Leshner espouses does not preclude moral approbation for addiction or for 
addicts, the implication that such approbation is inappropriate remains. 
That is to say, the moral model of addiction is wrong, incomplete, sub­
optimal - but there are moral dimensions of addiction that ought to be 
preserved. We ought not, for example, regard addiction, as Thomas Szasz does, 
as "the right of self-medication. "221  The experience of compulsion that addicts 
experience takes addiction out of the realm of things that competent adults 
ought to be left alone to choose at their own peril. Classic examples of 
possibilities that even competent adults may not choose for themselves include 
duelling and selling oneself into slavery, on the grounds that autonomy is so 
precious that one may not voluntarily choose those possibilities that effectively 
destroy it.222 Addiction is bad, and it is bad because it limits individuals' ability 
to choose for themselves; let's not pretend it's just a different choice than one 
we'd make for ourselves. 
Likewise, the disease model of addiction is wrong, incomplete, sub­
optimal - but there are neurological and other physiological dimensions of 
addiction which are vital in understanding and responding to it . However, 
neither of these models gets at the whole picture. A new perspective on 
221  Thomas Szasz. "The Ethics of Addiction. "  American Journal of Psychiatry 128:5, 
November 197 1: 54 1-546. p. 544. 
222 Gerald Dworkin. "Paternalism. "  The Monist vol. 56, no. 1 .  
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addiction, one that incorporates the appropriate features from other 
perspectives and places the appropriate level of consideration on each, is what 
is needed at this time. Such a perspective will be more complete, more 
coherent, and more useful. I shall argue in the following chapter that 
describing addiction in terms of habit and authenticity avoids many of the 
pitfalls of both the moral model and the disease model. Embracing such an 
alternative allows us to reject not only the moral model and the disease model, 
but, more importantly, the dead-end duality that either of them entails. 
Nonsubstance addictions 
A final point is that neither Leshner nor NIDA address nonsubstance 
addictions. Since NIDA is, after all, an agency that is concerned specifically 
with drug abuse, and since much of Leshner's work was published while he was 
the director of NIDA, perhaps we should not expect him or NIDA to say much 
about compulsive gambling, sex addiction and so on. However , these 
nonchemical addictions pose serious problems as well, both for the addicted 
individuals and for their families and friends, and it can be argued that the new 
disease-model perspective on drug addiction does not prima facie preclude 
classifying non substance-related compulsions as addictions. Leshner argues 
that the essence of addiction is " .. . compulsive drug seeking and use, even in 
the face of negative health and social consequences"223 and that " . . . what 
matters most in addiction is often an uncontrollable compulsion to seek and use 
223 Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and it Matters." p. 46. my emphasis. 
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drugs. "224 This implies that the phenomenology and behavior of addiction is 
more important than any neurological feature. For this reason, it seems that 
there is no reason to exclude nonsubstance addictions when they, too, are 
destructive and share the same phenomenological features. 
Jon Elster, sociologist at Columbia University, argues that chemical 
addictions form natural kinds, but that nonchemical "addictions" are, more 
than likely, only analogous to chemical addictions. Since they are likely not 
homologous to chemical addictions, i.e. they probably do not have the same 
etiology, and since homology is a stronger basis for comparison than analogy, 
he argues that nonchemical "addictions" share some important features with 
chemical addictions, but that they are probably not the same thing. The 
definitive answer, he argues, will appear when more is known about 
neuroscience. In his Strong Feelings, Elster considers a phenomenological 
analysis of addiction, including nonsubstance addictions. He identifies 
fourteen properties common to many addictions, and notes that no single 
property or group of properties, other than craving, that are universal 
properties of addiction. However, craving alone would cast too wide a net to be 
the sole criterion for addiction. Thus, phenomenological properties cannot be 
used to define addiction at the theoretical level. 
In contrast, he argues that while all chemical addictions are not identical 
in their neurological causal mechanisms they are remarkably similar to one 
another. All chemical addictions arise because of the way addictive substances 
224 
Leshner, "Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment." p. 13 14 .  my 
emphasis. 
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increase the amount of dopamine in the brain, which produces the 
characteristic craving that marks drug addiction. "For purposes of diagnosis 
and treatment, one could use a pragmatic approach and define something as 
addictive if it possesses (say) eight of the thirteen properties. For more 
theoretical purposes, this procedure is obviously pointless. "225 It is pointless, I 
take it, because theories should be more precise and elegant than this approach 
allows. This assertion, however, is troubling for three reasons. 
The first problem with the suggestion that defining addiction as 
possessing a certain number of phenomenological features is acceptable at the 
level of diagnosis and treatment, but not for theoretical purposes, is that doing 
so has us using phenomenology for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, and 
neurology for theoretical purposes. This conceptual gap is dangerous: it 
threatens to produce more of the inconsistencies that already plague 
discussions about addiction. As noted elsewhere, addiction is considered a 
brain disease in some contexts, a vice in others, and so on, owing (in part) to 
such conceptual shifts. These competing conceptions of addiction make 
sensible, sane, fair social policy and treatment planning even more difficult 
than they need to be. We need more coherence between the practical and the 
theoretical levels, not less. 
The second reason that this move is troublesome is that it excludes 
nonchemical addictions from being considered "real" addictions. Elster clearly 
indicates this consequence; he suggests that nonchemical addictions are 
phenomenologically similar to chemical addictions but are likely neurologically 
225 Jon Elster. Strong Feelings. (Cambridge: MIT Press 1999.) p. 59. 
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dissimilar, and therefore not likely to be true addictions. This will make for 
more elegant theory, to be sure. But the resulting elegant theory that leaves 
out important-but-troublesome features of the phenomenon it describes is 
worth less than theories in progress that do try to account for all of the 
variables. This is not unlike the many studies that discarded data from female 
subjects because they muddled the results: the all-male samples produced 
elegant results that were useful for describing men's experiences, but not useful 
for describing the experiences of women.226 Similarly, excluding nonsubstance 
addictions from consideration makes defining addiction simpler but incomplete. 
If the theory cannot account for important features that are relevant in 
diagnosis and treatment (i.e. if the theory appears to make the concept clearer 
but is misleading,) then it is worse than useless. 
I shall argue that the third, and most important, problem is that there is 
a common phenomenological feature of addictions, sometimes called 
compulsion. This refers to being drawn to the addictive object even against 
one's will. 
Its hallmark is an out of control, often aimless compulsion to fill the 
lost sense of belonging, integrity, and communion with substances 
like alcohol or food, or experiences like falling in love and 
gambling. The addicted person is trying desperately to satisfy real 
needs - but since either the external situation or the internal 
climate does not allow for satisfaction, she turns to secondary 
sources.227 
226 Sara Goering. "Women and Underserved Populations: Access to Clinical Trials. "  in It 
Just Ain't Fair: The Ethics of Health Care for African Americans ed. Annette Dula and 
Sara Goering. (Westport: CT: Praeger, 1994.) 
227 Glendinning, My Name is Chellis and I'm in Recovery from Western Civilization. p. 98. 
Emphasis in original. 
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By compulsion I do not mean metaphysical compulsion: I do not mean to say 
that addicts are, in point of fact, compelled to engage in their addictive objects. 
Rather, this is compulsion in the phenomenological sense: the feeling or 
experience of being compelled. This feature is, I argue, important in 
distinguishing "mere" chemical dependencies from drug addictions, and 
"merely" bad habits from nonsubstance addictions. The notion of compulsion, 
also called loss of control, is easily misused but deserves a second look. I 
address the advantages and disadvantages of making compulsion an essential 
feature of addiction in chapter four, and conclude that the notion of compulsion 
is vital for framing the problem of addiction. 
From neurochemistry to existential anxiety 
Elster, citing George Loewenstein, notes that there are many "visceral" 
(i .e. , physical) factors of behavior: hunger, pain, urge to urinate, etc. These 
factors, when they are powerful enough, can interfere with the capacity to make 
rational choices. There are also factors of behavior that are more emotional and 
less physical: fear, anger, etc. Addictions, he says, have a physical component 
which can be quite potent. When addicts are under the effects of a drug, their 
capacity for rational choice is indeed compromised. However, just as extreme 
hunger interferes with rational choice to a far greater degree than just having 
the munchies does, addicts experience the physical features of addiction to 
varying degrees at different times. It is not the case that every time addicts 
choose to engage in their addictive object, they do so because they are 
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physically compelled (in the same way that extreme hunger or other like factors 
compel behavior.) 
Furthermore, there is no question but that addiction is not just a matter 
of neurological effects. In fact, most of the research seems to indicate that the 
physical component of addiction is small compared to the other factors. For 
example , people who have long since quit their addiction get cravings and 
relapse when under stress or when exposed to a particular stimulus that 
reminds them of their addictive object. Perhaps these cravings can be mapped 
neurologically, but what caused them? The causes are not primarily 
neurological; they are primarily psychological, and they vary from person to 
person, from situation to situation. Some who argue for a brain-disease model 
of addiction say that relapse is based on changes in brain function, but 
acknowledge that these neurological changes interact with environmental 
factors.228 This move turns the causal picture on its head. Why? Because the 
environmental and social stress factors alone can prompt a relapse, while 
changes in brain function alone don't. The fact that relapse is a common 
feature of nonchemical addictions, and occurs in similar patterns as with 
substance-related addictions,  supports this point. 
Finally, it is important to note that, compelling as physical factors are , 
they are not deterministic; they do not reduce the behavior humans into the 
behavior of objects. Physical factors do have an equalizing effect - we all 
become less fastidious as we become more desperate - but, as Viktor Frankl, 
228 Charles O'Brien. "A Range of Research-Based Pharmacotherapies for Addiction. 11 
Science vol. 278 Oct 1997. p. 66. 
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psychiatrist and Nazi camp survivor observed, it is sometimes in situations 
characterized by physical extremes that one's character emerges: 
Sigmund Freud once asserted, "Let one attempt to expose a 
number of the most diverse people uniformly to hunger. With the 
increase of the imperative urge of hunger all individual differences 
will blur, and in their stead will appear the uniform expression of 
the one unstilled urge."  Thank heaven, Sigmund Freud was 
spared lmowing the concentration camps from the inside . His 
subjects lay on a couch designed in the plush style Victorian 
culture, not in the filth of Auschwitz. There, the "individual 
differences" did not "blur" , but, on the contrary, people became 
more different; people unmasked themselves, both the swine and 
the saints.229 
My use of this passage is not intended as a moralistic attempt to cast blame on 
drug addicts, or to require everyone to be one of the saints that Frankl 
describes. What deserves emphasis here is not that "good" people can resist 
physical temptations, but rather that nonphysical factors affect behavior even 
in the most profoundly physical situations. Freud hypothesized that hunger 
would render individuals indistinguishable from one another and from their 
fundamental urge; Frankl's experience suggests that even in such extreme need 
humans are more than their physical urges. 
Physiological features of addiction, then, should be addressed by 
biochemical means, but addiction is not entirely, or even mostly, physiological. 
Diseases are mostly physical and addiction is mostly nonphysical: we can tell 
that it is mostly nonphysical because (for example) if addiction was primarily 
neurological, we would expect to see people get addicted to painkillers and other 
drugs without regard to nonbiological factors. Their brains would be hijacked 
whether or not they liked, and pursued, the effects of the drugs. However, 
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many people take potentially addictive prescription painkillers without 
becoming addicted because they don't like the way they make them feel. 
Indeed, as sociologist Howard Becker notes, the "taste" for the effects of drugs is 
acquired, much like a taste for oysters. 
The user feels dizzy, thirsty; his scalp tingles; he misjudges time 
and distances. Are these things pleasurable? He isn't sure. If he 
is to continue marihuana use, he must decide they are. 
Otherwise, getting high, while a real enough experience, will be an 
unpleasant one he would rather avoid. 230 
People who initially were not addicted to anything but become addicted to 
painkillers do so, I argue, because they find that the effects of the drug satisfy a 
nonbiological craving - "help them get through the day" - which is existential 
rather than neurological. By this I mean that it involves addressing the lack of 
meaning in one's life. Situations in which individuals medicate themselves 
against periodic unpleasant experiences (e.g. taking a tranquilizer before an 
MRI, drinking a lot at a boring social gathering) may not be filling existential 
needs. But when individuals medicate themselves to cope with life in general, 
which they find boring or anxiety-producing or depressing, that is filling an 
existential need. 
Citing Peele's criteria for addiction, Elster asserts, "On the widest 
definition of addictions, according to which one can become addicted to 'any 
potent experience,' they may not have much in common. "23 1 I argue in 
response that chemical and nonchemical addictions are not merely analogous, 
but that they are homologous as well . To say that two things are homologous is 
229 Viktor Frankl. "The Case for a Tragic Optimism", in his Man's Search for 
Meaning. {New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. , 1946. )  p. 178. emphasis in original. 
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to say that they share a common causal history. The common casual feature of 
both chemical and nonchemical addictions is, I argue, existential rather than 
neurological, in the form of avoidance of existential anxiety. Elster's own 
narrative on the "secondary rewards" of smoking is an illustration of this: 
Smoking became a ritual that served to highlight salient aspects of 
experience and to impose structure on what would otherwise have 
been a confusing morass of events. Smoking provided the 
commas, semicolons, questions marks, exclamation marks, and 
full stops of experience . It helped me to achieve a feeling of 
mastery, a feeling that I was in charge of events rather than 
submitting to them. This craving for cigarettes amounts to a 
desire for order and control, not for nicotine.232 
In this example, the cigarettes serve the function of structuring and making 
sense out of the individual's life. The neurological features, which doubtless 
were present, are not relevant to why he smoked in the first place. They might 
be relevant in terms of his quitting, but not as relevant as the other features. 
Nicotine patches, gum and the like are helpful only to a point in the project of 
quitting smoking. Consumers are cautioned against smoking more than a 
certain amount while using these products; the fact that this warning is 
necessary (and that many people ignore it!) speaks to the primacy of social and 
emotional factors in cigarette addiction. 
As mentioned earlier, addiction used to be defined in terms of mere 
chemical dependency on a drug of abuse.  Persons were considered addicted if 
they exhibited tolerance to a drug and withdrawal symptoms when the drug use 
stopped.233 This definition has since been rejected, in part because some 
2ao Howard Becker, "Becoming a Marihuana User," in Outsiders: Studies in the 
Sociology of Social Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1963.) p. 53. my emphasis. 
23 1 Elster, Strong Feelings. p. 58. 
232 Elster, Strong Feelings. p. 64. 
233 O'Brien, "A Range of Research-Based Phannacotherapies for Addiction. 
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substances that are clearly "drugs of abuse" (perhaps most notably cocaine) do 
not produce these effects. Moreover, patients with severe and/ or chronic pain 
can become chemically dependent on painkillers insofar as they experience 
unpleasant physical withdrawal effects when they stop tal<lng their medicines, 
without being "addicted" in any other meaningful sense of the term. There is, 
therefore, an important distinction to be made between chemical dependency 
and addiction. Chemical dependency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for addiction; that is, an individual may be chemically dependent on a 
substance but not addicted to it (some neonates, for example, are born 
chemically dependent on drugs that their mothers ingested) , or may be addicted 
to something that is not a substance (gambling, shopping, sex, the Internet) . 
The distinction is an important one for theory, therapy and policy: an individual 
who is chemically dependent but not (on my account) addicted needs to be 
addressed differently than an individual who is addicted, whether or not the 
addiction involves chemical dependency on a substance . Keeping one's brain 
healthy, as the NIDA website advocates, is a relatively small component of a 
comprehensive approach to ameliorating addiction. 
Thus, certain apparent counterexamples to my thesis that addictions 
have in common existential features are actually examples of chemical 
dependency - which presents its own set of problems - but not examples of 
addiction. When we refer to crack babies, for example, we can hardly describe 
their "addictive" experience in existential terms. Their experience is purely 
visceral; it does not involve any sense of compulsion, moral tension, or 
existential anxiety. Whether or not a baby is born chemically dependent 
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depends on physiological factors. In adults, however, addiction rates vary 
depending on social context. (This is true even for adult nonhuman animals. 
The Rat Park experiments mentioned in chapter two, in which bored rats 
become addicted more readily than rats in a pleasantly stimulating 
environment, are a good example. Addiction in adult animals can more closely 
resemble addiction in adult humans than in human infants.) The fact that pain 
patients, crack babies and others who are "only" chemically dependent are said 
to be addicted is not necessarily problematic; many terms are used colloquially 
in ways that are not perfectly accurate . However, individuals who are 
chemically dependent but not addicted are importantly different from 
individuals who are both chemically dependent and addicted; their problems 
have different etiologies and respond to different interventions. Individuals who 
are both chemically dependent and addicted have more in common with those 
who are addicted and not chemically dependent (e .g. compulsive gamblers) than 
with those who are chemically dependent and not addicted (e.g. crack babies) . 
Explaining addiction in neuroscientific terms need not be at odds with 
explaining it in existential terms. Neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp discusses 
the relationship between neuroscience and emotion in his book Affective 
Neurosdence. Panksepp explores the relationship between oxytocin (the 
hormone responsible for milk "letdown" in lactating mothers) and bonding and 
the fundamental need for the feelings of security produced by relationships, 
bringing a neuroscientific perspective on what has historically been an 
existential issue. There are some interesting animal studies that examine the 
conditions under which animals find oxytocin rewarding. For example, animals 
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who are given oxytocin under ordinary conditions do not manifest behavioral 
changes, but puppies who are isolated from their litter mates cease crying 
within 1 5  minutes of receiving an oxytocin injection.234 Perhaps, Panksepp 
suggests, drug-seeking is an attempt to create a chemical counterfeit for the 
sense of well-being that we experience in our very first relationship, when we 
receive oxytocin in our mother's milk235 • The effects of the drugs themselves are 
not inherently rewarding; they are rewarding in response to this fundamental 
need, which is satisfied by milk and cuddling in infants, and by (among other 
things) meaningful interpersonal relationships in adults. 
This explanation accounts for why some people take "addictive" drugs 
but do not become addicted. These people take drugs for pain relief or 
recreation, and do not find that they fill a void in their lives . The drugs remain 
simply a minor source of recreation or (physical) pain relief. Others who start 
out taking drugs for pain relief or recreation find, perhaps accidentally, that the 
experience the drug provides for them answers a basic longing - perhaps one 
that they did not realize was there . The drugs then become much more than 
they originally had been. This explanation makes sense of both Leshner's 
description of drugs "hijacking the brain," and Peele's assertion that the most 
effective responses to addiction are found in communities. 
Panksepp dismisses Leshner' s argument that addiction is a disease 
because drugs cause persistent changes in the brain. "Life causes persistent 
234 Jaak Panksepp. Lecture at University of Tennessee Medical Center at Knoxville, 04-
12-02. 
235 If this is true , there are interesting implications for formula vs. breastfeeding infants. 
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changes in the brain," he counters.236 Since chemicals are not the only sources 
of neurological changes (i.e. , since patterns of behavior - habits - also change 
the brain) , it follows that treatment for addiction need not be reduced to 
pharmacology - not simply because there are other dimensions of addiction but 
because the neurological dimension can be addressed by nonchemical means. 
For example, much of Panksepp's research has focused on ADD /ADHD. The 
most severe cases of ADD/  ADHD are manifested by neurological differences 
from the norm (a shortened frontal lobe, for example) . Pharmacological 
treatments for ADD/ADHD are well-lmown. Panksepp, however, found that a 
regimen of vigorous play, for an hour twice a day, was at least as effective in 
reducing the symptoms of ADD/ADHD as phannacotherapies.237 Similarly, 
even though drugs cause neurological changes, the most effective treatments 
may be (and thus far have been shown to be) not the kind you swallow with a 
glass of water. 
A related point is that it is not clear that these neurological changes that 
occur as a result of drug-taking are unrelated to other mental features of the 
individual. That is, it is possible that the changes that occur depend not only 
on the substance, the amount of the substance, the duration to which the 
individual is exposed to the substance, etc. , but also to cultural, social, and 
emotional factors. It may be, for example , that relevantly similar dosages of 
tobacco cause different neurological effects on a nurse who smokes at work and 
a shaman who smokes at work. If the nurse smokes because it is a habit that 
236 Jaak Panksepp. Personal correspondence. 
237 Jaak Panksepp. Lecture at the University of Tennessee Medical Center at Knoxville, 
04- 1 2-02. 
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she develope� that reduces stress at work, and the shaman smokes - even the 
same amount, over the same period of time, etc. - because it is a part of a 
spiritual ritual of healing, it may be the case that the brain may respond 
differently in these two individuals . It is known, for example, that drugs affect 
the body differently depending on the setting in which they' are consumed: the 
explanation is that the behavior that "leads up to" consuming the drug when it 
is taken on the street gives the body an opportunity to prepare itself. When the 
same amount is administered in a clinical setting, the absence of warning cues 
means that the body is hit unawares with a dose of drugs. These studies relate 
to the question at hand because they show that an individual's frame of mind 
can have an effect on the body. 
This kind of issue is an application of the perennial philosophical 
question as to how the mind and body affect one another. The mind-body 
problem is one of several classic problems that is illustrated by the 
phenomenon of addiction. However, like another classic dyad, freedom vs. 
determinism, it may be that the most interesting and useful answer to the 
debate is outside the pair. That is, in contrast to descriptions of addiction as 
"of the body" in the form of a brain disease, or "of the mind" as a moral problem, 
it may be that the most accurate and complete description would make use of 
experience and habit, which involve both dimensions of the person. 
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Conclusion 
What, then, is in a name? The disagreement over whether addiction is a 
brain disease with important psychosocial features or a psychosocial problem 
with important neurological features is no mere semantic turf war. Like many 
other problems, the name frames the issue: names are both denotative and 
connotative. The attitudes of researchers, clinicians, addicted persons and 
their families and the public in general change depending on the framing of the 
issue. One of Leshner's 1997 articles is titled "Addiction is a Brain Disease, 
and It Matters." It matters because our definition of addiction indicates our 
beliefs about the etiology, moral dimensions, and effective responses to it. 
However , as I have argued, defining or describing addiction as a disease points 
us in the wrong direction on all of these questions. 
Neurological features of addiction have our attention because they were 
hidden from us for so long, because they are comfortingly, materially real, and 
because they corroborate the (comparatively) slippery behavioral and 
phenomenological data that has been amassing over the years. Additionally, 
neurological data are retrieved using fascinating high technology: they require 
instruments and procedures that most of us are not smart enough to 
understand, much less devise or use. It makes sense to expect that anyone 
who can do work of this kind must be right about the significance of it. 
However, it is easy to get seduced into thinking that the technical features of an 
issue are the most important ones. While these features may be important 
clues in understanding addiction, and while they may be among the most 
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interesting and impressive features, they are not the most important features 
and are easily overstated. 
We are now recognizing the extent to which the many facets of human 
existence are integrated, and thankfully, we are beginning to embrace a more 
holistic approach to all manner of problems. Even so, most of these problems 
have features that are more prominent than others, and these features are the 
ones that should - for theoretical as well as practical reasons - get top billing. 
Addiction is characterized primarily by a set of behaviors and experiences 
rather than medical symptoms. While the medical features of addiction, when 
saliently present, should be addressed, they should not be mistaken for the 
essential features of addiction. More importantly, they should not be addressed 
to the exclusion of the more important features of addiction. Rather than a 
brain disease, addiction is best considered in terms of the experience and 
behavior of addicted people : in other words, it is more existential than medical, 
and the answers are more social than neurological. 
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Chapter Four: The Existential Model of Addiction 
She gets lonely, why not admit it? She gets hugely, cavernously 
lonely, and then she eats. Eats and drinks and smokes, filling up 
her inner spaces. As best she can.23s 
As discussed in chapter one, thinking about addiction has, in large part, 
vacillated between moral models and disease models . Each of these models 
seems to have settled into different arenas; the disease model dominates the 
treatment world, while the moral model influences law. The reason for this 
dichotomization is understandable: the legal system has the task of assigning 
praise and blame and meting out punishments when appropriate. Moral 
models facilitate this task, while disease models complicate it . Similarly, 
disease models facilitate treatment by positing a problem that can be fixed by 
the interventions of trained professionals and the participation of the patients. 
In contrast, moral models, especially the more simplistic "moralizing" moral 
models, make treatment more difficult because they make addicted people feel 
judged. However, even though the different models lend themselves to different 
arenas, the fact remains that the same addict exists in both arenas and is 
asked to internalize the norms and assumptions of both. Using different 
models of addiction in legal and therapeutic settings is incoherent and works 
against ameliorating the problem of addiction. It would be far preferable to use 
a single, accurate, workable model in every arena. 
Thus, it is my contention that the best model for addiction is neither a 
version of the moral model, nor a version of the disease model . As I have 
argued, even rich, elaborate versions of each of these models will ultimately fail. 
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They will fail for four reasons: For one, even if the content of either model is 
basically right, it will still frame the problem of addiction in a distorted way. 
That is, even the contemporary disease model, with its provisions for the 
non biological features of addiction, carries all of the connotations of the word 
"disease", and even moral models that acknowledge the social and neurological 
features of addiction have the undesirable connotation of judgment. Secondly, 
because of the history of bouncing back and forth between two models that 
frequently were in direct opposition, proponents of each perspective will 
naturally resist the other one. Thus, the solution will have to reside outside of 
the dyad. Thirdly, in order to be consistent, both the moral model and the 
disease model rely on an answer to the freedom-determinism debate, which 
isn't forthcoming. As discussed in earlier chapters, for both the moral models 
and the disease models, an important question concerns whether or not addicts 
can control their behavior. The answer to this question is likely to be fairly 
complicated (i .e. it is likely that the answer will vary from addict to addict, and 
further from situation to situation) and for this reason may not be as helpful as 
it first appears. Finally, neither model can adequately account for the complex 
experience of addiction. Both major models can account for some features of 
the experience, but not others. A more phenomenologically complete model is 
needed. 
What would an adequate account of addiction look like? We need an 
account of addiction that avoids the problems of the disease models and the 
moral models. That is, it must be able to accurately describe the lived human 
238 Margaret Atwood. The Robber Bride. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) p. 102. 
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experience of addiction, account for all the major features of addiction, and 
accord them appropriate weight. Furthermore, it should point us toward 
treatment options that will work, social policies that make sense , and laws that 
are fair. Additionally, it should avoid the pitfalls that are engendered by the 
freedom-determinism dichotomy. That is to say, it should not rely on a 
definitive answer to the question, Do people in general ultimately have control 
of their own behavior? Finally, the new model should reflect the complex 
nature of responsibility, and should avoid overly simplistic attributions of 
blame. 
This chapter presents an alternative definition of addiction, one that is 
fundamentally different from both disease models and moral models . Rather 
than describing addiction as a moral, psychological, or physiological defect of 
the addict, this proposed model - call it the existential model - describes 
addiction as a compulsive, inauthentic habit: a compulsive habit that the 
individual does not endorse. Since compulsion and habit are already 
frequently-cited features in descriptions of addiction, I shall focus here on 
authenticity. Addiction, I argue , limits authenticity because the power of 
addictive desires (i.e .  the desire to engage in the addiction) makes authentic 
choice difficult, if not impossible. Addiction constrains authentic choice in the 
same way that factors such as pain and fear can interfere with autonomous 
choice. Just as some conditions can obscure autonomous thinking, addiction 
interferes with the process of living authentically. The powerful, compulsive 
nature of addictive desires obscures individuals' endorsed desires and thus 
interferes with their living authentic lives . 
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The Existential Model of Addiction 
The existential model of addiction begins with the assumption that angst, 
or existential anxiety, is a universal feature of the human condition. 239 That is, 
nearly every human experiences existential anxiety at various points in life, and 
has to find a way to deal with it . What triggers existential anxiety varies from 
person to person, but everyone (or nearly so) has to deal with it at some time or 
another. Rollo May notes that individuals develop the "positive aspects of 
selfhood" by confronting and overcoming anxiety; that is, angst is a universal 
component of human development. 240 
The term "angst" is used in many different ways. For Heidegger, angst is 
the feeling of dread one experiences when one apprehends nothingness - which 
is to say, when one confronts death. Authenticity for Heidegger is being­
towards-death, or living in such a way that one is conscious of death as an 
ever-present possibility. In contrast, inauthenticity is living in denial of 
death.24 1 In my account, angst is used to mean something slightly different. 
Angst is the state characterized by the fear that one is getting life wrong; that 
one has chosen the wrong values, the wrong projects, the wrong way of living 
one's life . Here, as for Heidegger, angst is not an emotion, but rather a state 
that has emotional and cognitive components .242 The emotional components 
have been described as fear, anxiety, dread, and the like. The cognitive 
239 If not truly universal, then very nearly so. Individuals with Down's Syndrome might 
be an example of people whose lives are unmarked by angst. 
240 Rollo May. The Meaning of Anxiety. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950.) p. 
234. 
24 1 Martin Heidegger. Being and TI.me. trans. Joan Stambaugh. (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1996.) p. 24 1 .  
1 52 
components might include beliefs about mortality, one's own facticity, and one's 
own possibilities.  Additionally, it includes an understanding that there is such 
a thing as "getting my life wrong" or "living my life wrongly". 
I begin with the assumption that people need to believe that their lives 
matter, they need their existence to be tangible, they need to express 
themselves, to say I AM. We all are afraid that our lives might not matter, that 
we will be forgotten, that we are insignificant. Furthermore, we all are afraid 
that the choices we make will tum out to be the wrong ones . This is not simply 
the fear that our choices will have bad consequences for us; that is not angst. 
Rather, this is a deeper fear that the choices we make are fundamentally wrong 
for us. Both major life choices (e.g. whether to have children) and minor 
choices that we believe reflect something important about ourselves (e .g. how to 
dress) can be sources of angst. Major life choices can lead to our wasting our 
lives, while the minor choices, we suppose, indicate that we are wasting our 
lives . The notion of angst as the belief that one's life has been spent wrongly, or 
that it does not matter, is related to Heidegger's definition of angst, in that our 
deaths represent the end of opportunities to get our lives right and to make our 
lives matter. Thus, Heidegger's idea that angst concerns being-towards-death is 
closely related to my notion that angst concerns "not getting one's life right" . 
Angst is both necessary and uncomfortable. It serves as a powerful 
motivator to live life authentically, which, given our finitude and propensity to 
get distracted, is a good thing. However , too much angst can be crippling. 
Precisely how much angst one needs would be impossible to determine, and in 
242 Ibid. , p. 13 1 - 134. 
153 
any case will vary from person to person. It may also vary across the lifespan; 
angst may be more important at certain phases of development (adolescence 
and midlife seem to be likely candidates here .) Heidegger notes that angst is 
the means by which individuals are able to confront themselves; that is , to 
"own" their actions, possibilities, and limitations.243 He calls this the "call of 
conscience" .244 Angst makes authenticity possible, because authentic choices 
are made in response to angst. Thus, a certain amount of angst is actually 
good, as it strengthens character in unique and important ways. Aldous Huxley 
makes a similar point in Brave New World; as terrible as anxiety, disease and 
death are, human life without some suffering is frivolous and superficial. 
For some people , angst results from believing that their labor is all for 
naught. This group includes, but is not limited to, what I call the poor-and­
hopeless . Poverty alone does not always produce angst, even when it produces 
other kinds of emotional and physical suffering. Poverty coupled with the belief 
that one's labors make a difference (whatever that means for the individual in 
question) is not angst-producing. For example, in my clinical work in Oswego, 
N.Y. I used to see Mexican migrant workers who were admitted to our inpatient 
mental health unit for depression, suicidal behavior, and alcoholism. In 
addition to other concerns (e .g. about relationships) they frequently expressed 
hopelessness and helplessness about their working conditions. However, some 
migrant workers found their labor meaningful because it meant that they could 
send money back to their families in Mexico. It was supporting their families 
that made them feel that they mattered; it was the cash and the food it would 
243 Ibid. p. 176.  
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buy for their families, not the manner in which it was earned. More money 
made a real difference to those families. 
In contrast, the group I call the rich-and-aimless experience angst 
because they have not found anything they can do that matters, that makes a 
difference. They are too comfortable, afraid of failing, of suffering even small 
privations; they never risk, reach, do anything that changes their world. So 
they come to fear, and then believe, that their lives do not matter - that they 
haven't gotten life right. Self-centeredness produces angst because there is 
never anything bigger than oneself toward which one can make a difference. 
Mattering, or making a difference, requires people to get outside themselves and 
do something that matters to someone else - or even to something else. 
When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do 
not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, 
the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves. To those 
who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of 
life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the 
time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by 
death: while those who leave after them objects of personal 
affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow­
feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an 
interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and 
health.245 
Believing that one's life matters requires community; if not community 
with people, or animals, then a meaningful connection with something. The 
someone or something might even be imaginary or in the future -- one might 
hope that one's labors will be appreciated by future generations, even when no 
one presently seems to care. Even in such cases, such individuals experience a 
244 Ibid. p. 271. 
24s John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1979. 
Originally published in 1861.) p. 13. 
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connection with something outside of themselves. The individual cannot be the 
sole object of mattering (that is, it isn't enough that my life matters to me - it 
has to matter to me and someone or something else) because the individual is 
finite. If I matter only to me then my life ceases to have meaning when I die . It 
will be as though I never was, and all my struggles are for nothing. 
Common sources of existential anxiety include a sense of 
meaninglessness in one's life, feeling a lack of control, awareness of mortality, 
alienation, feelings of personal inadequacy (also feeling like an "impostor") ,  and 
a sense of rootlessness or lack of foundations. Each of these, in tum, can have 
a multiplicity of triggers. For example, seeing a commercial on television can 
make someone feel inadequate because she doesn't look like the model in the 
Slim-Fast ad. The inadequacy she experiences (e.g. "I'm not slender enough") 
can cause angst, a state in which she believes that she could and should be as 
slender as the model in the Slim-Fast ad; that in failing to be that slim she is 
"failing life" . (In the words of Saturday Night Live' s Stuart Smalley, "I'm going to 
die homeless and penniless and twenty pounds overweight, and no one will ever 
love me.") 
My personal favorite of these triggers is Western culture (broadly 
construed) which I think causes all manner of existential problems, especially 
as regards meaninglessness and alienation. 
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I think of those youngsters who,  on a worldwide scale, refer to 
themselves as the "no future" generation. To be sure, it is not just 
a cigarette to which they resort; it is drugs. In fact, the drug scene 
is one aspect of a more general mass phenomenon, namely the 
feeling of meaninglessness resulting from a frustration of our 
existential needs which in tum has become a universal 
phenomenon in our industrial societies .246 
Western culture encourages us to take our superficial desires too 
seriously, so we never transcend these desires, and therefore do not connect 
with anything that we can regard as larger or more important. As a result, we 
fail to make the kinds of connections that could cause us to believe that our 
lives really matter. Western culture contributes to angst by emphasizing self­
importance to the point that it becomes self-centeredness. However, a certain 
amount of self-centeredness is important for believing that one's life matters . 
Ive discussed this elsewhere in terms of contextualization of the self.247 
Spiritually balanced people, I have argued, neither take themselves too 
seriously nor not seriously enough; they balance their desires against the needs 
of others. I've suggested that for those of us who live in upper-middle class 
America, striving to live in an ecologically sustainable manner helps to 
contextualize the self, to help us to accord ourselves an appropriate amount of 
importance. 
Personally, I keep coming back to cooking and gardening because I think 
that alienation from the sources of life contributes to angst for people like me -
rich, white, educated, overly-comfortable people. But for others . . .  many of the 
migrant farmers in Oswego did not find connection to the soil meaningful; it did 
not make them feel as if their lives mattered. If anything, it served as a 
reminder that they were only migrant workers , and that all of their labor would 
never amount to much. The point here is that, while angst is universal, what 
246 Frankl, "The Case for a Tragic Optimism" p. 164. 
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causes it is particular. Sometimes something that triggers angst in one person 
will ameliorate it for another person. 
The existential model of addiction begins by acknowledging that angst is 
a feature of the human condition. Sometimes when angst surfaces, we 
experience it directly and confront it straightforwardly. We might call this 
dealing with angst authentically. In the language of pop psychology, this is 
called "facing pain" or "feeling your feelings, ti both of which refer to 
acknowledging angst, which is the first step of dealing with it authentically. 
After acknowledging angst, the next step is to acknowledge one's limitations 
and possibilities and to make choices based on these. "Inauthenticity as well as 
authenticity begins with a recognition of the challenge to take hold of oneself, 
but the former flees it while the latter accepts it. "248 
A cornerstone of 12-step programs is the Serenity Prayer, and authentic 
responses to angst require the same combination of acceptance, courage and 
wisdom to which that prayer appeals. That is, facing angst authentically 
requires individuals to both confront their limitations (what they cannot 
change, what they are powerless over) and also to recognize their power (the 
things they can change, their possibilities) . Both recognition of powerlessness 
and recognition of possibilities can be extremely uncomfortable. Powerlessness 
can degenerate into helplessness, but at the same time, sometimes even the 
best possibilities within our scope of power are pretty unattractive. It is easier 
not to face angst authentically. In any case, the final step in facing angst 
247 Women and Power conference, MTSU, Murfreesboro, TN. February 27, 2003. 
248 Robert C. Solomon Continental Philosophy since 1 750: The Rise and Fall of the Self. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.) p. 164. 
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authentically involves acting on the choices one has made based on one's 
limitations and possibilities. 
In contrast, sometimes when angst surfaces, we deal with it 
inauthentically. There are many ways this can happen. We might not 
acknowledge it or allow ourselves to experience it. 249 We might use one of the 
"standard" coping mechanisms, as taught in psych 10 1  - denial, sublimation, 
projection, etc. Sometimes when we use these coping mechanisms we use a 
vehicle for them; we overeat and "stuff' down our feelings. We put in too many 
hours at work or work out excessively: misplaced penances for unnamed sins. 
We drink to forget, to loosen inhibitions. We shop to make ourselves feel better 
(novelist Ann Lamott calls this "retail therapy.") We become emotionally welded 
to another person (i.e. "codependent") to avoid dealing with our own problems. 
We have emotionally-disconnected sex in order to feel attractive and desirable , 
or to gain a sense of power. 
It is noteworthy that both disease model theorists250 and anti-disease 
model theorists251  have described addicts as comprising two groups: thrill­
seekers and depression-avoiders. Both of these groups can be seen as avoiding 
angst, either by distraction (in the case of thrill seekers) or anesthesia (in the 
case of depression-avoiders .) Sometimes these coping activities (drinking, 
gambling, eating, etc.) become compulsive, then later become habits. 
Sometimes they become habits, which tum compulsive. An example of the 
former is someone who occasionally drinks excessively, out of control, more 
249 Rollo May discusses this in terms of "covert anxiety," characterized by keeping 
oneself distracted in order to escape ennui. See The Meaning of Anxiety p. 8. 
2so Leshner, "Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment."  p. 13 14. 
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than he meant to . When these binges become habitual, part of a pattern, then 
he has developed an addiction. An example of the latter is someone who is in 
the habit of eating for comfort and entertainment. (Most people do this from 
time to time, but some people are in the habit of doing so.) Perhaps in response 
to some stressful event, the habit becomes compulsive; it takes on more 
urgency. This person is also an addict. Addictions are compulsive, inauthentic 
habits. 
The inclusion of both "compulsive" and "inauthentic" in the proposed 
definition of addiction may seem redundant, because in some sense the 
compulsion to do something precludes one's authentic endorsement of it. 
However, there are other reasons that individuals might not endorse their 
compulsive habits besides the mere fact that they are compulsive. Compulsion 
can limit authenticity in several different ways. For one, it might limit 
authenticity by how much an individual does something. For example, someone 
who eats sweets compulsively might endorse eating sweets, but not in the 
amounts she does. A second way is that it might limit the manner in which an 
individual does something. To keep the same example, someone who eats 
sweets compulsively might endorse eating sweets and even feel that how much 
she consumes is acceptable, but is disturbed by the urgency with which she 
consumes them when she does. Similarly, she might be bothered by the fact 
that she feels compelled to eat sweets in certain situations {e.g. "when I'm 
stressed I just have to have my chocolate - I wish I could find a better way to 
cope") .  Thirdly, compulsion might limit authenticity by limiting what the 
25 1 Peele, et al . , The Troth About Addiction and Recovery. pp. 42-43. 
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individual does (or is able to refrain from doing). In the same example, someone 
who eats sweets compulsively might not endorse eating sweets at all -
regardless of the circum�tances. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, compulsion limits authenticity by 
"overriding" other, endorsed desires. That is, the three examples above are 
ways or modes in which compulsion can limit authenticity, but the mechanism 
by which compulsion limits authenticity is that it out-competes other desires 
(for example, the desire to be fit, to spend one's money on something other than 
sweets, to model good food choices for one's kids, etc .) The call of compulsion 
drowns out the "call of conscience" , deafening addicts to their endorsed desires. 
While inauthenticity and compulsion are essential features, addiction is 
not simply a compulsion that the individual does not endorse, but rather a 
compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse. The difference may be 
illustrated thus: there is a basket of cookies on the counter in the Philosophy 
Department. Two people, Ernie and Bert, are standing at the counter. Ernie 
absentmindedly eats a cookie, and then another and another. He finds himself 
eating more cookies than he really (i .e. authentically) wants to, but he also 
wants more cookies. Finally he pushes the basket away and exclaims, "Get 
these cookies away from me! They're addictive!"  He leaves the office and the 
thought of cookies does not trouble him further . His description of the 
experience as "addictive" is fine as a colloquialism, but it's inaccurate. His 
experience was compulsive and involved a conflict of desires, but was not 
addictive. In contrast, there's Bert, who is still standing in front of the counter 
with the cookies. Bert also is eating more cookies than he really (authentically) 
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wants to, but this is a pattern with Bert, not just something that happens 
sometimes. Ernie can usually eat a few cookies and let it go at that, but not 
Bert. He habitually overeats - more than he wants to, more than is good for 
him. He always does this. When he does leave the office, the thought of 
cookies goes with him, and he continues to be tempted by them for as long as 
there are any left. After all the cookies are gone his thoughts turn to other 
cookies, sweets, snacks, etc. that might be around. Bert eats addictively ("is a 
compulsive overeater" in 12-step lingo) while Ernie simply has occasional brief 
episodes of cookie compulsion. 
Compulsion, Habit, and Authenticity 
To say that addiction is a compulsive, inauthentic habit is to paint 
addiction differently than other models have done. It is to say, first, that an 
essential feature of addiction is the attitude of the addict toward the addictive 
behavior. Thus, for instance, given two individuals who are equally dependent 
on a substance, one of them might be addicted and the other one not, if one of 
them authentically chooses to be dependent. Similarly, individuals who 
endorse their habits - people who seem like they might be addicts but who 
wholeheartedly and authentically defend their choices - are not addicts. They 
may make weird choices, they may have serious problems, but they're not 
addicts. (I will discuss this further in the section on authenticity.) Likewise, 
how much or how often a person engages in an addiction does not define 
addiction. Excessive consumption might be a red flag; a signal to examine the 
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habit as a possible addiction, but addiction can't be defined strictly in terms of 
number of drinks per day, number of hours spent watching television, etc. 
Thus, in spite of the power of the contemporary brain-disease model of 
addiction, addiction is best described as a compulsive habit that the individual 
does not endorse rather than a brain disease. I include that the individual does 
not endorse, even though that may seem redundant to compulsive, in order to 
nudge the connotation toward authenticity and away from the (admittedly 
related) concepts of freedom and determinism. 
These habits, which can develop with more or less of the individual's 
awareness and assent, become increasingly entrenched socially, behaviorally 
and neurologically. When these habits are not endorsed by the individual and 
are compulsive in nature, they qualify as addictions. I will devote comparatively 
little energy developing the criteria of compulsion and habit, since these are 
well-known to the addiction literature. Discussing addiction in terms of 
authenticity, however, is a relatively new and undeveloped idea, and merits 
more attention here. 
Compulsion 
Describing addiction in terms of compulsion is an obvious move. Self­
help literature and narrative accounts of addiction paint addiction in terms of 
feeling out of control, compelled, possessed by the objects of one's addiction. 
Further, both disease model theorists like Alan Leshner252 and anti-disease 
model theorists like Stanton Peele253 emphasize the fact that addicts seek their 
addictive objects compulsively, seemingly uncontrollably. "Compelled" 
252 Leshner, "Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment." p. 1 3 14. 
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describes what it feels like to be addicted; the most important 
phenomenological (i .e. experiential) component of addiction is compulsion. 
It is interesting to note that compulsion is a feature of addiction that 
appears, albeit in different guises, in the classic disease model, in addiction 
definitions put forth by critics of the classic disease model, in the new disease 
model, and again here. This feature of addiction was explored in some depth by 
E.M. Jellinek, popularizer of the classic disease model of alcoholism. Jellinek 
argued that the disease-making feature of alcoholism was a loss of control, and 
that other heavy drinkers (European wine drinkers, for example) are not 
diseased. Herbert Fingarette discusses the same idea in terms of the 
compelling force that entrenched habits, or central activities, can have. Alan 
Leshner and other promoters of the new disease model have defined drug 
addiction in terms of compulsive drug-seeking and use. This feature of 
addiction is, perhaps, the most salient one in the minds of addicts themselves, 
clinicians, researchers, and in the lay public. While there are many pictures of 
addiction, from the proverbial skid-row alcoholics to the socialites who embezzle 
thousands of dollars to shop for items they subsequently never use, the 
common feature of these pictures is that their behavior seems - to them and to 
others - not wholly voluntary. 
When addicts talk about their experiences with their habits, they often 
describe feeling out of control, compelled or controlled by a force outside of 
themselves. Suzanne Vale, protagonist in Carrie Fisher's novel Postcards from 
the Edge, is an actress who is addicted to opiates. Her therapist describes her 
253 Peele , The Meaning of Addiction. p. 26. 
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as someone who "doesn't lead her life. She follows it around."  She reflects on 
her habit: 
The weird thing about all this is that I had been straight for 
months - the whole time I was filming Sleight of Hand in London 
and all through my vacation. But then I got home and BOOM! 
four weeks of drugs. I hated it, I even wanted to stop, but I just 
couldn't. It was like I was in a car, and a maniac had gotten 
behind the wheel. I was driven, and I didn't know who was 
driving. 254 
Suzanne, like many addicts, had the sense that a force alien to her was 
controlling her behavior. Even though she found the experience unpleasant 
and wanted to stop, she felt that she could not. 
Another important feature of compulsion is the conflict of desires of the 
individual who experiences it; to be compelled is to feel on some level that you 
don't want to do it, but then to do it anyway. For example, one question on a 
Compulsive Behavior Inventory reads, "When I attempt to resist exercising, 
there is a sense of mounting tension that can be relieved by exercising. "2ss 
Frequently, compulsion is described or defined in terms of actions, desires, 
thoughts, etc. that occur "against the will" of the individual. The fact that these 
seem to occur against the individual's will indicates that the individual both 
wants and doesn't want to do (or think, feel, desire, etc.) the object in question. 
People who experience compulsion are caught between desires that accord with 
the will and those that occur against the will. People who exercise 
compulsively, for example, know on some level that the amount they exercise is 
unhealthy, and they want to refrain from doing that. However, they also want 
254 Carrie Fisher. Postcards from the Edge. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.) p. 1 2 .  
255 Richard W .  Esterly and William T .  Neely. Chemical Dependency and Compulsive 
Behaviors (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.) Appendix B, p. 99. 
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to do it anyway, often to relieve the tension that arises if they don't. This 
conflict of desires is a central feature of compulsion.256 Other features of 
compulsion include preoccupation, denial, and progression of intensity over 
time.257 
Thus, while doing something frequently, strenuously, or repetitively 
might signal compulsion, these may sometimes be features of uncomplicated, 
uncompulsive behavior. Frequent, strenuous or repetitive behavior is neither 
necessary not sufficient for compulsion. Similarly, doing something that 
damages oneself or others may be a reason to suspect compulsion, but this, 
too, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the behavior to be compulsive . 
Damage to oneself or others signals a problem, but not necessarily the problem 
of compulsion. 
The internal conflict that I take to be essential to compulsion fits the 
intuitions of both disease model frameworks ("they do it because they can't help 
it"), and moral model frameworks ("they do it even though they know better") . 
However, unlike these models, the existential model of addiction does not 
require that addicts are compelled, but rather simply that they feel compelled. 
It should be noted that there are many other phenomenological (i.e. 
experiential) features that are frequently associated with addiction - for 
example, addictions tend to create more desire than they can satisfy. Addicts 
256 The potency and importance of conflicting desires may be obscured by the belief that 
individuals (unless constrained) always do what they want to do. But, for one thing, it 
is not at all clear that we always do what we want most to do. Cases in which we 
simply can't get the nerve to do something we want to do are particularly vivid 
examples. Since, even under "ordinary" circumstances people don't always do what 
they want most to do, the argument that compulsions (and by extension, addictions) 
involve a conflict of desires - in which the "most desired" desire doesn't always win -
gains force. 
1 66 
and professionals alike describe addiction as characterized by preoccupation 
and denial. However, at this point the only experiential feature of addiction 
that I am willing to describe as essential is compulsion. 
While disease model and moral model theories get caught in the gridlock 
of the empirical question ''.Are addicts compelled to behave as they do?" we need 
not take a position on it ; the important aspect of compulsion on the existential 
model is how it feels to be addicted . The two other models stand or fall on the 
truth of the empirical question as to whether we are actually compelled: if 
addicts truly can't control their behavior, we should not try to make them; if 
they can, we should. However, contrary to the disease model, the evidence (as 
discussed in chapters two and three) suggests that addicts can (and do) change 
their behavior. Further, contrary to the moral model, it suggests that such 
changes are extremely hard to make, and that they happen through attention to 
habit rather than through sheer force of will (or, for that matter, by "restoring" 
control with medications) . 
It seems to be that case that the amount of control addicts have over 
their behavior varies from individual to individual and from time to time 
depending on the situation. Control is a matter of degree; we cannot generalize 
and say the "addicts are" or that "addicts are not" in control of their actions; 
only (at best) that this addict �as in control of her behavior to this degree. For 
this reason, the freedom/ determinism debate may be seen as unnecessarily 
complicating the issue of addiction. Rather than asking the question, "Are 
257 Esterly and Neely, Chemical Dependency and Compulsive Behaviors. p. 6-7. 
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humans free?" we ought to ask, "How can we help this person to acquire more 
control in her life?" 
The problem of control, however, is not the problem of achieving 
total control; it is not whether we can gain control over all that 
influences what we are and what we do. The problem is whether it 
is possible to increase the control we have. And we can do that 
even if we acknowledge, as it is reasonable to do, that no one can 
ever have total control.258 
This is not to say that the answer to the question of freedom is not 
important; only that its importance can be overstated. Brain-disease model 
advocates, for example, will maintain that compulsion can be understood in 
terms of brain states : that when enough is known about the brain we will be 
able to describe, predict, and understand compulsion. We will lmow to what 
degree addicts are compelled and to what degree they are free.  It is true that if 
we could know for certain that a particular addict had a particular level of 
control over her addiction, that would affect legal and therapeutic decisions 
regarding that individual. However, I suggest, it would not have as profound an 
effect as we might think, especially therapeutically. The most effective methods 
for treating addiction for the long term concern attention to habit. Having 
access to precisely how much control an addict has over her addiction might 
streamline such treatment a bit, but it will remain essentially unchanged. 
One problem engendered by regarding the addict's experience of 
compulsion as a criterion for addiction might be termed "prereflective 
compulsions" . Some people's lives are so unproblematically arranged around 
an addiction that they do not experience the conflict of desires that has been 
258 John Kekes. Moral Wisdom and Good Lives. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.)  
p. 80. 
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cited as an essential feature of compulsion. This, in tum, would imply that 
such persons are not addicts, since they do not experience their behavior as 
compulsive. Criminologist Mariana Valverde notes, with regard to alcoholism: 
"The inclusion of emotional and ethical criteria has a peculiar effect: people who 
drink extremely heavily without ever trying to cut down will be less likely to be 
pathologized than those individuals who for one reason or another worry about 
their drinking. "259 She adds, " .. . we are left with a psychological disorder that 
waxes and wanes depending on one's moral scruples, one's occupation, the 
moral standards of one's spouse ... "260 
Two responses are possible. The first is that it seems quite unlikely that 
many such people have truly never thought about the issue before. What is 
likely is that most people who might be described as having a prereflective 
compulsion are in the very early stages of what 12-step programs call denial. 
The problem has occurred to them, and it is troubling, so they put it out of their 
head. They might even use the addiction in question to help them do just that . 
Furthermore, people who arrange their lives around an addiction (for instance, 
arranging their work schedules, friendships, etc. to fit in with their drinking) so 
that they are never forced to experience the conflict of desires I describe, know 
on some level what they are doing and why. 
The second possible response is that the experience of compulsion may 
be latent. Even such carefully-crafted lives come apart at some point, at which 
the compulsion in experienced with an intensity that often surprises the 
individual. So perhaps others can see that an individual has arranged her 
2s9 Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom p.  27. 
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whole life around (for example) work, although she herself really just doesn't see 
it. At some point, something will happen to bring the problem sharply into 
focus.26 1 In the same way that one can "realize" that one has had a headache 
all morning without really being aware of it, one can realize that one has been 
experiencing compulsion without really being aware of it. People who come to 
describe themselves as TV addicts might say, for example, "I never knew how 
much I needed the TV until it broke. "  
Whether it is latent or experienced directly, the feeling of compulsion is 
essential to addiction. The conflict of desire that is a component of compulsion 
is therefore important for understanding addiction. A better understanding of 
the nature of this conflict will go a long way towards understanding addiction. 
Conflicts of desire occur even in ordinary experiences (i.e .  those not affected by 
addictions or compulsions) . They are not compulsions until they involve a 
"driven" or "out of control" experience. In tum, a compulsion is not an 
addiction until it becomes entrenched as a habit. 
Like compulsion, using habit to describe addiction is natural. Addictions 
are often described as habits: "the liquor habit" "a drug habit" and so on. 
However, the use of the term is not universal. The debate as to whether 
addictions are diseases or "just habits" has sometimes been a version of the 
moral model/disease model debate, in which habits are considered to be under 
the control of the individual and thus appropriate objects of blame. However, 
260 Ibid. , p. 28 
261 An example of such a person is Ivan 111ych, in Tolstoy's short story 11The Death of Ivan 
Illych. "  
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the two models need not be at odds with one another with respect to 
recognizing the importance of habit. In fact, contemporary disease model 
advocates make connections between behavioral descriptions and neurological 
descriptions of the same phenomena. 
As mentioned earlier, John Dewey has supplied us with an account of 
habit that proves to be particularly helpful for understanding addiction. One 
reason is that, for Dewey, habits are dynamic forces between the individual and 
the environment; that is, habit emphasizes both the role of the individual and 
the role of the social context in explaining behavior. This has promising 
implications for avoiding the difficulties into which the freedom/determinism 
dyad leads us. The other reason is that, for Dewey, habits are powerful forces 
- much more powerful than we usually think of them as being. This feature of 
habit may be used to respond to the criticism that addictions can't "just" be 
habits. 
For Dewey, habits are organizing forces of thoughts, desires, and 
capabilities:  "they constitute the self. "262 He also refers to habits as 
systemizations of minor elements of action, formed by many specific acts.263 
Each repetition of the action gathers some force (how much force surely 
depends on many variables.) Since habits are acquired by the repetition of 
many acts , they are more intimately a part of us than our conscious choices 
are. Conscious choices, after all, can be superficial and fleeting, and can come 
from sources that are outside ourselves (e .g. "Mom says I shouldn't bite my 
nails, so I hereby resolve to stop biting my nails" can't compete with the 
262 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct p.  25. 
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gazillions of times I bit my nails and the force that each successive instance of 
nail-biting has gathered.) For Dewey, we are our habits ; the self is composed of 
its habits. However, since the self is always situated in a context, habits involve 
the environment as well. They are acquired modes of responding to the 
environment. Thus, to place responsibility for habits exclusively on the agent 
or exclusively on the environment is to falsely separate people from their 
surroundings.264 
Because habits are acquired, they are dynamic in quality; each action 
"sets up" which choices are live. One choice may open up certain other choices 
and eliminate certain other choices, or it may maintain the status quo. 
Deciding against going running every day from January to October precludes 
the choice of running a marathon in November (for most of us, anyway). It 
doesn't preclude the choice of running a bit one day (or even every day) in 
November, though. This has important implications for addiction, as we shall 
see. Addicts - that is, people who have compulsive, inauthentic habits -
should not expect to change simply by sheer force of will265• Habits have to be 
changed by changing the social conditions that allowed them to develop in the 
first place.266 
No habit occurs in a vacuum, and no habit that involves other human 
beings occurs in a social vacuum.267 So it is with addictions. And while 
Dewey's notion of habit emphasizes the importance of social context, it does not 
263 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct pp. 40-42. 
264 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 18. 
265 Jane Fritsch "Scientists Unmask Diet Myth: Willpower." New York Times Oct. 5, 
1999 . P. ! -science. 
266 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 20. 
267 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct p. 17. 
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neglect the role of the individual and need not be at odds with neurological 
descriptions of addiction. Addictions, like most habits, are socially 
contextualized. Even the solitary alcoholic has to buy liquor from someone: 
many such drinkers describe the elaborate measures to which they went in 
order to avoid buying too much liquor from the same merchant so they wouldn't 
seem like drunks. " . .  [S}ince habits involve the support of environing conditions, 
a society or some specific group of fellow-men, is always accessory before and 
after the fact. "268 Attending to this is helpful in terms of understanding both 
what addictions are and how they come about, and also what kinds of 
strategies will be helpful in fixing the problem. Again, this is not to say that 
physiological features of addiction are irrelevant, but rather that the 
physiological features should play a supporting role rather than a central one in 
describing addiction. 
It is abundantly clear that context is important in the etiology and 
maintenance of alcohol and other drug dependence . . .  When the 
problem is seen as lying within the person, there is little reason to 
attend to (let alone get involved with) the social environment.269 
Identifying addiction "within the person" (as both moral models and disease 
models do) engenders the danger that we will not attend to the social 
environment - the context out of which addictions arise. 
A second virtue of Dewey's view of habit for describing addiction is that it 
accommodates the intensity with which habits organize the individual. While 
we may be tempted to think of habits as innocuous, no more than a collection 
of quirks and preferences, Dewey argues that habits , both good and bad, are 
268 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct p. 16.  
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powerful forces. The fact that everyone has habits but that not everyone is an 
addict may make it seem less plausible that addictions, too , are habits . 
However, since even ordinary habits - those that organize our daily lives - are 
powerful forces, then habits that are fueled by angst, are deeply entrenched in a 
social context, have physiological features, and may profoundly affect one's 
mood can be expected to be extremely difficult to overcome. Habits are hard to 
break, to be sure, but addictions have force beyond what is usually expected 
from "just a habit," and often have far more serious consequences than 
behaviors we think of as bad habits. 
The argument that addictions aren't habits - advanced, often, by classic 
disease model advocates - seems to rest on two features: the intensely 
compelling experience of addiction and the physiological features that some 
addictions have. After all, it seems implausible to put drug addiction in the 
same category as biting one's nails, or saying "nuculer. " However, this neglects 
the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that habits can accommodate rich 
neurological descriptions, it and underestimates the strength with which habit 
organizes (indeed, constitutes) the individual .  According to Dewey, habits are 
the will of the individual. Individuals' thoughts, desires, capacities and choices 
are formed by their habits .270 Furthermore, habits, like compulsions, 
addictions, and so many other phenomena, are on a continuum. Some are 
more socially entrenched than others, some have physiological features that 
others do not have. Each of these possible features affects where on the 
269 Robert J. Meyers and William R. Miller, eds. A Community Reinforcement Approach to 
Addiction Treatment. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 200 1 .) p. 166. 
270 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct p. 58. 
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continuum the habit belongs. Addictions are on one end of the continuum. 
The force of these compulsive habits is far greater than the force of what one 
might call "mere habit. "  
Habits can be endorsed, unendorsed, or unreflective . Unreflective habits 
may be endorsable or unendorsable upon reflection. Addictions are, under the 
proposed description, unendorsed - or at least unreflective-but-unendorsable 
- habits. Other habits may begin as endorsed habits that lose the individual's 
endorsement for one reason or another. Addictions to objects that have few 
social sanctions associated with them are more likely to fall in this category 
than addictions to things that are socially unacceptable . Shopping, eating, 
drinking and the like all may begin as endorsed habits that progressively 
become compulsive and lose the individual's endorsement. In such cases, the 
individual rejects the habit because of its compulsive nature rather than the 
activity itself. In contrast, habits that are socially disapproved of even in 
moderation - illegal drugs, for example - are less likely to begin as endorsed 
or unreflective habits . However, since social context determines what is socially 
acceptable, these examples will not be universally generalizable. In some social 
contexts, illegal drugs are not only acceptable but socially required; in others 
(e .g. the world of high fashion) normal eating is unacceptable . Regardless, 
addictions are compulsive habits that the individual does not endorse: they may 
be unendorsed (i.e. the individual disapproves of the habit) or unreflective but 
unendorsable (the individual has not considered the question, but would not 
endorse the habit if she gave the matter much serious thought. )  
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Although it officially subscribes to a disease model of addiction, much of 
the success of M and other twelve-step programs of recovery is attributable to 
its focus on changing the habits of their members to those that support their 
sobriety (or other relevant form of recovery, e.g. abstinence from gambling. )  
Valverde describes this process in terms of hupomnemata - ''ancient 
scrapbooks for daily ethical meditation . "271 This process, for the ancient Greeks 
and for contemporary twelve-steppers, is one of acquiring virtue by the 
accumulation of good habits. In literature and in meetings, the twelve-step 
philosophy is to do "what works" to stay sober. An important feature of this 
strategy, noted in chapter two, is that sobriety in M (and "recovery" in other 
twelve-step programs) is not simply refraining from drinking. Sobriety is a new 
way of thinking and acting. Twelve-steppers know (as Dewey, too, remarks) 
that simply trying not to do something can only be effective in the short term. 
Cultivation of sober habits - changing preferred beverages, friends, routines, 
etc. - supports and strengthens one's resolve. To refrain from drinking but fail 
to cultivate these new, sober ways of life - called "white-knuckled sobriety" -
is to court relapse. 
The advantages of using the notion of habit to explain addiction were 
discussed in chapter two, especially with regard to Fingarette's notion of 
alcoholism as a central activity rather than a disease. Briefly, these advantages 
include bypassing the freedom/determinism debate (with the various problems 
facing each side), creating an obvious role for the community to play in helping 
addicts overcome their problems, and demystifying addiction. My description of 
271 Valverde, p. 140. 
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addiction owes a debt to Fingarette in that it borrows from his account of the 
evolution of addiction in the individual and the importance of understanding 
the individual as situated in a community. Both accounts describe addiction as 
the product of the many choices - some of them seemingly inconsequential -
that an individual makes over a lifetime. My description goes further than 
Fingarette's account in emphasizing the existential aspects of addiction. 
Focusing on the existential features of addiction (i.e. authenticity and angst) 
has two advantages: for one, it helps to make clear how alcoholism, for 
example, appears both in wealthy, well-educated persons and poor, relatively 
uneducated ones, but selectively in both socioeconomic groups. For another, it 
provides a more vivid and more accurate account of how it feels to be addicted. 
That is, my account agrees with Fingarette's view that addictive habits are not 
different in kind from other habits, but emphasizes that they are different in 
power and scope from other habits. 
Authenticity 
Much of the philosophical literature on addiction focuses on how 
addiction limits freedom. The central question of this literature concerns 
whether people with established addictions choose to engage in their addictions; 
that is, whether they could have done otherwise. A related, but often­
overlooked, dimension of the issue is how addiction limits authenticity. 
Framing addiction in terms of authenticity rather than in terms of 
freedom facilitates our understanding of the experience of addiction, without 
getting mired in the age-old philosophic quandary about freedom. For example, 
a claim that is consistent with the classic disease model is that addiction 
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"makes" people do things that they would never do otherwise: say inappropriate 
things, lie, cheat and steal to support the addiction, etc. "That wasn't me -
that was the whisky talking."  Some anti-disease theorists, notably Peele, 
dispute this . According to Peele, an addiction is actually an expression of 
addicts' values, and drugs, alcohol, etc. don't "make" anyone act against their 
own will.272 "New" disease model theorists respond that drugs do indeed "hijack 
the brain, " and that these persistent neurological changes constrain addicts' 
behavior . Nevertheless, each of these argue that addicts should be held 
responsible for their actions. This dialogue shows that the moral/ disease 
dilemma and the freedom/ determinism dilemma are not productive frames for 
addiction. Both generate questions that steer us away from the more important 
questions, i .e. those that will help us to prevent and ameliorate addiction. An 
advantage of the proposed existential model of addiction is that it does not 
depend on an answer to the questions posed by these binaries . 
Like many terms, "authenticity" is used differently by different people. 
As for Heidegger and other existentialist thinkers, authenticity here refers to 
living with an awareness of one's life as one's own - "the self that has explicitly 
grasped itself'.273 In this context, authenticity should be viewed as an ongoing 
process that admits of degrees rather than a static state that is attained once­
and-for-all . However, the term (as it is, in the form of a noun) is misleading, as 
it implies a status that can be "achieved" . Better, perhaps, is "living 
authentically. "  Another possible coinage is the "authentic self, " in which the 
self is a project rather than a thing. For Diana Meyers, an authentic self 
272 Peele, Diseasing of America. p. 165. 
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emerges through the exercise of what she calls autonomy competency. 
Autonomy competency is the set of skills that enables people to ask of 
themselves, "What do I really want, need, care about, etc.?" and to carry out 
their decisions.274 They also need to be able to recognize and make corrections 
when they "get the answer wrong" - i.e. come to believe that they have made a 
mistake in answering these questions. The principal feature of the account of 
authenticity used here are mine-ness or "ownliness", which involves facing 
angst. Other features include acceptance of facticity, honesty, and courage. 
Each of these features is necessary, but not sufficient, for authenticity. 
Another feature, coherence, is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is included 
here as it often indicates authenticity. 
There are features of every life that individuals did not choose, e.g. race, 
gender, etc, and factors that they had little choice in, e.g. skills and 
predilections. Authentic individuals respond to such features of their lives 
("facticity") by accepting them, asking themselves what they can realistically do 
under the circumstances, and following through with the choice they make. 
Meyers uses the example of a woman who wishes to have an abortion. She 
can't obtain one, which means she can't do what she wants to do with her life; 
she is prevented by circumstance from acting according to her autonomous 
choice. However, she acts authentically in the manner in which she parents 
273 Heidegger, Being and Time p. 12 1 .  
214 Diana Meyers. Self, Society, and Personal Choice. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989 .) p. 53. 
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her child.275 Circumstances can limit which choices are available, but 
individuals can still live authentically within those constraints. 
Furthermore, to live authentically is to live both honestly (authentic 
individuals do not deceive themselves or others) and courageously (authentic 
individuals acknowledge all aspects of their lives, whether they are painful or 
pleasant.) Authentic individuals do evolve, and so can come to change their 
minds about goals, values, etc. However, these changes, when they occur, are 
the result of reflective endorsement, not whim, caprice , or the desire to gain 
external rewards. They involve an honest appraisal of one's past, present, and 
possibilities. Changes in values, goals and the like that are authentic are not 
made in bad faith; authentic individuals neither refuse to accept the facts about 
the past and present, nor deny that they have the capacity to change. 
Authenticity in the sense of "mine-ness" or "ownliness 11 requires -
indeed, implies - endorsement. Authentic people are willing to "own" the 
various components of their lives. Since authenticity is a continuum concept, 
we might say that people are authentic to the degree that they can endorse their 
own actions, choices, desires, and so on. Actions, choices, desires, and the like 
can be endorsed (i .e. the individual acknowledges and embraces them) 
unendorsed (i .e. the individual refuses to acknowledge them or disavows them) 
or nonendorsed (i.e .  the individual has not reflected on them.) However, even 
endorsement does not guarantee authenticity, as one might "endorse" a choice 
one minute and change one's mind the next. (We might call this "mere" 
27s Ibid p. 162. 
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endorsement.) Living authentically is not based on loyalty to pursuing one's 
fleeting preferences, but rather involves a continuing process of evaluation. 
In contrast to mere endorsement, reflective endorsement requires a 
certain kind of ongoing consideration. Some have suggested that authentic 
choices are those that the individual could endorse after considering them 
through a course of psychotherapy.276 However, even ongoing, reflective 
endorsement - with or without the benefit of therapy - is not necessarily the 
same as existential endorsement. Existential endorsement requires more than 
just reflection; the reflection has to involve one's life as such. That is, the 
reflection has to include 0what I want my life to be about" or "who I want to be" ; 
it needs to involve a particular kind of self-awareness. People can still be 
inauthentic when making reflectively endorsed decisions if they only take 
practical considerations into account, for example, or if they only worry about 
what the neighbors might think. 
As Michael Gelven notes in his analysis of Being and Time, there are 
many kinds of self-awareness. One can be aware of oneself as a physical being, 
as a rational being, and so on. However, authentic self-awareness is different 
from these; it is awareness of oneself as "my own" . (The word "authentic", he 
notes, is a translation of the German eigentlich; the root eigen means "own" as 
in "my own. ")277 Thus, authentic reflection necessarily involves attention to 
one's own life as such. Heidegger refers to this as being open to "the call of 
conscience" .  Openness to the call of conscience is the willingness to face one's 
276 Richard B. Brandt A Theory of the Good and the Right. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979. )  p. 1 1 3. 
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life as one's own, to face one's freedom and therefore to acknowledge that one's 
actions were indeed one's own. 278 Thus, the call of conscience requires one to 
face the possibility that one has done wrong; that one has done something that 
goes against what one wants to say that one's life is about. The courage to do 
that is the courage to experience angst.279 Existential endorsement requires 
attention to angst, and reflection upon how to deal with it. 
Angst, then, is related to authenticity in that authentic choices are 
motivated by angst. However, angst (defined as a state of anxiety about the 
possibility that one is "getting life wrong") can inspire both authentic and 
inauthentic responses; thus, angst is necessary, but not sufficient, for 
authenticity. When individuals respond authentically to angst, they ask the 
questions engendered by autonomy competency, i.e. "What do I want, need, 
care about?" These are hard questions, and angst is an uncomfortable state. 
Further, authenticity requires another set of skills included in Meyers' notion of 
autonomy competency: the skills of knowing the limits of one's situation and 
making choices that reflect this understanding. For example, one can't 
authentically choose to be a professional football player if one is five feet tall, 
one hundred pounds, and not athletic - even if one really, really wants to be a 
professional football player. Such recognition of one's limitations can also be 
difficult and uncomfortable. Thus, inauthenticity often eases angst more 
readily than authenticity, at least in the short term. It is more comfortable, for 
277 Michael Gelven. A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time". (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1970.) p. 16 1 .  
278 Or, indeed, to acknowledge that one's actions were not one's own; that is, to "own" 
the fact that one had been inauthentic. 
219 Being and Time pp. 272-273. 
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example, to dream of becoming a professional football player than to face the 
various, realistic alternatives. 
The concept of coherence helps to clarify the concept of authenticity. 
Coherent lives are those in which there is little conflict between actions, goals, 
values, relationships, work, desires, and so on. Completely coherent lives are 
not possible , but people are authentic (roughly) to the degree that their lives are 
coherent. (An important exception follows.) For example, a person who claims 
to endorse safety but rides in the car without buckling up is living a slightly 
incoherent life , and (perhaps) is not being authentic about which desire is the 
endorsed desire (i .e. safety or freedom from seat belts .) Pushing the example , a 
person whose life's work has been risk management in transportation, who 
lectures worldwide on the subject of highway safety, but who frequently rides a 
motorcycle at excessive speeds without a helmet while drunk is living a 
seriously incoherent life, and (we might charge) is not being authentic about 
either the penchant for safety or the penchant for helmet-less high-speed 
drunken motorcycle riding. 
Since everything we do precludes other possibilities, a measure of 
coherence in one's life requires reflection on one's own desires. This includes 
an appreciation of facticity regarding these desires. Some desires, while not 
incoherent in the abstract, are incoherent in point of fact; i.e. something about 
one's particular situation makes them incoherent. An example might be the 
desire to perform excellently in one's job and the desire to be an involved, 
attentive parent. These are not incoherent desires, but to claim to endorse both 
of them equally is inauthentic if the demands of either elbow the other one 
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another out. Inattention to facticity precludes authenticity. Kierkegaard calls 
this fear of the limits of actuality the aesthetic orientation.280 Aesthetic persons 
live only in the present moment, without attention to past or future. They focus 
on what is immediately appealing, and refuse to acknowledge that sometimes 
people have to choose between two desiderata. Elsewhere he describes this as 
possibility's despair. "Instead of taking the possibility back into necessity, he 
chases after possibility - and at last cannot find his way back to himself. " 28 1 
Coherence, both over time and at any given time, is a mark of an 
authentic person. However, it is not an essential feature of authenticity. 
Incoherence can reflect existential dissonance (disconnections between 
important features of individuals' lives) , which can be part of the process of 
living authentically. Individuals who are engaged in the process of living 
authentically may at some times adopt values, goals, habits, etc. that contradict 
their current values, goals and habits. During such times of exploration, such 
individuals are not less authentic than they were before (when their lives were 
more coherent. )  While coherence is a useful heuristic, it is not absolutely 
necessary for authenticity. Furthermore, coherence is not sufficient for 
authenticity. Individuals can be utterly inauthentic while living coherent lives if 
they do not allow themselves to experience and be motivated by angst. 
(Tolstoy's Ivan Illych282 is such a person. )  
280 S0ren Kierkegaard. ed. Steven L. Ross, trans. George L. Stengren. Either/ Or. (New 
York: Perennial Library, 1986. ) p. 6.  
28 1 S0ren Kierkegaard. trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H Hong. The Sickness Unto 
Death (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.) p. 37. 
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Authenticity and Addiction 
Addiction - and the feeling of compulsion which I take to be essential to 
it - limits addicted persons' authenticity by creating a conflict of desires 
between those that are endorsed (but strenuous) and those that are unendorsed 
(but easily alleviate angst). Rather than being a momentary respite in order to 
rest, after which the individual returns to facing anxiety, an addiction interferes 
with the experience of anxiety and therefore with living authentically. (Angst, 
as noted earlier, is necessary, though not sufficient, for living authentically.) As 
Harry Frankfurt notes, the concept of the verb "to want" or "to desire" is difficult 
to pin down. His famous distinction between first-order desires and second­
order desires is useful here. First-order desires are simply desires to do (or not 
to do) one thing or another, but second-order desires are desires to have (or not 
to have) certain other desires .283 Using this distinction, we might say that 
second-order desires are endorsed desires, and that first-order desires can be 
endorsed, unendorsed, or non-endorsed. 
Some disease model theorists will say that this conflict is essentially 
neurological; that the addictive desire is the result of the effects of certain drugs 
on the human brain. I suggest that while it is sometimes useful to view drug 
addictions as "hijacking the brain," it is better to think of addiction primarily in 
terms of damaging authenticity. Emphasizing the existential features of 
2s2 Leo Tolstoy. "The Death of Ivan Illych. "  in Great Short Works of Leo Tolstoy with 
introduction by John Bayley, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude. (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967.) pp. 245-302. 
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addiction puts the focus on its etiology and phenomenology rather than on its 
consequences. However, these ways of framing the addiction problem should 
not be seen as mutually exclusive. As neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp notes, 
''our existential capacities are interpenetrant completely with our 
psycho biological tendencies. "284 The inclusion of neurological features for 
diagnosis and treatment is a valuable part of recovery for some addicts. 
In the same way that other kinds of extreme discomfort (fear, pain, 
hunger) can prompt people to do things that they would not ordinarily do , the 
discomfort of existential anxiety and the force of addictive habits can do the 
same. Resurrecting the notion of "value options" from chapter two, we can 
describe addiction as limiting possible objects of value for addicts. Addiction, 
then, is not a force that "makes" addicts do things against their will (as some 
disease model advocates claim) nor is it "an expression of addicts' values" (as 
disease-model critic Stanton Peele claims) but rather it is a compulsive habit 
that expresses what has become most immediately compelling to the addict. 
This developmental dimension is an important feature of addiction which both 
of the major models tend to ignore. 
Everyone has conflicting desires, many of which are unendorsed, some of 
which can be very compelling. Moreover, everyone acts on unendorsed desires 
from time to time . Addictions, however, seem to involve the most extremely 
compelling of unendorsed desires, and addicts seem to go from unendorsed 
desires to unendorsed behavior with stunning alacrity. Addictive desires are 
283 Harry Frankfurt. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," reprinted in 
Free Will, Derek Pereboom ed. pp. 167- 183. (Indianapolis: Hackett , 1997.) p. 169.  
284 Jaak Panksepp, personal correspondence, 10-0 1 -02 . 
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intensely compelling because,  in addition to simply being attractive to the 
addict, they ease the addict's existential anxiety and are sustained by the force 
of habit. It should be noted that addictive desires are focused; that is, addicts 
are not necessarily people with poor impulse control in general; rather, they 
have trouble abstaining from one particular behavior. If they are addicted to 
more than one thing, then they have difficulty abstaining from more than one 
behavior, but not, qua addict, from any whim that happens by. 
As noted, addiction produces powerful desires which are at odds with 
individuals' endorsed desires. That addicted individuals do not endorse their 
own desires appears in their narratives about their addictions. Likewise , 
endorsement of their desires appears in non-addicts' narratives about their 
habits. Renee Himmel, protagonist in Rebecca Goldstein's novel The Mind-Body 
Problem offers insight as to the distinction between an addict and a non-addict: 
" . . .  I'm philosophically committed to smoking. It' s an act of 
existential freedom." 
"Is it? I always thought it was simply an indication of wealmess of 
will." 
"For some, it is. You see, there are two kinds of smokers, heroic 
and unheroic . . .  Unheroic smokers are worried about the health 
hazards of smoking, which is weakness one, and would like to 
quit, which is weakness two. Heroic smokers don't worry. Worry 
is for little minds. That goes double for worrying about mere 
physical dangers. Fear for the body should never govern one's 
actions . . .  Heroic smokers disdain death. They laugh at death 
with every inhaling breath. "285 
Renee's "heroic smoker" is not an addict, if she is being genuine about her 
beliefs and values. If she truly is not worried about the health hazards of 
smoking and really does not want to quit, then smoking for her is an authentic 
285 Rebecca Goldstein. The Mind-Body Problem. (New York: Random House, 1983 .)  p. 
224. 
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choice. It is not in conflict with what she wants and cares about ; rather , it is in 
concert with it. It should be noted that "heroic smokers" (unless they smoke so 
rarely that they do not court smoking-related health problems) would have to 
have an unusual set of values and projects. These probably couldn't include 
close relationships, given the correlation between smoking and cancer, 
emphysema, heart disease, etc. But surely heroic smokers are possible. In 
contrast, "unheroic smokers," which are much more common, are addicted to 
smoking because they continue to smoke even though they want to quit . 
The authenticity criterion can help distinguish addicts from others who 
may be troubled or unusual, but are not addicts. Addicts' reactions to their 
own habits give us a clue as to whether they are, in fact, addicts. The conflict 
of desires is one such clue. Unendorsed desires - .ones that are not what the 
individual wants to say her life is about - signal the possibility of addiction. 
Conversely, if what might look like an addiction is what the individual genuinely 
wants to say that her life is about, then she's not as addict. Such individuals 
may very well have serious problems - including, perhaps, chemical 
dependency - that result from their choices. However, these problems lack 
the existential features that characterize addiction. It seems likely that such 
people are quite rare. They are interesting because of their unusual life 
choices, but not because they're addicts in any m�aningful sense. At the end of 
her life, a non-addict who drank heavily might say, "I've lived a good life. I've 
had some wonderful binges." A person who was addicted to alcohol will say, at 
the end of her life, "I wish I hadn't spent so much of my life on drinking. 
Drinking took so much away from my life." 
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The consequences of one's addiction are important to address here; a 
non-addict might dislike the consequences of a hobby or habit, but find these 
consequences worth the trouble. For example, my friend Melissa plays the 
guitar, but doesn't like the fact that she has to keep her fingernails very short 
in order to do it, and that her fingertips have calluses on them from the guitar 
strings. But she'll tell you that having ugly fingers (her words, not mine) is 
worth being able to play music. In contrast, the consequences of addiction 
produce real anguish, sometimes because they are more serious than ugly 
fingers, but more interestingly because they are the consequences of an 
inauthentic force in one's life. Playing the guitar is part of Melissa's identity, 
she's proud of it, and she can regard her callused fingertips as a badge of honor 
- part of what one must accept to have the pleasure of being musical. Addicts, 
however, don't regard the unhappy consequence of their habits as badges of 
honor. You don't hear many smokers say, "Yeah, I've got yellow fingers and a 
nasty cough. But I'm proud of them; that's what it takes if you want to be a 
smoker." Rather, they say. "I've got yellow fingers and a nasty cough. These 
are two of the reasons that I wish I could quit." Their addiction might be part of 
their identity, but not a part that they're proud of, or even neutral about. 
An apparent problem with the existential model of addiction is that it 
seems to make the criteria for addiction subjective in nature. As such, it does 
not seem to account for the fact that addicts' own attitudes about their 
addictions may not be authentic. There are a couple of varieties of inauthentic 
attitudes about addictions. For one, it is possible for people to be in denial 
about their habits (which is discussed ad nauseum in the addiction literature). 
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For another, it is possible for people to feel overly guilty about their (non­
addictive) habits - and therefore to wrongly think of themselves as addicts -
because they are situated in unusually repressive social settings. It is easy to 
imagine, for example, the daughter of a Baptist preacher thinking of herself as 
an alcoholic because she drank a beer or two one weekend. What is considered 
excessive in one setting might be quite moderate in another , and individuals' 
attitudes develop in the context of particular settings. 
A response to this objection is that the important features of addiction 
concern the individual's endorsed desires and the experience of compulsion. 
Both of these are matters of degrees; desires can be more or less endorsed and 
can feel more or less compulsive. If our preacher's daughter experienced little 
or no compulsion about drinking the beer, but experienced a feeling of shame 
or regret later, it may be that her authentic character is emerging. Her desire 
not to drink, perhaps, is being tested, and at this time is less authentic than 
her desire with regard to drinking will be later, when she either decides {based, 
in part, on her experiences) that the desire to abstain is authentic, or that 
(again, based on her experiences) that her desire has changed. Not all conflicts 
of desire signal an addiction, or even a lack of authenticity. Indeed, it is by way 
of such conflicts of desire that authenticity develops. Addicted persons are 
caught in the continuing tension of such a conflict, unable to resolve the crisis 
of identity. Conflict of desires is only one feature of the proposed description of 
addiction; the preacher's daughter shows neither compulsion to drink nor the 
habit of drinking, which are the other two features. 
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As mentioned earlier, another inauthentic attitude concerns denial about 
one's addiction. Many addicts - or, at least, many people who certainly seem 
like addicts - deny that their (putative) addiction involves unendorsed desires. 
Denial is a problem for the existential model : what to do with addicts who peer 
out from the wreckage of their lives and claim they like it that way? That they 
don't want to stop? That this really is their authentic and genuine choice? The 
difficulty of assessing addicts' self-reports leads many people to turn to models 
with "scientific" criteria that can be measured, which is understandable. To do 
so, however, is a mistake. As mentioned in chapters two and three, using 
models with objective criteria because it makes diagnosis easier makes 
misdiagnosis easier, too - which works against the goal of helping people quit 
their addictions. Furthermore, to do so overlooks the possibility of availing 
oneself of important informal information; that is, the observations of family, 
friends, and others who know the addict well. 
It would be easy to mistakenly characterize the existential model as 
saying that people are addicts if and only if they say they are. Addicts' self­
reports are pieces of the puzzle, to be sure, but they cannot be the whole 
picture. Authenticity is not a purely "inner" phenomenon any more than our 
lives are. As I suggested in chapter one,286 there is not an easy or certain 
answer to this problem. There is no litmus test for authenticity, and even the 
possibility that there may be one someday - some kind of authenticity­
verifying MRI - is frightening, to say the least. However, those close to addicts, 
both professionals and their families and friends, usually get a good sense of 
286 Chapter One, p. 44. 
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addicts' authentic desires over time. Their assessment can provide a 
touchstone against which one might compare a (possible) addict' s self-report. 
The conflict of desires that marks addiction is accompanied by dissonance in 
the rest of addicts' lives, and often this dissonance is well-known to those who 
know them. Determining whether to believe someone who says "I want my life 
to be this way" is not a task for a stranger to that person, but may not be 
difficult for a friend. 
Finally, although its members would not recognize the existentialist 
vocabulary, the M tradition has an interesting note to add to the discussion of 
addiction and authenticity. The AA slogans "fake it 'til you make it" and "act as 
if' seem, at first blush, to be authenticity-threatening. Both of these slogans 
can be interpreted as something like "you are an alcoholic , but act like a sober 
person until you really are sober. "  Since these direct the individual to "pretend" 
to be something that (according to M's notion of alcoholism) they are not, it 
might seem like a threat to authenticity. However, these slogans may be seen 
as authenticity-promoting because they are encouraging individuals to act in 
accordance with their more authentic desires rather than their less-authentic , 
addictive desires. This technique is used elsewhere, to cope with other life 
situations (e .g. phobias) . People are encouraged to repeat a counterfactual 
affirmation in response to troublesome emotions or cravings: e.g. "I am a non­
smoker" at the urge for a cigarette, or "I love to fly" when panic at the thought of 
a plane trip sets in. 
As I've noted elsewhere, the notion of sobriety in AA is much more 
substantial than simply not drinking. In fact, the term dry drunk is used to 
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refer to people who are no longer drinking, but are not fully sober because they 
are not "working" the steps to recovery. The related slogan is, "If you put down 
the bottle without picking up recovery, you don't have a drinking problem but 
you still have a thinking problem. "  Recovery in M is a process of removing 
such "character defects" as grandiosity, dishonesty (with oneself as well as with 
others) , self-pity, self-righteousness, rationalization, excessive anger, etc. 
Sobriety in M is holistic in nature, involving a state of spiritual, emotional and 
physical recovery. Quitting an addiction, then, can be a mechanism by which 
people become more authentic than they were prior to developing the addiction . 
Many kinds of crises strengthen character; addiction can certainly be one such 
crisis if the individual uses it to advance the project of living an authentic life .  
193 
Chapter Five: Implications or the Existential Model of Addiction 
The existential model of addiction combines features of addiction that are 
already familiar, but does so in an unusual way. The result has some 
important benefits and some interesting implications. The ramifications of this 
model appear in theorizing addiction and in philosophy. Furthermore , this 
model generates questions for addiction research. Finally, this model would 
change the practice of responding to addiction, both at the level of public health 
and in individual therapeutic settings. 
Thinking of addiction in terms of compulsion, habit, and authenticity has 
several advantages: it accords appropriate importance to the various features of 
addiction as the brain-disease model does not, and includes moral components 
for addiction in a way that is not harsh or overly judgmental. Furthermore, 
such a conception of addiction can include nonsubstance addictions, which are 
excluded from many disease models but share important experiential, 
etiological and therapeutic features with chemical addictions. Finally, an 
advantage of this framework is that it defines addiction with a notion of 
authenticity that acknowledges the social context of the authentic individual, 
which balances the respective roles of the individual and society. While 
conceiving of addiction in terms of authenticity does not - and is not meant to 
- preclude discussing it in neurological terms as well, authenticity is a better 
frame for the issue than neurology is. 
Defining addiction as "a compulsive habit that the individual does not 
endorse" has several advantages over calling addiction a brain disease . The 
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advantages include all the advantages of avoiding the disease models , which are 
discussed earlier in chapters two and three. It also eludes the disadvantages of 
the moral models, and allows for theory and practice, law and treatment, to be 
coherent. It accounts for the important features of addiction (e.g. neurological, 
social, experiential, etc.) and places the appropriate emphasis on each factor, 
rather than overemphasizing the physiological features, as I've argued that the 
disease models do. 
It should be noted that the existential model of addiction is compatible 
with much of the contemporary disease model. Neurological features of 
substance addictions can remain salient (though they are not essential) on this 
model, and there's nothing to say that addiction treatment cannot include 
drugs or other medical-model therapies. The important difference concerns the 
framing of the problem. Disease models put the emphasis on the wrong 
features of addiction. Doing so points us toward less effective treatment 
modalities, diminishes the volitional features of addiction, emphasizes cure 
rather than prevention, neglects nonsubstance addiction, and leads to 
inconsistencies between law and treatment . There is no single fix for so 
multidimensional a problem as addiction; but the most important lines of 
offense and defense are best indicated by the existential model. 
Theory 
There are a number of interesting implications for theorizing addiction 
that follow from this existential model of addiction. The scope of the present 
work allows for mention of just a few here; more careful analysis of these 
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should be undertaken in future. One such implication is that addiction can 
occur with both substances and non-substance related habits, because 
addiction occurs when a person does not endorse a compulsive habit - which 
need not involve substances. Another is that addiction would seem to be 
endemic in the contemporary United States. That is, on this model, an awful 
lot of us appear to be addicted to at least one thing, especially when 
nonsu bstance addictions are included. Thirdly, on this model addictions 
belong on a continuum with other habits. 
In addition to the implications for theorizing addiction, there are 
philosophical implications that follow from this model. One, concerning ethics, 
relates to the fact that it places the responsibility for addiction on both the 
individual and the social circumstances in which addiction was allowed to 
flourish. Another concerns rejecting the dilemma of freedom and determinism 
in favor of the notion of habit. 
The first implication for addiction theory is that addictions comprise a 
much broader set of behaviors than just substance abuse. While I will not go 
so far as Stanton Peele does and argue that addiction can occur with any 
potent experience, at the same time I am reluctant to place firm lines of 
demarcation on what can or cannot be the object of addiction. (That is, Peele 
may be right, but I will not explicitly defend his position here. ) It is important, 
however, to acknowledge that there are nonsubstance addictions - that 
addiction is not merely a metaphor when used to describe habitual compulsive 
gambling, eating, Internet use, and the like. Dividing addiction into substance 
and nonsu bstance addiction is sometimes useful, but since they share 
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important etiological and experiential similarities (angst and compulsion, 
respectively), they both ought to be classified as addictions. This broadening of 
the scope of addiction theory makes it more complete. Further, it should make 
addiction treatment more effective, because the similarities between addictions 
are highlighted. It helps explain, for example, why some people who eat 
compulsively break that habit by dieting and exercising compulsively, and why 
many people who stop smoking start overeating. Attending to the similarities 
between the various addictions should make II crossover" addiction less likely . 
The second theoretical implication of the existential model is that 
addictions would seem to be endemic, especially since compulsive, inauthentic 
habits can include such things as Internet use, video games, etc. as well as 
drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol . (It bears emphasizing that this model would not 
implicate all Internet use any more than it would implicate all alcohol use: only 
compulsive, unendorsed, habitual Internet use qualifies for an addiction.) 
Some will argue that this implication shows a wealmess in the model; that if 
everyone is an addict, the term loses its force. However, that needn't be the 
case. Obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the United States lately, but 
that doesn't weaken the term. Indeed, the CDC recently made a decision to use 
height and weight charts that are based on optimal height and weight instead of 
nonnal height and weight because normal (i.e. average) weight-to-height ratios 
have increased to the point that "normal" deviates significantly from "optimal" .  
Similarly, it does seem possible that more people than we might initially expect 
are involved with compulsive, inauthentic habits, and if this is the case, it does 
not minimize the degree to which it is a problem. An underlying assumption in 
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this argument is that addiction is not a natural or inevitable feature of the 
human condition, but that certain kinds of societies foster conditions in which 
addictions flourish. This claim has some indirect support in the work of Rollo 
May2B7 and in some addiction literature .288 As noted below, such an empirical 
assumption requires support from empirical research. 
Thirdly, a feature of this model that has both advantages and 
disadvantages is that addictions are at one end of the continuum of 
"unendorsed habit" . (Another continuum, comprising "endorsed habits," would 
not include addictions.) At the other end of this continuum are non-compulsive 
unendorsed habits. One advantage to this is that addiction admits of degrees; 
there is room in this description for minor addictions and severe addictions, 
which fits both intuitions about addiction and the experiences that many 
addicts report. Whether an addiction is minor or severe on this account 
depends more on the degree to which the habit is compulsive than the 
dangerousness of the addictive object. Thus, it is possible to have a minor 
heroin addiction, or a serious shopping addiction. The disadvantage is that is 
would be very difficult to say precisely on what place on the continuum a habit 
becomes an addiction. Everyone has habits, and everyone develops habits that 
they don't endorse. At what point is the inauthentic desire to indulge a habit 
properly called an addiction? At what point is it compulsive? However, this 
problem of indistinguishability plagues every continuum. The fact that there is 
287 May, The Meaning of Anxiety. 
2sssee, for example, Glendinning, My Name is Chellis and Im in Recovery from Western 
Civilization. 
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no universal criterion for deciding at what point blue turns to purple does not 
mean that we can't ever distinguish blue from purple. 
Some implications of this model are more broadly philosophical. For 
example, there are ethical implications related to the effect of placing 
responsibility on both individuals and the society in which they reside. The 
vision of human beings implicit in the existential model of addiction situates 
people in the context of other people, whereas traditional accounts of ethics 
tend to focus on the agent. (This is not to say that traditional accounts of 
ethics deny the interconnectedness of human beings; but simply that they do 
not emphasize it . )  This indicates that the social context is a morally relevant 
feature in determining a particular agent's responsibility. This subtle shift in 
the locus of responsibility has ramifications for both theoretical and applied 
ethics. We might, for example, hold that a decision that would be 
impermissible (or less permissible) if the agent had had sufficient social support 
might be permissible (or more permissible) if the agent was socially isolated and 
had no one to tum to for help. Members of the Donner party, who had to make 
ethically delicate decisions without the assistance of disinterested advisors, 
might be excused from their actions on the grounds that their isolation limited 
their ability to make such decisions. 
Finally, the existential model supports the trend of avoiding the freedom­
determinism dilemma. As mentioned in chapter one, a theory of freedom that is 
effective for discussing addiction will involve degrees of freedom, and will regard 
freedom as a process in which degrees of freedom can be gained or lost. 
Furthermore, such a theory of freedom will need to account for the role that 
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other people play in enhancing or inhibiting an individual's freedom. The idea 
that freedom varies from person to person is gaining popularity, as is using the 
notion of habit instead of one of the more traditional theories (i .e . , hard 
determinism, soft determinism, and libertarianism.) This model supports that 
trend, as well as lending it a rich source of examples. 
Research 
As for any theory, the existential model of addiction will require extensive 
research to corroborate, refute, and refine. There are challenges to doing 
research of this nature, due in part to the emphasis this model places on 
addicts' experiences. This emphasis would require researchers and clinicians 
to rely on addicts' self-reports and on the third-person, subjective reports of 
others. These data are harder to interpret and are less reliable than 
quantifiable data. Diseases are easier to investigate. However, there is the 
tradition of existential psychotherapy that can be drawn upon to help, together 
with the filed of phenomenological research. 
One claim that needs to be supported by empirical research is that 
addicts use their addictions to escape existential anxiety. A similar assertion is 
a staple in the paraprofessional and laical addiction literature; often in terms 
like "filling the void in one's life" , "loosening one up" , and "quieting one's 
demons" . Whether these descriptions can reasonably be interpreted as avoiding 
any reference to angst needs to be corroborated. Likewise, the frequency with 
which addicts (that is, people who seem to fit the profile of an addict on the 
existential model) report experiencing angst should be measured. If people who 
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intuitively strike us as addicts are not found to use their habit to relieve angst, 
this model will be weakened. Researchers should take care to look for angst 
prior to individuals' developing their addictions, since we don't want to mistake 
angst caused by addictions for angst that causes (or contributes to) addiction. 
Secondly, the assumption mentioned in the previous section on theory, 
that addiction is worse in societies that foster alienation, meaninglessness, and 
the like, bears some investigating. An obvious challenge in such research is 
how to determine whether another society is (or was) marked by high levels of 
angst (i .e., in which a high percentage of persons experience more angst than 
they can handle) . The dangers of revisionist history and ethnocentrism are 
apparent. However, careful research design can overcome these issues to a 
significant degree. If other societies with high levels of angst are not found to 
have high levels of addiction, this model is not necessarily disconfirmed, since 
on this model addiction is an inauthentic response to angst. However, such 
results would inspire additional research and analysis on the topic of 
authenticity and authentic responses to angst. 
Thirdly, there needs to be more research into the efficacy of treatment 
modalities that focus on habit and community supports, with psychotherapy 
and pharmacotherapy as ancillary, optional features. There are already some 
promising results to this effect, such as community reinforcement approach 
(CRA) and CRA with family therapy (CRAFT) studies. The cornerstone of this 
approach involves training addicts' family, friends, and others to offer positive 
social rewards when the addicts are sober (or "clean", as the case may be) but 
to withhold these when they are drunk or high. Other features of this approach 
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include rehearsing drink or drug refusal, relaxation techniques, disulfiram 
(Antabuse,) and counseling regarding employment and leisure, and so on. This 
approach compares favorably with other treatment methods. 289 Additional 
studies and support may make this effective approach a more popular 
treatment option. 
Fourthly, addiction research in general needs more long-term studies 
that evaluate treatment efficacy. Successful outcomes are usually evaluated on 
relapse within two years of completing treatment. Two years is a fine start, but 
it isn't enough. (Would we say that a treatment for cancer - or a program for 
rehabilitating criminals - was "successful" if remission only lasted two years?) 
Short-term successes can be extremely misleading, especially if they are 
followed by failures that are just out of range of past analyses. Approaches that 
follow from the existential model are likely to take more time to complete and be 
more effective in the long term. More longitudinal studies on approaches of all 
kinds are necessary for adequate comparison. 
Finally, I shall offer a word on an important limitation of neurological 
research. Neurological research unquestionably plays an important role in 
understanding addiction. The emphasis that the scientific community places 
on it, however, often leads the public (and, indeed, some of its own members) to 
misunderstand the role such research plays in understanding behavior. For 
example, author and nutrition activist Neal Barnard, M.D.  recently claimed that 
people aren't to blame for indulging in . . . cheese. Recently-conducted (but 
hitherto unpublished) research has revealed that casein, one of the proteins in 
289 Meyers and Miller, eds. A Community Reinforcement Approach to Addiction. 
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milk, produces "casomorphins" when digested. Thus, he argues, food is 
physically addictive and people should stop blaming themselves for overindulging 
in it. Dr. Barnard goes on to extend his support for lawsuits against 
McDonalds, asserting that "Big Food" ought to be held accountable for 
addiction to its products in the same way that "Big Tobacco" has been. This 
leap -- from noting the presence of a chemical that shares some features with 
opiates, to the moral claim that those who were unknowingly exposed to it are 
no longer responsible for their behavior -- needs little more than to be revealed 
in order to be refuted. 
It may well turn out that every substance and experience has some effect 
on the brain (indeed, it would be surprising to learn otherwise) . Such effects, of 
course, will vary widely. (Maybe there ARE casomorphins in cheese. Are we 
expected to believe that these "opiate-like substances" are as powerful as 
heroin? as morphine? or merely as . . .  cheese?) Such information will, 
doubtless , be interesting and useful. For example, there will be some surprises, 
as when it was discovered that cocaine and marijuana don't produce tolerance 
and withdrawal symptoms (and thus could not be considered "classically" 
addictive. )  A better sense of how clifferen t variables affect our brains will enrich 
our understanding of addiction. As with all empirical research, however, how to 
assign praise and blame will remain outside the scope of science. 
Practice 
The existential model states that addiction is an inauthentic response to 
angst. It follows from this model that treatment for addiction should include 
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measures aimed at strengthening authenticity and reducing angst to 
manageable levels. The implications of this are far-reaching; the most complete 
interpretation involves a fundamental change in contemporary American life. 
The edict to change society so that it fosters meaning in order to ameliorate 
addiction is overwhelming. The aim of the claim is not to suggest that there's no 
treatment short of the revolution, but rather that the existential model indicates 
an important component of treatment, both at the individual level and at the 
public-health level. At the public-health level, it is worth remembering that ER 
physicians were among those who campaigned for seat-belt laws; by extension, 
it may be that addiction healers should advocate other kinds of social reform 
that can be expected to alleviate addiction rates. At the individual level, an 
important component of each addict's personal treatment approach should be 
to find central activities that are meaningful and inoculate against addiction. 
This claim is supported by a number of sources, not the least of which are John 
Dewey, Herbert Fingarette, and clinicians who use the community 
reinforcement approach. Finally, the existential model makes room for the 
possibility of facilitated authenticity - discussed later in this chapter - as a 
treatment strategy. Facilitated authenticity, a kind of Ulysses contract, aims at 




If it is the case that certain social contexts tend to promote addiction, 
then it makes sense to say that an important course of addiction "treatment" is 
to nurture those social contexts that inoculate people against addiction. 
Just as researchers responded to the high incidence of dog bites in Garfield 
Park, Chicago by putting pressure on city officials to round up feral dogs ( as 
noted in chapter three), we need to root out the factors that promote 
experiences such as meaninglessness and isolation, which (I have argued) are 
fundamental causes of addiction. This task will be far more difficult than 
rounding up feral dogs, for several reasons. Perhaps the biggest challenge to 
doing this is that contemporary American society is focused on earning and 
entertainment - which, as discussed in chapter four, are too self-focused to 
provide life with meaning. Another significant challenge is that it is not clear as 
to how to go about changing society in ways that promote meaning. ("Step One: 
Change the World. Step Two: ...  ") A third challenge is promoting authenticity 
as a value without resorting to the kinds of marketing techniques that would 
ensure its failure. (New from Milton Bradley: Meaningful Dialogue TM -- The 
game that promotes Interpersonal Connection!)  The solutions to these 
challenges lie in such diverse arenas as neighborhood planning, spirituality and 
religion, economic and environmental justice, education, and a host of others. 
Changing the social climate that contributes to meaninglessness will be 
met with much resistance - both from those who stand to lose money and 
power with such change, and from those who have a "good enough" life for now 
and can't see the possibility of anything better. An even more obvious problem 
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is that meaning is highly individualized: it would be impossible to impose one 
particular source of meaning on everyone and expect people to be fulfilled. 
Even so, there are forces that rob many people of meaning in their lives. Erich 
Fromm29°, Herbert Marcuse29 1 , Chellis Glendinning292 and others have written 
forceful accounts of this phenomenon. While we cannot (and should not 
attempt to) instill each person's life with meaning for them, it does seems 
plausible that a socially responsible society should try to remove obvious 
barriers to sources of meaning for its members. As noted in the beginning of 
chapter four, barriers to meaning include isolation from family and friends 
(exacerbated by our "mobile" society) alienation from one's work, living 
disaffected from the sources of what sustains us, and the generally self-focused 
nature of our culture today. With nothing more impressive or important to 
believe in than ourselves, meaning becomes hard to find. Expanding our sense 
of community is a good place to start. 
Therapeutic 
Stanton Peele agrees that the most effective solutions to addiction reside 
in communities. Case in point is the story of Chet, a man with a 10-year 
history of alcoholism and homelessness. One day, he started helping some kids 
at a community center with basketball, something for which he had real talent. 
The community center director offered him the opportunity to referee games 
and help out during practice at a boys' club, but told him that he had to be 
sober to do it. The first time he showed up drunk, she asked him to leave -
290 Erich Fromm. The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1955.) 
29 1 Herbert Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.) 
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but to come back sober to the next game. He did, and he showed up on time and 
sober for the rest of the season. When the director congratulated him and 
remarked that she had not thought that he could stay sober for that long, he 
replied, "I never had any reason to before."293 Chet's life was lacking in 
meaning, and the only thing that mattered to him was drinking. Trying to get 
him to stop drinking without there being some other thing in his life to make it 
worthwhile would be futile, maybe even cruel. We all need something to live for, 
after all, even if it is nothing but the next drunk. When he had something to do 
that was important to him, he rose to the challenge. 
Trying to get people to quit their addictions without replacing the 
addiction with something that will give life meaning is a little like trying to give 
birth with no drugs, but neither with any of the other methods used to relieve 
childbirth pain used in "natural" childbirth. Simply taking the drugs away 
won't do it. A drug-free birth needs a variety of techniques - immersion in 
water, Lamaze breathing, walking, etc. etc. - to facilitate labor and relieve 
enough of the pain to make childbirth bearable for the mother. These methods 
should be selected by the mother, according to her preferences and needs. 
Similarly, a drug-free (and other addiction-free) life needs a variety of features 
that facilitate the flourishing of the individual and relieve enough of the pain to 
make life bearable. And similarly, these features should be selected by the 
individual, according to her preferences and needs. One other similarity is that 
both childbirth and life itself involve unavoidable pain. In both cases, the pain 
is not a desirable end in itself, but focusing primarily on avoiding it interferes 
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more with the process than accepting the inevitability of some pain and 
learning to deal with it effectively. 
Peele also rejects the notion of powerlessness as used by AA; he believes 
that alcoholics do in fact have the power not to drink (or to drink moderately) 
and that telling them that they are powerless, even over just this one feature of 
their lives, is disrespectful and ultimately destructive . The connection between 
powerlessness (which he rejects) and life projects (which he embraces) is a kind 
of balanced sense of one's own importance. Contra Peele, I suggest that AA's 
theme of powerlessness is important, because of the way it relates not only to 
drinking (for the alcoholic) but to facticity (for all of us.) Being sober requires 
working toward serenity. (Sobriety in AA, as I've mentioned, is not merely not 
drinking; it includes rigorous personal honesty, service to others, and other 
principles.) Serenity, as in the Serenity Prayer, dutifully recited at 1 2-step 
meetings of all kinds, involves accepting the things one cannot change. A 
version of this kind of powerlessness can be understood to facilitate a balanced 
humility, which contributes to one's capacity to find meaning in life, and thus 
affords some protection against addition. 
Facilitated Authenticity 
I use the term "facilitated authenticity" to describe a therapeutic 
consideration that has implications for both public health and clinical settings. 
If addiction is a compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse, and if 
addiction limits authenticity by creating powerful desires that conflict with 
individuals' endorsed desires, it follows that a central component of addiction 
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treatment should attempt to restore addicted individuals' authenticity. To that 
end, paternalistic responses to addiction may be permissible if they are used as 
methods of enhancing individuals' authenticity (as opposed to merely 
controlling their behavior "for their own good") .  Such paternalistic methods, I 
suggest, should be put into place only at the request of the individual, and 
should be (at least potentially) temporary. Voluntarily placing certain 
limitations on one's own liberty can be a useful tool in the project of enhancing 
the authenticity of one's life . 
There are some interesting implications of this description of addiction. 
Ordinarily, in terms of the law and medical policy we assume that addicted 
persons are competent to make their own decisions. Addicts who are in 
treatment, unless they have been placed there by the courts, are free to sign 
themselves out of treatment. They have, in the past, been considered 
competent to consent to being research subjects (although Louis Charland's 
recent work, "Cynthia's dilemma," questions addicts' competence to be research 
subjects that involve their addiction.) They continue to have access to the 
object(s) of their addiction; alcoholics may have their drivers' licenses revoked, 
but their right to drink remains intact. Because we are loath to interfere with 
competent adults' decisions, we do not interfere with addicted persons' 
decisions about their addictive objects, unless they cross legal boundaries. 
Some kinds of paternalistic actions may be justified in responding to 
addicted persons on the grounds of enhancing authenticity. While any mention 
of paternalism should be considered with great caution and attention to 
protecting the liberty of individuals, it is also important to guard against 
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abandoning those in need of help. The moral tension between abandoning 
addicted persons and infringing on their liberty can be mediated by an interest 
in promoting the authenticity of the individual . 
Paternalism is morally questionable because it does not respect the 
autonomy of the individual. However, addiction interferes with the authenticity, 
and therefore the autonomy, of the individual. I suggest that paternalistic 
responses that take the form of contracts made with an addicted person's 
authentic desires in mind reflect greater value for personal autonomy than do 
responses that privilege an addict' s stated (but inauthentic) desires. The use of 
such moral devices as Ulysses contracts can be authenticity preserving, 
especially in contexts such as addiction. Indeed, the use of drugs such as 
Antabuse, which makes individuals sick if they drink alcohol after having taken 
the drug, rests on a similar moral principle. Privileging decisions that an 
individual makes autonomously is respecting the authentic desires of the 
individual. An addicted person who is developing her authentic self may need 
additional support for her autonomous choices. Examples of this kind of 
support might include not allowing persons in treatment for addiction to sign 
themselves out of treatment, or limiting access to addictive objects to addicted 
persons (e.g. substances, credit cards, etc .) 
Responses like this should not be adopted in any kind of automatic 
fashion; and certainly not without the addicted person's agreement and 
endorsement. However, some addicts do wish that someone would impose a 
mechanism they could use to get a better grip on themselves and their more 
authentic desires. For such persons, paternalism in the short run may be a 
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valuable tool in enhancing authenticity in the long run. Facilitated authenticity 
is intended to be a temporary measure that strengthens individuals and is to be 
removed so they can flourish on their own. 
Conclusion 
The dissertation has made a case for rejecting the popular disease model 
of addiction, as well as the less popular moral model of addiction, in favor of a 
model that emphasizes compulsion, habit, and authenticity. Since 
disadvantages of the moral and the disease models of addiction have been 
discussed at some length in earlier chapters, I'll mention them only briefly here . 
Disease models absolve the addict of responsibility. They absolve the 
community of responsibility. They suggest medical (mostly pharmaceutical) 
cures, which have not been shown to be effective in the long run. They 
stigmatize as much as, albeit differently than, moral models of addiction. They 
lend themselves more to curing addiction rather than preventing it. They 
promote an "identity of disease" for people who struggle with addictions. 
Finally, consistent adherence to disease models would lead to unworkable 
social policies: for example , alcoholics who drive under the influence of alcohol, 
if they are truly in the grip of a disease, ought to be treated differently in the 
legal system than people who just happen to be driving drunk - which seems 
counterintuitive . On the other hand, moral models of addiction absolve the 
community of responsibility. They stigmatize addicts and make them less likely 
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to seek help. They do not recognize the force addictions have over the 
individual. They are overly judgmental and harsh. 
In contrast, calling addiction a compulsive habit that the individual does 
not endorse neither stigmatizes addicts not absolves them. It places 
responsibility for developing the habits in question on individuals and their 
communities, and places responsibility for changing those habits in the same 
places, rather than placing it in the hands of the medical establishment and 
pharmaceutical companies. This description logically points to solutions that 
are effective in both stopping and preventing addiction. 
Theory and practice can be more coherent on this existential account of 
addiction. As Jon Elster points out in his Strong Feelings, the DSM-IV defines 
substance dependence as the copresence of any three of seven defining 
features.294 He argues that this description is theoretically unworkable, but is 
adequate for the more pragmatic concerns of diagnosis and treatment.295 I 
argued in chapter three that this kind of gap between theory and practice is 
tolerated in addiction world, but to the peril of those involved.296 Competing 
conceptions of addiction at the level of theory and practice lead to 
inconsistencies in social policy and treatment. There is no virtue in diagnostic 
criteria that are misleadingly clear. 
Another reason to frame addiction as a compulsive habit rather than as a 
disease or a moral failing is that to do so humanizes addiction. The moral and 
scientific contributions to the discussion must be used judiciously, and in ways 
294 American Psychiatric Association. Di.agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Di.sorders, 4th edition. p. 18 1 .  
29s Elster, Strong Feelings p. 59 . 
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that do not divide the different features of human existence (e.g. neurology, 
spirituality, psychology, etc .) Understanding addiction as part of a continuum 
of behavior - not "a disease that can strike anyone arbitrarily", nor a sin, nor a 
vice - makes addicts and their problems understandable , accessible, less alien. 
Finally - and perhaps most importantly - this description accounts for 
the most important features of addiction, and places appropriate emphasis on 
each factor. The essential features of addiction, as I suggest in chapter three, 
are experiential and behavioral . Moral models of addiction focus on how 
addicts affect others - an important feature to be sure, but certainly not the 
most important feature of addiction. If the effect that addicts have on society 
were the most important feature of addiction, then the idea of addiction as such 
would disappear, melding into a variety of other obnoxious, anti-social or illegal 
behaviors. The notion of well-behaved addicts would be nonsensical, and yet 
there certainly do seem to be people who suffer with addictions but cause no 
legal or social trouble. Disease models focus on the brains of addicts, which, as 
I argue in chapter three, misses the point. The essential features of the 
experience of compulsion, the force of habit as a motivating factor of behavior, 
and the conflict of desires that addiction produces deserve the most attention, 
while other features are simply supporting cues or calls to pay attention for the 
essential features of addiction. 
296 Chapter Three, page 28. 
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